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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
PROBLEMS
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, growth pole theories were
widely accepted by both regional planners and governments and also by both
industrialized and developing countries.
Regional planning doctrine in the 1950s and 1960s
revolved essentially around the idea of growth centers.
It was, basically, an entrancing notion that had gained
plausibility from its common-sense appeal. Wasn't
economic growth a result of industrialization? And
weren't industries found concentrated in locations that
favored further accumulation? And wasn't it true that
these burgeoning centers of progress helped to spread
jobs and income over wider and wider areas, until the
entire national space was integrated into a single
market area? (Friedmann and Weaver, 1979, p. 172).
The essence of this idea was that regional disparities could be
reduced and regional development could be accelerated at once through
concentrating investment at growth poles or centers which had a potential
for economic growth. But, according to Higgins (1982), "[b]y the ends of
1970s the same planners who had so eagerly seized upon the concept some
years earlier had almost totally and unanimously rejected it" (p. V,
.
New streams of development doctrine evolved and new paradigms in
regional planning began to replace old ones. According to Friedmann and
Weaver (1979), territorial regional planning offers a better alternative
to the task of promoting regional development. "Territorial development
simply refers to the use of an area's resources by its residents to meet
their own needs. The main definitives of these needs are regional
culture, political power, and economic resources" (Weaver, 1981, p. 93).
Another alternative paradigm was introduced by Stohr and Taylor
(1981). They have tried to suggest an alternative approach to reduce
regional inequalities in developing countries and have identified two
basic approaches: development from above; development from below. Accor-
ding to Gore (1984), "[t]hey [territorial development and development from
below] arise from the perceived failure of the strategy of accelerated
industrialization" (p. 161). And both two approaches attempt:
to reverse the 'urban bias' in current planning prac-
tice, to promote greater equality and the satisfaction
of the 'basic needs' of the majority of the population,
to re-establish local and regional communities, and to
avoid the centralization of economic and political
decision-making (Gore, 1984, p. 161).
In this evolution of regional development doctrines, one of the
overriding issues was whether those development doctrines which were
modeled after the development process of the U.S. and Western Europe would
(could) be applied well to the developing or underdeveloped countries
(Gore, 1984, pp. 169-71, 249-51; Friedmann and Weaver, 1979, p. 143, 172;
Penouil, 1981, pp. 3-17; Hilhorst, 1981, pp. 139-69).
One possible explanation about this issue is that there is no
general theory which will enable us to deal with all cases and all objec-
tives. "The theory of polarization has been established by referring to
the model observable in Western Europe." Thus, "the idea of reconstitu-
ting in developing countries is certainly tempting, but this is to assume
a control over the factors which shaped that polarization. But this
condition is rarely fulfilled in developing countries" (Penouil, 1981, p.
8). On the other hand, one may want to suspend judgment on this issue
until there is more evidence of applicability to the conditions of deve-
loping countries. Rather, no one could readily discard Hilhorst's stric-
tures on modes of operation which bear more resemblance to improvisation
than to planning (Hilhorst, 1971).
Although it may be possible to generalize several countries'
experiences into very broad terms, a more important attempt would be to
understand particular institutional forms and values of individual coun-
tries, which were produced in response to their specific cultural and
environmental inheritance. Their weakness and strength in terms of appli-
cability in different soils (countries) will be more explicitly revealed
by way of comparing different conditions. This argument provides room
for comparative study on regional policy in developed countries.
Under the general premises which were discussed so far, this paper
will compare regional policies in the United States and in the United
Kingdom in order to suggest an answer to the conventional question in
regional policy: How differences in the structure of countries, in the
country size and in the specific phase of national development could
produce different types of regional policies in different times.
This is an attempt to find indigenous policies in each country. And
their weakness and strength will also be analyzed by way of identifying
similarities and differences in regional policies between two countries.
Scope of Study
There can be several ways in which specific policies are analyzed.
The first one may be to follow the political process of policy formula-
tion. This way usually posits several phases in policy development:
perception/definition of problem, measurement of problem,
organization/representation/agenda setting of problem, formulation, imple-
mentation, and evaluation of policies (Charles Jones, 1984, p. 29).
Another mode of analysis intends to identify policy's goals and
objectives, its formal mechanic and its strategies, tools and instruments.
This paper will adopt both two ways in its analysis of regional
policy in the United States and in the United Kingdom. The main subjects
of comparison will be goals, objectives, strategies, tools, and measures
of regional policies in both countries. But description of policy will
follow those several phases in policy development.
The first chapter will review regional development theories with
emphasis on identifying causes of regional problems. The second one turns
to regional problems and problem regions in both countries. Main focus
will be put on evolution and scope of regional problems, trends and
characteristics
.
In the third chapter, this paper will discuss about how each govern-
ment has perceived regional problems. Regional problems may convey diffe-
rent meanings to each government. Thus, this chapter will focus on values
and institutions which have shaped regional policies in each country.
This will lead to compare the goals and objectives of policies.
The main topics of the fourth chapter will be: policy measures for
regional development, comparative merits of different policies, and
overall effects on spatial structure.
Each chapter will have its own comparison of the two countries. And
in the final chapter they will be summarized.
The focusing statement of this study will be based on examining past
experiences of regional policies in the United States and in the United
Kingdom. This study will follow a descriptive process by deferring to the
historical-analytical literatures in the field of regional policy.
Definitions
Regional Policy
Any policy has its own goals (objectives), strategies and policy
tools or instruments. In order to identify these three components, this
paper will first examine several definitions of regional policy, which are
taken from the literature. A regional policy:
1. deals with the locational aspects, the where of economic develop-
ment. It reflects the need to deal with regional problems at the
national level (Friedmann, 1966, pp. 5-8).
2. is concerned with the existence and amelioration of regional
disparities in economic prosperity and growth, notably, between
the relatively prosperous South East and the economically lagging
peripheral regions of Wales, Northern England and Scotland
(Keeble, 1976, p. 206).
3. can be defined as those that are geographically limited in their
scope and that are explicitly designed to spur the economic
growth of certain regions (or limit the growth of other regions)
in order to reduce interregional disparities in employment oppor-
tunities and income levels and thus to stem interregional migra-
tion (Sundquist and Mields, 1979, p. 305).
4. includes all public intervention intended to ameliorate the
geographical distribution of economic activities; in reality
regional policy tries to correct certain spatial consequences of
the free market economy in order to achieve two interrelated
objectives: economic growth and improved social distribution
(Vanhove and Klassen, 1980, p. 43).
The above examples lead to the following conclusion: goals of policies are
concerned with economic growth and social redistribution (equity and
efficiency). Policy measures may comprise all public interventions, of
which impacts are geographically limited in their scope. In other words,
regional policy measures are discriminatory among regions. Strategies
will vary according to the attached importance on equity or efficiency.
Thus this paper will discuss those policies which have several
characteristics discussed above. But there are still more things to be
clarified. In order to put a more clear focus on this paper, three
different types of regional policies will be explained.
a. Physical policy / Economic policy
Different types of regional policy can be distinguished on the basis
of the nature and scope of the policy activity: physical policy or land
use policy; economic policy. This study will mainly deal with regional
economic policies in both countries.
b. Interregional policy / Intra-reglonal policy
The term, regional policy, can be used to refer to planning the use
of resources and development of activities within a region (intra-regional
policy) and to planning the distribution of resources and activities
between regions (interregional policy). In this study, focus will be laid
on the interregional policy in both countries.
c. Implicit policy / Explicit policy
Regional policy is defined very broadly as an activity by public
agencies which affects regional development. It includes explicit poli-
cies expressed in legislative plans as well as the unstated, implicit and
often unintended ones. Almost by definition most countries have an impli-
cit policy. The actions of government influence patterns of regional
development. In this study, focus will be put on the explicit policy in
both countries, but implicit policy will also be discussed.
Regions
There can be several definitions of regions which have been the
subject of regional analysis. As far as this paper is concerned with case
studies of government policies which have been actually implemented, this
paper will analyze those regions which have been employed in policy formu-
lation. Usually, the U.S. literatures analyze regions according to the
classification of Census Divisions and Regions (Figure 1.1). The U.K. has
several experiences of rescheduling their boundaries of regions. But
regional boundaries which were set according to the reorganization of
local government in 1974 will be used in this study (Figure 1.2).
Figure 1.1: Census Regions and Divisions of the United States
Source: U.S. Bureau of Census
Figure 1.2: Standard and New Standard Regions of the United Kingdom
Source: Law, C. 1980, British Regional Development since World War I,
(London: Methuen), p. 29, Figure 5.
CHAPTER II
REGIONAL PROBLEMS AND PROBLEM REGIONS
A policy process usually begins with perception and definition of
public problems. This stage will be followed by measurement and interpre-
tation of problems before formulating policies. (Charles Jones, 1984,
pp. 29-39).
The very essence of a region is its interdependence with others.
"Regions are not self-contained nor independent of one another" (Hoover,
1975, p. 275). An assessment of regional problems must contain a
theoretical review of the process of how regions grow and stagnate and how
regions interact with each other. This will help us identify the reasons
why problems evolve and why market forces may not solve them. This chap-
ter will review several regional development theories which might be
relevant to long-term interregional development trends in the United
States and in the United Kingdom. Main focus will be put on their policy
implications. And then this paper will discuss regional problems and
problem regions with emphasis on the causes of regional problem.
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT THEORIES
Neoclassical Models
1
Under certain conditions neoclassical models demonstrate that
factor flows from low-to-high return regions until factor returns are
equalized in each region. High wages are associated with low returns to
capital and high returns to capital are obtained in low wage regions.
Labor will flow from low to high wage regions and capital will flow in the
opposite direction.
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This model reveals a convergence in regional per capita incomes.
Borts and Stein (1964) explained the process of income convergence
in the United States by using this model. They correlated returns to the
machinery sector in the states of New England and with the rest of the
United States. From the results of their analysis, they concluded that:
the relative rate of growth was positively and signifi-
cantly correlated with the realised rate of return. Sec-
tors which had the highest profitabilities for expansion
did, in fact, expand most rapidly. The 'invisible hand'
led the regional firms in the direction of competitive
equilibrium. The result is the more remarkable inasmuch
as it occurred in the machinery industry, where atomistic
competition is not universal. (Borts and Stein, 1964, p.
145).
Cumulative Causation Models
While neoclassical models emphasize regional income convergence,
this model predicts regional income divergence. Myrdal (1957) was one of
the first to suggest this point of view:
That there is a tendency inherent in the freeplay of
market forces to create regional inequalities, and that
this tendency becomes more dominant the poorer a country
is, are two of the most important laws of economic deve-
lopment and underdevelopment under laissez-faire. (Myr-
dal, 1957, p. 34).
According to these theories, market forces tend to concentrate in
certain locations with increasing return to scale. Once this pattern of
agglomeration rtarts in a particular center, then that region develops its
own momentum of growth through the process of cumulative causation. There
can be "spread" and "backwash" effects of the economy between lagging and
growing regions. But, according to Myrdal, continuous growth of growing
regions will occur at the expense of lagging regions due to dominance of
backwash effects over spread ones (p. 27).
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Neoclassical models imply that the competitive forces of the market
create an optimal spatial allocation of resources. But cumulative causa-
tion models posit that intervention measures are necessary to ensure
regional equality. These two models imply a quite different range and
scale of government intervention in the process of interregional
development. Harry Richardson (1984) explained this:
The neoclassical models suggest the need to eliminate
barriers to the mobility of both labor and capital and
the use of taxes and subsidies to change the relative
prices of inputs among regions, especially in the pre-
sence of externalities . The cumulative causation
theories are consistent with strategies to promote
agglomeration economies in lagging regions (e.g.,
growth center policies), measures to reduce efficiency
wages (e.g., wage subsidies to labor in backward
regions), and capital incentives to boost productivity
growth. (Richardson, 1984, p. 23).
Trickling Down and Polarization Effects
Albert Hirschman (1958) examined the process "how growth could be
communicated from one region to another" (1975, p. 139). His work on the
interregional transmission of economic growth reveals that there is a
relationship between regional inequality and the process of national
development, (pp. 139-151).
The growth of growing regions (the North) will have direct economic
repercussions on lagging regions (the South) in terms of "trickling down"
and "polarization effects". Favorable trickling down effect of the North
occurs through rising demand for the products of the South and increasing
investment in the South. Polarization effects arise because Southern
economic activities become depressed as a result of Northern competition
and because "the North denudes the South of its key technicians and mana-
gers as well as of the more enterprising young men" (p. 144). In the
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first stage of national development the polarization effects will dominate
over the trickling down effects, causing increased regional disparities.
But, "increasing congestion" (agglormeration diseconomies) of the North
and "deliberate economic policy" will come into play to correct this
situation in the latter stage of development, thereby decreasing regional
disparities, (p. 146).
Jeffrey Williamson (1965) analyzed the relationship between regional
inequalities and the process of national development. He used internatio-
nal data on regional income disparities in twenty-four countries in the
1950s in order to test the hypothesis: " the early stage of national
development generates increasingly large North-South income differentials;
somewhere during the course of development, some or all of the disequilib-
rating tendencies diminish, causing a reversal in the pattern of inter-
regional inequality" (p. 164). His findings support the pattern of income
divergence and convergence as follows:
This concludes our investigation into the nature of
regional dualism. What we have done thus far is to
simply describe the nature of the so-called "North-South
problem," giving particular attention to the relationship
between regional dualism and national economic develop-
ment. There is a consistent relationship between the
two: rising regional income disparities and increasing
North-South dualism is typical of early development stage
while regional convergence and a disappearance of severe
North-South problems is typical of the more mature stages
of national growth and development. (Williamson, 1965, p.
199).
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Export Base and Sector Models
The idea of "export-base" was first used by city planners (Andrews,
1953, pp. 161-67). They distinguish between the export and service compo-
nent of employment within a region in order to predict the local popula-
tion growth. Employment in the export and service sectors is recursively
related to population growth within the region. Thus, the primary so^ce
of regional growth depends on export demand.
Douglass North (1955) applied this idea to understand long-term
regional economic changes. He proposed that regional economic growth
takes place in response to exogenous demand for products. A given in-
crease in demand for exports resulted in multiplier effects, inducing
increased investment not only in the export industry, but in the other
economic activities as well.
"Sector theory views regional economic growth as an internal evolu-
tion of specialization and division of labor." (Emerson and Lamphear,
1975, p. 132). Thus economic growth depends on how resources are shifted
out of agriculture into manufacturing and service activities. Differen-
tial rates of productivity growth in those sectors resulted in shifts of
labor and capital.
"Like export base model, sectoral stage of regional development
model has also numerous deficiencies as a satisfactory theory of regional
2
growth ." But earlier debate on those two models between Charles Tiebout
and North shows that these two models complement each other in explaining
regional growth.
15
Growth Pole Theory
This theory cannot be explained in a few phrases. This comes from
semantic confusions which resulted from arbitrary adoption or application
of Perroux's aspatial ideas into spatial context. In Perroux's vocab-
ulary, 'growth pole' originally referred to leading industries (propulsive
industries) that were highly interconnected with other sectors of the
economy. But when it was applied to geographical space, a growth pole
became "a set of expanding industries located in an urban area and induc-
ing further development of economic activity throughout its zone of
influence" (Boudeville, 1966, p. 11). Later, the growth pole concept was
more generalized to mean several diversities: "It refers sometimes to
larger development regions that include centers and sometimes to specific
industry complexes, activities, or even single large installations that
play a strategic role in sparking new development" (Hoover, 1975, p. 276).
Gore (1984) explained this point:
Once growth pole is defined in purely spatial terms, it
is possible to bring any body of theory, whether neo-
classical, Schumpeterian, dualist, dependista, sociologi-
cal or political, to bear on the understanding of the
spatial relationships between growing centers and their
linked hinterlands. And thus 'growth pole theory' has
become and electric synthesis of ideas which relate to
the behavior of different types of 'growth pole' but
which have no necessary coherence in terms of their
underlying assumptions about how growth or development
occurs (Charles Gore, 1984, p. 92).
Richardson (1984, p. 19) also expressed similar views that "the
growth pole theory is not very helpful to explanations of interregional
trends in regional development". He also expressed two reasons for his
views:
There are two problems. First
,
the growth pole is
almost invariably conceived as an intraregional phenome-
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non functioning in the context of its hinterland.
Second, the growth pole or growth center is a link bet-
ween theory and regional policy much more than an obvious
component of regional development theory. (Richardson,
1984, p. 20).
Meso-Economic Power in Regional Development
There can be little doubt that corporate organization may interfere
with the way of resource allocation between regions. Their decisions,
behavior and responses to government policies have increasingly provided
institutional settings in which regions grow or stagnate. Considering
these observations, Gunter Krumme finds that "regional development theory
as formulated over the past two decades has been highly abstract and
aggregate in nature, largely ignoring institutional and organizational
constraints, idiosyncracies, and impulses" (1981, p. 164).
Stuart Holland (1976) is one of those who have written about the
effects that large-scale enterprise has upon regional development (Firn,
1975; Westaway, 1974; Massey, 1979). He defines giant companies as "meso-
economic firms that are multi-product, multi-company and multi-national
enterprises, whose size and spr?ad span the gap between micro and macro-
economics" (1976, p. 29). His analysis about the behavior of the meso-
economic firms, and its impact on regional development goes as follows:
This domination of particular markets by meso-economic
companies has major regional implications which have been
ignored by the exponents of regional self-balance theory.
The historical location of such leading firms in national
markets has tended to be in the more developed regions
and areas. This is not simply an inconvenient coinci-
dence. These regions and areas have become more deve-
loped because of the expansion of output and demand by
such firms, and the income and employment in ancillary
services and distribution developed by them. Many less-
developed regions, by the same token, have remained less
developed through their lower share of such leading com-
panies. (Holland. 1976, p. 29).
17
To offset the regional inequality, Holland suggested the need to
"harness the meso-economic firms in the interest of problem regions" (p.
121). Policy measures range from direct control on location decision to
state participation in production in growth industries. According to John
Friedmann and Clyde Weaver (1979), "with this proposal, he [Holland]
stated what is likely to become the major theme in regional development
during the coming decades" (p. 174).
REGIONAL PROBLEMS
Regions in Economic Distress
The process of industrialization has favored concentration of popu-
lation and economic activities in urban areas. Economic development in
urban areas has increased national wealth and created greater employment
opportunities. At the same time, rapid increase in agricultural producti-
vity reduced the necessary employment in rural areas. There was a push
3
and pull of population between urban and rural areas . This situation was
reflected in out-migration or high level of unemployment in rural areas.
Rural regions began to be classified as underdeveloped or backward
regions.
It was not only the rural areas that pushed outmigrants. Technolo-
gical development in the manufacturing sector has made some of older
industries obsolete. According to Everett Lee, "a characteristic of
modern economies is the quick exploitation of newly developed resources or
knowledge, a process that requires the abandonment of old enterprises
along with the development of the new", (quoted from Peter Morrison, 1975,
p. 221). This process of modernization has produced a new type of problem
region, those whose economies are heavily based on declining
18
industries which are beginning to shed their population. They appeared to
have failed to make an adjustment to changing economic situations.
Thus regions in economic distress were those "whose primary indus-
tries had failed to keep pace, whose economy was technologically
backward," (Friedman and Weaver, 1979, p. 143), and those whose access to
major markets were interrupted by physical remoteness. These regions had
several common characteristics which were unfavorable to economic growth:
the highly selective migration movement denudes those regions of most
skilled workers; local markets are too small to gain internal economies of
scale; public facilities are too old to be utilized for growth.
Pressured Regions
Economic growth and urbanization have also produced another type of
problem regions: pressured regions or over-developed regions. Urban
places have more advantages than rural areas in regard to quality and
quantity of public services that contribute to savings in production
cost. This advantage stems largely from the relative cheaper cost per
person for providing services. These are one type of agglomeration econo-
mies, which means "the cost savings to a firm accruing because of the
scale of industry in a particular conurbation or region, and the resultant
ability of the firms to share some of its external expenses with others".
(David Keeble, 1976, p. 59).
Although geographical concentration of activities in one place
4
produce several types of agglomeration economies
, the relationships bet-
ween these economies and the scale of concentration (city size) is not
known (Jarvin Emerson and Charles Lamphear, 1975, p. 107). Controversies
over minimum and maximum city size revealed this fact. But most approac-
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hes to ideal city size have stressed the presumed diseconomies of 'Jiban
scale: external diseconomies (such as added cost of public services,
congestion and environmental pollution) make cities uneconomical as places
to produce or to live. These have been the justifiable reasons for con-
taining of urban growth. More examples for external diseconomies are as
follows:
Inflationary pressures within the growing metropolitan
areas as the demands of the growing metropolitan popula-
tions press upon scarce local resources, these infla-
tionary pressures being ultimately transmitted throughout
the whole system by nationally organized trade unions,
regardless of local differences in productivity and in
costs-of-living (Cameron, 1979, p. 376).
Measurement of Problems
<
Regional policy is concerned with the existence and amelioration of
regional disparities or inequalities. And these are normally measured by
the rate of unemployment, income per head and outmigration. Most litera-
tures on regional policy regard high unemployment and low income as major
problem indices in identifying problem regions. Leo Klassen (1965, p. 30)
has classified four types of regions according to income level and the
rate of change of income (Table 2.1).
According to John Glasson (1978) "the advantage of the Klassen
approach is its emphasis on dynamic characteristics of regional problems,
identifying not only the prosperous regions and the 'hard core' problem
regions, but also regions that are developing out of problem situations
and others that are facing potential declines" (p. 171). Several other
literatures suggested diversified or dynamic criteria in identifying
problem regions (Hunt Commission, 1969; Kraft et al., 1971). But, as far
as there are no a priori standards for the ideal type of spatial develop -
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Table 2.1: Klassen Typology of Problem Areas
Income level compared
to the national level
Rate of increase in income compared High Low
to the national rate of increase (>1) (<1)
High (>1) I Prosperity area II Distressed
area in
process of
develop-
ment
Low (<1) III Declining Pros- IV Distressed
perity area area
(potential dis-
tress)
Source: Klassen, L., (1965) Area Social and Economic Development, , OECD.
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raent, distressed areas are usually defined and identified in comparison
with other regions or with the country as a whole. Reliance on comparison
has caused more controversy on the regional problem itself. The next
section will discuss those controversies.
Geographical Division of Problem Regions
There are several techniques that have been used in the measurement
of regional income inequality: the relative mean deviation; the standard
deviation; the Lorenz and Gini curves; and measures of entrophy. These
statistics are all calculated by way of comparison with the national mean.
But, according to William Alonso (1971, p. 45), "a fine-grained regionali-
zation will result in higher measures of inequality than one that is
coarse-grained. The same index of inequality for the United States
computed by state will be lower than if computed by county because much
of the intercounty variation is averaged out when the larger unit is
used". The degree of regional inequality can be variable according to the
geographical division of regions. As Gore (1984, p. 53) notes, "problem
inevitably arises because there are no standard spatial units which may be
defined as the right regions for measuring the differences which indicate
inequity. This means that whether or not greater 'interregional equity'
is being attained in a country depends on the regional boundaries which
are selected." He went further by arguing that "this points to the most
fundamental weakness in the view that regional economic disparities should
be reduced for the sake of equity, and that greater interregional equity
is a desirable goal" (p. 53).
Several compromising suggestions were made in relation to this
measurement problem. According to Alonso (1971, p. 43), "a meaningful
22
measure should be based on divisions of the territory that reflect the
spatial structure of the socio-economic system." And Henry Ziraon (1979)
suggested that "measurement of regional inequality should not neglect
those phenomena related to inequality patterns and processes which are not
necessarily spatial in nature," (p. 9). This suggestion was based on the
findings that "many of the causes, consequences, and manifestations of
inequality are dominantly structural rather than spatial in nature."
(Coates et al., 1977, p. 5 quoted from Zimon, p. 9). Recent literature
on the regional problem began to employ new types of indices in the
measurement of regional inequality. They are: geographical dispersion of
R&D function; the entrepreneurship of new firm formation; the degree cud
type of external control or ownership of manufacturing (Firn, 1975;
Westaway, 1974; Massey, 1976).
Summary and Conclusions
Problems in depressed regions differ from those in underdeveloped
regions. High rates of unemployment are the typical problem in depressed
regions. But economic distress in underdeveloped regions can be more
easily identified by their lower level of income. The problem in the
depressed region is one of "redevelopment and conversion" while the prob-
lem in the underdeveloped region is industrialization and urbanization
(Smith, 1981, p. 388).
In terras of causes of regional problems, each theory emphasizes one
or two factors by deemphasizing or ignoring other factors. In sum, they
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1. low mobility of production factors such as labor and
capital
2. geographical factors such as natural resources endowment
and physical remoteness from markets
3. economic structures such as sectoral composition of the
economy.
These cannot be all factors which are responsibile for regional
problems. As Vanhove and Klassen (1980) have put it, institutional,
political, and sometimes psychological factors also can be causes of
regional problems (pp. 6-7).
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CHAPTER TWO BACKNOTES
1. Those conditions (assumptions) are: "full employment, perfect
competition, one homogeneous commodity, zero transport costs,
regionally identical production functions exhibiting constant returns
to scale, a fixed supply of labour and no technical progress."
(Richardson, 1979, p. 137).
2. The problems of this theory are that "its high level of aggregation
and its assumed correspondence between the income-elasticity-of-demand
sectors and the high-productivity-growth sectors" (Emerson and
Lamphear, 1975, p. 133).
3. There can be a controversy over the degree of 'push' for
outmigration. According to Lansing and Mueller (1967), there is no
obvious relationship between the economic distress and the
outmigration. But "a highly signigicant relation between outmigration
rates and local labor market conditions, as characterized by
'prospective unemployment' [that is] the level of unemployment
which would have accumulated by the end of the period had no
outmigration taken place" (Olvey, 1970, p. 107, quoted from Morrison,
1975, pp. 231-2).
4. Agglomeration economies can be classified into four types: "transfer
economies, scale economies, economies of labor specialization, and
economies of professional interaction" (Emerson and Lamphear, 1975, p.
107).
CHAPTER III
REGIONAL PROBLEMS IN THE U.K. AND IN THE U.S.
Regional problems may vary from time to time and from place to
place. Chapter II shows that there can be several causes of regional
problems. Each country's process of development (industrialization and
urbanization) may have produced those causes, which may have also
influenced them.
This chapter will discuss the process of regional development in
each country. As main purposes are concerned with identifying problem
regions, this paper will investigate only several variables: population
(migration), unemployment, and income trend. If these factors cannot
fully explain the problems, other factors such as employment will
supplement them. The main focus will be put on the evolution and scope of
regional problems, trends and characteristics.
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PART I
REGIONAL PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Regional Development Before 1970
Urbanization
Between 1801 and 1901 the population of England and Wales increased
nearly 24 million from 8.9 to 32.5 million. It was with the 1851 census
that more than 50% of the population began to be classified as urban. In
1901, "there were eight cities whose population exceeded 250,00 in England
1
and Wales. Four cities in Scotland had more than 150,00 population".
(Cherry, 1974, pp. 8-9).
During the nineteenth century, the availability of raw materials had
been the major factor in location of manufacturing firms. The coal
fields and the ports attracted manufacturing industries. "As a conseq-
uence urban concentrations emerged in Central Scotland, South Wales, South
Lancashire, the East and West Midlands, West Yorkshire and on the North
East coast." (Manners et al., 1972, p. 2). Thus, "Clydeside [Glasgow]
meant ships and heavy engineering, the North East meant export, coal, iron
and steel, ships and heavy engineering, Lancashire meant cotton and some
engineering: the West Riding meant coal and woolens; South Wales meant
export coal and iron and steel" (Peter Hall, 1974, p. 84). This led to a
situation in which "several of the major industrial regions had based
their prosperity on a very limited economic base" (Hall, 1974, p. 83).
This kind of regional specialization in production has been
brought about by the international division of labor in the early nine-
teenth century. At the outset of the nineteenth century, the United
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Kingdom had established international monopolies in a narrow range of
basic industries. The normal industrial town of Britain represented an
aggregation of early capitalist industries in one sector of production.
Thus, according to Rosemary Mellor (1983), the British pattern of
urbanization showed several peculiarities. And this fact provided useful
implications in identifying problem regions of Great Britain:
British urbanization was dispersed; that is with the
exception of the Scottish high lands, there was no exten-
sive underdeveloped tract equivalent to the Italian
South, France outside the Paris region and the north, the
American deep south. Development was peripheral —
provincial ports and merchant townships were thrust into
centers of specialized industrial activity. The periphe-
ral nature of development can be attributed to the loca-
tion of the coalfields, but the reliance on overseas
suppliers and markets is more convincing explanation for
the growth of cities such as Dundee or Belfast. (Mellor,
1983, p. 387).
A characteristic feature of the 19th century Britain was the high
degree of local and regional specialization in a few manufacturing sectors
(Rawstone, 1964, Mellor, 1978). But, British economic growth since 1945
had exhibited different locational pattern from that of the nineteenth
century. The attraction of coal-fields (raw materials) for the location
of manufacturing industries steadily weakened. Other factors have become
more important in the location of economic activity. According to Manners
et al., (1972, chapter 1), southern England provided "an easy access to
market" and "external economies" for the newly developing industries. As
a consequence, "[i]n the inter-war period regional differences were most
marked with the South East attracting large numbers, the two midland
regions, the South West and East Anglia just about holding their own,
whilst the northern and western regions lost heavily." (Christopher Law,
1980, p. 60).
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Population
Between 1951 to 1971, the U.K. population had increased by about 10
percent, or some 5 million. Of this increase, 4.3 million were to be
found in the three regions in the south and two Midlands of England.
(Manners et al., 1972) (Table 3.1). The other six regions in the north
and west did not come up with the growth rate of national population,
"seeing their share of the British population fall from 44.5 percent to
42.3 percent between 1951 and 1969." (Champion, 1983, p. 189). The most
striking features are the accelerating decline of Scotland in relative
terms, and the very fast growth of East Anglia.
During the 1960s, a little different aspect in population trends can
be found in the South East and West Midlands. They have both experienced
net outmigration. (Law, 1980, p. 61). Despite the continuing southward
shift, British conurbations began to lose their population. Out of seven
conurbations in the U.K, five declined in their population size in the
2
1960s. Greater London's population began to fall in the 1950s (2.5 per-
cent) and showed massive decline in the 1960s (6.8 percent) (Champion,
1983, p. 191; Douglas McCallum, 1980, Chapter 2). Thus, across the whole
country the dominant southward migration shift has been weakened in the
1960s. This was largely due to the decentralization of residential
activities within metropolitan areas (Champion, 1983, p. 190).
Employment
A. Hoare (1983, chapter 4) has calculated the Gini coefficient in
order to understand changing distribution of manufacturing jobs both among
regions and counties. His analysis shows (Table 3.2) that "the shifts are
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Table 3.1: U.K. Population by Region, 1951-1981
Pcjpulation (thousand) Growth %)
Regions
1951 1961 1971 1981 51-61 61-71 71-81
South East 15,216 16,071 16,994 17,027 7.5 5.8 0.19
East Anglia 1,388 1,489 1,683 1,895 5.9 13.5 12.60
South West 3,247 3,712 4,088 4,362 5.8 10.6 6.70
West Midlands 4,426 4,762 5,122 5,181 7.6 7.4 1.15
East Midlands 2,913 3,330 3,635 3,840 6.8 9.5 5.64
Yorkshire and 4,488 4,667 4,869 4,907 2.2 2.9 0.78
Humberside
North West 6,417 6,407 6,603 6,460 1.9 2.6 -2.17
North 3,130 3,113 3,138 3,114 3.6 1.4 -0.76
Wales 2,588 2,635 2,724 2,807 1.7 3.3 3.05
Scotland 5,103 5,184 5,217 5,150 1.6 1.0 -1.28
N. Ireland 1,371
50,219
1,427 1,538 1,482 3.9 7.8 -3.60
U.K. 52,807 55,610 56,225 4.9 5.3 1.10
Source: column 1, Manners et al., (1972) Regional Development in
Britain
.
(London: John Wiley and Sons).
columns 2,3,5,6, Law (1980) British Regional Development since
World War I, (London: Hethuen), p. 58, Table 4.5.
column 4,7, RSA (1983), Report of an Inquiry into Regional
Problems in the United Kingdom
,
(Norwich: Geo Books) pp. 61-92.
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very slight, both between adjacent years and over the
entire half
century." The distribution of manufacturing jobs between regions
showed a
stability over several decades (p. 71).
The five southern regions provided more jobs than before the war,
containing 56% of all employment in 1951 compared with 51%
in 1921. Since
then the share in employment increased to 59.2% in 1971.
The six northern
and western regions declined in their actual size
of employment during two
decades (Law, 1980, pp. 66-68). In the case of manufacturing
jobs, "a
prewar concentration of leading manufacturing growth
counties in the
immediate vicinity of London became increasingly diffused
post-war throug-
hout southern England" (Hoare, 1983, p. 73).
The pattern of regional
employment changes is "very similar to that for population"
(Law, 1980, p.
66).
Unemployment
In the U.K. the identification of areas of economic
distress was
largely based on the rate of unemployment.
Other variables such as migra-
tion or personal incomes were not considered to be
important in defining
regional problems. The great increase in
unemployment was felt most
severely in the depressed areas of central Scotland,
West Cumberland,
North-East England, South Wales, Lancashire and
some similar coal field
areas during the years of the Depression. "In May 1928
unemployment rates
were between 2 and 5 percent in London and the
Home Counties, but in South
Wales and North East England the rates were 20 to 25
percent" (HcCallum,
1979, p. 3).
In 1951, "Scotland and Wales still had twice the
national percen-
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Table 3.2: Manufacturing Employment Changes:
The Gini Coefficients
Regional County
1921-31 5.6 2.9
1931-51 5.4 2.4
1951-61 2.9 2.1
1961-71 3.1 3.6
1921-71 13.4 4.7
Source: Hoare, A. (1983) The Location of Industry in Britain, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press), p. 71 Table 4.1.
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tage of jobless, and the Midlands less than half" (Table 3.3). Since
then, regional disparities in unemployment have been tending to become
much less marked" (Eversely, 1971. p. 225). Thus, the rankings of
the
regions has remained remarkably similar over the period (Law, 1978, p.
76). Several other studies also found that differences in unemployment
rates between the south and the north have been narrowed from the mid
1960s to the mid 1970s (Chisholm, 1979; Manners, 1976, quoted from M.
Frost and N. Spencer, 1983, p. 239). According to Eversely (1971, p.
226), "emigration is still the time honored remedy" to regional dispari-
ties in unemployment. "If Humberside and North East Lanchashire do not
have higher unemployment rates, then this is due to the fact that school
leavers and young unskilled workers leave before they have to register as
needing work" (Eversely, 1971, p. 226).
Income Inequality
Regional disparities are normally measured and expressed in terms of
income differences among regions. In the United Kingdom, however,
"less
importance has been attached to these figures as an index of regional
inequality" (Law, 1980, pp. 80-1). Rather than income variance, unemploy-
ment rate has been considered to be more important.
According to Williamson (1965), regional inequality measures for the
U.K. was very stable from 1939 to 1960. The weighted inequality index,
V , ranges from 0.071 in 1960 to 0.116 in 1937. Compared
with other
countries such as the U.S, Canada, France and Italy, the U.K has relative-
ly low income inequality during that period, (pp. 170-81).
Since 1950s, there has been very limited convergence in the income
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Table 3.3: Unemployment Percentage as a Ratio of National
Average (G.B. = 100)
Area 1951 1956 1961 1966 1970
Northern 182 131 165 173 185
Yorkshire and
Huraberside
North West
West Midlands
East Anglia
South East
South West
Wales
Scotland
Great Britain
Source: Eversely, D. (1971) "Population Changes and Regional Policies
since the War" Regional Studies 5(4) p. 226. Table 14.
73 63
99 114
34 91
76 72
98 106
225 173
208 204
100 100
66 80 112
109 100 104
93 87 89
67 80 85
93 120 112
170 193 150
210 193 166
100 100 100
Table 3.4: United Kingdom: Relative Income by Regions
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Year 1949-50 1954-5 1959-60 1964-5 1970-71 1976-7
UK Mean
UK Index
South East
East Anglia
South West
West
Midlands
E (North)
Midlands
Yorkshire
E & W
Yorkshire
and
Humberside
North West
North
Wales
Scotland
N. Ireland
400
100
107.5
93.2
93.5
98.8
98.3
94.8
92.2
88.8
95.0
83.6
546
100
107.5
90.8
94.4
104.1
(97.8) (99.9)
98.4
97.6
95.6
91.8
94.6
85.4
732
100
108.1
91.4
94.3
102.9
(98.2)
97.3
97.0
93.8
92.6
92.1
82.0
1004
100
108.1
94.8
96.5
102.2
(97.6)
95.8
95.8
95.6
92.4
92.9
93.1
81.9
1545
100
107.7
96.4
96.9
99.8
96.1
96.4
95.2
94.1
92.4
95.8
86.0
3477
100
106.5
101.3
95.1
100.0
101.2
97.8
96.4
95.7
92.8
93.2
87.1
Source: Law, C. (1980). British Regional Development Since World War I.
(London: Methuen) p. 80, Table 16.
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trends. (Table 3.4). The South East and the West Midland had higher than
average national income, while Northern Ireland had an income far below
the average income. "All other regions have average incomes between and
10 percent below the U.K. mean" (Law, 1980, p. 81).
Regional Problems Before 1970
The peripheral areas of the United Kingdom — Scotland, the Northern
part of England and the Wales — experienced exceptionally high levels of
unemployment in the Depression years. Thus, among the three broad cate-
gories of problem regions, the UK provided some of the "best" and "the
most widespread" examples of depressed industrial regions in Europe. This
had been regarded as the predominant type of problem 'cgions in Britain
(McCrone, 1969, p. 15; Glasson, 1978, p. 169).
Historical, economic and social forces were at work to produce these
regions of depression: it was associated with the UK's peculiar urban
development and with a general lack of adjustment to the changing economic
situations. According to Dunford et al., (1981), British "capitals
remained small in size and resorted to protected market and cartel
arrangement rather than rationlization and the development of standardized
production" (p. 380). These structural weaknesses were more aggravated by
such external factors as "the over-valuation of the pound in the 1920s,"
and "competition from lower wage countries" (McCrone, 1969, p. 16).
The acute nature of regional problems were masked by war-time
production and post war booms. Modern industries which were located in
the South lost no time in gaining strength from post war booms, while
traditional industries declined more due to growing competition. Dunford
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et al., (1981) explained this fact:
The industries that were largely located in the southeast
and midlands but that had grown slowly in the 1930s due
to the depressed state of demand came to play a leading
role in the phase of growth lasting from 1945 to the mid
1960s. The gap widened between the increasingly
congested metropolitan centers with a high proportion of
modern growth industries and the declining industrial
areas lacking a diversified industrial structure. (Dun-
ford et al., 1981, p. 80).
Examination of a limited number of indicators in this sections shows
that regional disparities in the level of income, unemployment rate and
employment have been reduced. Several factors played a role together in
this process: interregional migration, decentralization trends, and the
effects of regional policy. But, according to Townroe:
The regional problem has not ceased in the U.K. in the sense that
the assisted areas - Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales, Northern
and Northwestern England and parts of the South West and the
Yorkshire and Humberside regions - continue to exhibit above
average unemployment rates, lower incomes, and high relative
scores on indices of economic and social deprivation (Townroe,
1978, p. 13).
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Regional Development in the 1970s
UNCTAD published a "Trade and Development Report" in 1982, which
shows that the average growth rate in GDP for developed
countries declined
from 5.2 percent per annum in the period 1963-1973 to 2.6 percent in
1973-
80. Since 1973, most developed countries have experienced slow
growth,
high inflation and rising unemployment. Among these industrialized
countries, the UK showed a much slower rate of economic
growth
.
There
have been an increasing consensus that the context for regional problems
in the 1970s was different in many ways from that of two
decades which
preceded them, both for Britain and for many other countries.
Recent researchers began to discuss the impact of slow
growth on
regional problem (W. Hiernyk, 1982; H. Richardson, 1984; B. Moore and J.
Rhodes, 1982; M. Chisholm, 1985; J. Goddard, 1983; A.
Champion, 1983).
Their discussions centered on the issue of whether slow growth
has
resulted in the development of new types of regional
problems and new
regional inequalities. British regional problems in the 1970s will be
discussed in this context.
Population
During the 1970s, the East Anglia gained more people than any other
region. It was followed by South West and East Midland.
Their gain in
population was the result of loss in other regions. While no region
actually declined in population size during the 1950s and
1960s, four out
of eleven regions in the north and west lost population in the 1970s
(Table 3.1). With a declining birth rate throughout the nation,
the
most important factor in population trends has become interregional
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migration. Even in the south, the South East and the West Midlands showed
"a downward shift of around 7 percent points in their population growth
rates" in the 1970s (Champion, 1983, p. 197).
Traditional British population movement was southward from the
north. In the 1960s, the major change in this movement has been explained
as the spread of the South East population to surrounding areas, which
means the weakened (narrowed) north-south shift. But, in the 1970s, there
has been a turnaround in this trei.': . As Champion (1983, p. 199) has
pointed out, "it appears that the major changes in this direction [spill-
over of South East population] had been completed by the early 1970s and
that subsequently there has been some move back to the previous patterns
[the North-South shift]" A. Ogilvy (1982) came to the same conclusion in
his analysis of population trends from 1971 to 1978:
There can be little doubt that population migration
within Great Britain during the 1970s was affected by the
change in economic circumstances which began at the end
of 1973 — the onset of economic recession marked not
only a general reduction in population mobility but also
a fundamental change in the pattern of population move-
ments between the various regions of Britain. Population
dispersal from South East England to all other parts of
Britain — was checked and then began to decline. The
change brought about an increasing north-south shift of
population." (Ogilvy, 1982, p. 72).
Employment
Another distinctive feature in recent economic change is the massive
decline in the number of manufacturing employment. Between 1966 and 1982,
manufacturing sector lost 2.75 million jobs in the UK (Regional Studies
Association, 1983, p. 7). This secular pattern was labelled as "deindus-
4
trialization" . British regional problems originated from rising
unemployment in manufacturing sector. Thus, the effect of deindustriali -
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zation on the British regional development came to be another issue to be
examined. To begin with, Goddard (1983) explained this point:
just as the Industrial Revolution was associated with
fundamental changes in the location of economic activi-
ty at both the urban and regional scales, in particular
rural decline and the growth of the northern coalfield
conurbations, so the process of deindustrialization has
come to be associated with large city decline and rural
revival, with growth and prosperity shifting further
towards the southern part of the country. (Goddard,
1983, p. 1).
"Large city decline" was not a problem of late years. Greater
London began to lose population in 1950s. Seven conurbation cities
in
the UK declined in their population from 4.7 million in 1951 to 4 million
in 1971 (Cameron, 1980, p. 19). This stage of decentralization has
been
reinforced by the process of deindustrialization: "[m]etropolitan
economies have been increasingly tertiarized," (Dunford et al., 1981. p.
382). According to the report to Regional Studies Association (1983, p.
4), "there has been a massive shift in the location of manufacturing in
the UK from conurbations and cities to small towns and rural areas.
(Table 3.5). Thus, in the 1970s, a new type of spatial problem, the inner
city problem, emerged.
Unemployment
Depressed regions have a tendency of over-reaction to the impact of
economic cycle. When the national economy is in decline, unemployment
rates of depressed regions tends to increase rapidly. Moore and Rhodes
(1981, p. 326) confirmed this fact in the late 1970s: "[t]here was no
sharp deterioration in the unemployment difference until 1975 with the
possible exception of the North West. But after 1975 a combination of
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Table 3.5: Manufacturing Employment by Type of Area 1960-1978.
Employment (thousands) % change 1960-78
1960 1978
London 1338 769 -42.5
Conurbations 2282 1677 -26.5
Free standing cities 1331 1148 -13.8
Large towns 921 901 - 2.2
Small towns 1631 1887 +15.7
Rural areas 527 728 +38.0
G.B. 8031 7110 -11.5
Source: Regional Studies Association, (1983) Report of an
inquiry into
Regional Problems in the United Kingdom , 1983, (Norwich: Geo
Books) p. 41. Table 3.1.
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deepening national recession and a weaker regional policy led to a
persistent and consistent widening of the unemployment differential in the
problem regions between 1975 and 1980" (Table 3.6). Regional percentage
point deviation from UK unemployment rate shows a divergency. (H. Frost
and N. Spence, 1983, p. 248). These findings led to the conclusion that
"the current economic crisis has seen the appearance in the U.K. of
regional problems reminiscent in some ways of those that characterized the
1930s" (Dunford et al., 1981, p. 377).
Peter Elias (1981) has analyzed unemployment rate in a different way
(Table 3.7). Rather than "percentage point deviation " from national
mean, he used "the proportional growth in unemployment" in his analysis.
His findings reveal that "registered unemployment has grown rapidly than
at the national level in the South East, the West Midlands and the East
Midlands. ... Late in 1980 the West midlands and North West regions
experienced a dramatic increase in registered unemployment." (p. 338).
The West Midlands which has been one of the prospering regions in the UK,
showed a dramatic decline in the 1970s. As Frost and Spence (1983) have
pointed out, "the last and deepes' recession phase has brought renewed
convergence." (p. 248). There was no great difference in unemployment
change under the national recession. According to Gillespie and Owen
(1981), "the most recent recession has done more for the equalization of
employment rates across regions than three decades of regional policy."
(quoted from Frost and Spence, 1983, p. 258).
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Table 3.6: Regional Differences in Registered Unemployment
Rates
in the U.K., 1950-80
percentage point deviation from UK rate
1950 ~1965~ 1970 1975 1977 1979 1980 1981
Scotland +1.5
North +1.2
North West
Wales +1.1
Northern Ireland —
Yorkshire and
Humberside -0.3
South West -0.2
East Midlands -0.8
West Midlands -1.1
East Anglia -0.3
South East -0.6
+1.4 +1.6 +1.0 +1.8 +2.0 +2.3 +2.2
+1.0 +2.0 +1.6 +1.9 +2.5 +2.9 +3.0
+0.1 +0.1 +1.1 +1-2 +1.3 +1.7 +2.0
+1.0 +1.2 +1.4 +1.C +2.1 +2.6 +3.0
+4.5 +4.1 +3.4 +4.3 +4.9 +5.7 +6.5
-0.4 +0.3 -0.1 -0.4
+0.1 +0.3 +0.6 +0.7
-0.6 -0.3 -0.5 +1.0
-0.8 -0.6 -0.4
-0.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.7
-0.6 -0.9 -1.2 -1.4
+0.2 +1.5
-0.5 -0.2
-1.0 -0.8 -0.9
-0.3 +0.3 +1.7
-0.2 -1.5 -1.1
-1.8 -2.4 -3.1
Source: Moore and Rhodes (1981) "A Second Great
Depression in the UK
Regions: Can Anything Be Done?" Regional Studies , 16(5), p. 32b,
Table 2.
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Table 3.7: Changes in Unemployment by Region, 1970-81
June
1970
level
000s (%)
% change between periods indicated
1970
1975
1975
1980
1980 1981 June
1981Registered
unemployed Jun
Sep
Sep
Dec
Dec
Mar
Mar
Jun
level
000s (%)
South East 114(1.5) 60 77 31 11 14 9 5S4( 7.8)
East Anglia 12(1.9) 83 74 24 15 15 4 64( 9.0)
South West 32(2.2) 101 57 22 16 9 3 160( 9.6)
West Midlands 40(1.7) LOS 92 38 11 14 10 306(13.4)
East Midlands 30(2.0) 65 104 22 11 12 12 168(10.4)
Yorks and Hurab. 53(2.6) 35 114 25 10 10 9 251(12.1)
North West 72(2.6) 89 85 19 7 9 10 386(13.7)
North 56(4.3) 28 98 13 9 7 9 203(15.2)
Wales 33(3.3) 54 95 28 9 6 3 150(14.1)
Scotland 82(3.8) 24 120 8 9 10 7 306(13.7)
Northern Irelanc I 32(6.3) 22 90 22 5 7 4 104(17.9)
UK 555(2.4) 57 91 23 10 11 2681(11.2)
Source: Elias (1981), "The Regional Impact of National Economic Policies:
a Multi-Regional Simulation Approach for the U.K., Regional
Studies, 16(5), p. 339, Table 3.
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Income Equality
According to the Report of Regional Studies Association (1983) only
one region (the South East) out of eleven in the UK has greater than
average Gross Domestic Product per head since 1976 (pp. 61-97) (Table
3.8). The West Midlands had greater than average income during the 1960s.
As one of major industrial areas, this region encompasses the industrial
conurbation of Birmingham and Coventry. This region "has moved within the
last decade from a position of relative prosperity into one of deep dec-
line" (RSA, 1983, p. 80). This GDP statistics also shows that the North
West is in the same position with West Midlands.
Another analysis about regional GDP as a share of UK's by Elias
(1981, p. 336) shows no great fluctuation in their rankings during the
1970s. The South East, the North West and the West Midland lost their
shares, while the problem regions (Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales and
the North) held their former positions, (p. 336).
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Table 3.8: Regional GDP in the 1970s.
Region GDP per
1976
headl
1981
GDP share
1971(Ranking)
of UK GDP2
1979(Ranking)
South East 112.6 114.5 35.4 (1) 34.2 (1)
East Anglia 93.7 97.3 2.9 (10) 3.1 (10)
South West 90.8 95.8 6.4 (6) 7.1 (6)
West Midlands 98.1 90.6 9.5 (3) 8.9 (3)
East Midlands 96.5 99.9 5.8 (7) 6.6 (7)
Yorkshire and
Huraberside 94.6 92.9 8.0 (5) 8.3 (5)
North West 96.4 94.3 11.7 (2) 11.1 (2)
North 96.2 94.2 5.2 (8) 5.1 (8)
Wales 89.8 86.8 4.3 (9) 4.4 (9)
Scotland 97.8 98.7 8.8 (4) 8.9 (3)
N. Ireland 74.9 72.1 2.1 (11) 2.1 (11)
U.K. 100 100 100 100
Source: 1. Regional
Regional
Studies
Problems
Association
in the Unit
(1983) Report of an Inauiry into
ed Kingdom (Norwich: Geo Books)
pp. 61-97.
Peter Elias (1981) "The Regional Impact of National Economic
Policies: a Multi-Regional Simulation Approach for the UK"
Regional Studies 16(5) pp. 335-343.
The Ranking was given by the Author.
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Regional Problems in the 1970s
As explained in the introduction, this section has attempted to
investigate spatial impact of slow growth. Some statistics like popu-
lation movement and unemployment show uneven geographical impact of
national decline. The traditional north-south population movement reap-
peared. In the late 1970s, the changing rate of unemployment reveals
regional convergence, but it largely stems from "decreases in national
manufacturing employment and increases in national unemployment, and their
concentration in the formerly prosperous areas such as the SouthEast and
West Midlands, and particularly in their inner city areas" (Hudson, 1978,
quoted from Dunford et al., 1981, p. 380).
The West Midlands, decline was noticeable because this region has
moved from "one of the prosperous regions" to "one of the problem
regions." This was largely due to the decreasing manufacturing employ-
ment. A new spatial inequality emerged during the 1970s.
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PART II
REGIONAL PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED STATES
Urbanization and Rural Depopulation
A historical overview of changing spatial structure of American
cities shows that the period from 1870 to 1920 can be called the age of
the "industrial city" in the United States. (John Ottensman, 1975, p.
13). During this period, "continuing industrialization and economic
growth set the context within which industrial cities would develop: the
large and mechanized factory emerged as the dominant unit of economic
organization" (pp. 13-4).
It was also during this period that half of the population was
classified as urban. In 1920, New York City's population climbed to
almost six million, Chicago grew from three hundred thousand people in
1870 to nearly three million by 1920. Other cities shared this growth
as well. "As far back as 1870, the regions which are most highly urbanized
today — New England, Middle Atlantic, Pacific — already had less than
one third of their employment in agriculture." (Benjamin Chinitz and
Richard Dusansky, 1973, p. 158).
During the Depression years, "some urbanites returned to their farm
origins and reduced employment opportunities in the city also led to
greater retention of potential farm out-migrants. As a result net farm
5
migration was approximately zero between 1930 and 1935." (Nan Johnson and
J. Beegle, 1982, p. 61).
According to Chinitz and Dusansky (1973, p. 158), "the period 1940-
60 was one of further sharp reductions in agriculture [employment]."
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Rural population declined from 57.5 million in 1940 to 54 million in 1960
and stabilized at that level for the next decade. But, the percentage of
rural population has declined steadily from 43.5 percent in 1940 to 26.5
percent in 1970. (Table 3.9).
Historically, declining rural population has been primarily due to
rural-to-urban migration, which was associated with the technological
development of agriculture: mechanization in production, improvement in
seeds and use of fertilizers and pesticides. Dale Hathaway (1960) sug-
gests that "between 1920 and 1960, 25 million persons moved from the farm
into urban and nonfarm rural areas, approximately 18 million of them after
1940." (quoted from Crane, 1975, p. 31). This fact has led to the conclu-
sion that "there has been a major off-farm movement, running at about one
million persons per year and that this movement has substantially reduced
the number of persons living on farms in the United States." (Crane, 1975,
pp. 31-2).
Another stream of rural to urban migration was the interregional
migration of rural southern blacks to the North. According to Johnson and
Beegle (1982), "northern manufacturing firms sent representatives to rec-
ruit black workers from the South. Between 1916 and 1918, over one
million black people left rural areas in the South to settle in the
industrial centers of [North]." (p. 62). Thus, "starting with the decade
1910-1920, the south has never failed to run a net migration deficit of
less than 1 million. This deficit reached a high of two and quarter
million for the decade 1940-1950. These migration have become incrasingly
Negro as new opportunities in the rural and urban South have gone
primarily to whites." (John Kain and Joseph Perky, 1971, pp. 249-50).
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Table 3.9: Rural Population in the United States, 1920-80.
Rural Population
in Million
% of U.S.
Population
Previous Urban Definition
1920
1930
1940
51.8
54.0
57.5
48.
8
43.9
43.5
Current Urban Definition
1950
1960
1970
1980
54.5
54.1
53.9
59.5
40.4
30.1
26.5
26.3
Source:
1920-1960: U.S.D.A. (1966) Rural People in the American Economy
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) p. 103.
Table 14.
1960-1980: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census (1984)
Statistical Abstract of the United States 1984, (Wash-
ington, D.C., Government Printing Office), p. xvii.
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The pattern of urbanization varied from one region to another. The
New England and Middle Atlantic regions achieved their 1960 levels of
urbanization before 1920s. At that time, three southern regions were
below than 30 percent in their level of urbanization. But there has been
"a marked convergence. In 1900, the range was 14.9-68.6 for per cent
urban By 1960, these ranges had been narrowed to 43.5-75.1."
(Chinitz and Dunsansky, 1973, p. 158). There have been regional diffe-
rences in the process of rural depopulation. Crane has explained this:
The rural South, because of its high birth rate,
tended to grow despite outmigration, while the counties
of the Central regions and the Great Plains experienced
both outmigration and a declining birth rate. Many of
the counties of the northern Great Plains witnessed al-
most continuous population decline after 1940, while
another area of absolute population decline was the wes-
tern and southern fringe of the corn belt: eastern Kan-
sas, northern Missouri, western Iowa and eastern Nebras-
ka. During the sixties this zone of declining population
also extended into the counties of western Minnesota.
(Crane, 1975, p. 26).
American cities could not be contained in their physical boundaries.
When the migration flow of rural blacks to the Northeastern cities dried
up, "migration takes place between metropolitan areas on an interregional
scale and intraregionally through an accelerating dispersion of people and
jobs outward into the expanding metropolitan periphery," (Brian Berry,
1973, p. 36). "The concentrative migration process resulting from indus-
trial urbanization had ended" (p. 30). And Berry has emphasized "the
social rather than economic dynamics" (p. 36).
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Regional Development in the 1970s
Population
The secular pattern of population movement among regions has been
westward: the West has been the fastest growing region; the South has been
the second fastest, while both the North Central and Northeast regions
have grown at rates below the national average.
But, in the 1970s, the South has grown more than the West: while the
West's growth has slowed, the South' s has accelerated markedly. George
Sternlieb and James Hughes (1977) have identified "three major phenomena
in population movement: the accelerating regional shift, the emerging
metropolitan-nonmetropolitan dynamic, expanding intrametropolitan
differentials." (p. 227). They have concluded that:
A very powerful momentum has built up over the past
fifteen years, sweeping employment and population growth
away from the older metropolitan centers of the Northeast
and North Central states to the newer growth poles of the
South and West. Unnoticed was the fact that the
industrial belt from Boston to St. Louis, which Wilbur
Thompson calls the "American Ruhr," was beginning a long-
term downward slide. (Sternlieb and Hughes, 1977, p.
228).
Bernard Weinstein and Robert Firestine (1978) also explained the
rise of the South and the decline of the North using Friedmann's taxonomy
6
of five regions:
Upward transitional areas are areas of rapid economic
development receiving large inflows of people and capital
from both the core regions and rural areas. Typically
they are less concentrated and urbanized than core
regions. The problems facing upward transitional areas
are those generally encountered by fast growing regions:
urbanization, industrialization, and transportation.
The Sunbelt is obviously the dominant upward transitional
area in the United States today.
Downward transitional areas are old, established regions
characterized by declining economies and an out-migration
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Table 3.10: U.S. Population by Region, 1950-80
US
North East
North Central
South
West
1950
151,375
39,478
44,462
47,244
20,191
Population (thousand)
19801960
179,322
44,678
51,169
54,973
28,053
1970
203,296
49,061
56,589
62,812
34,838
226,502
49,135
58,866
75,372
43,172
Population Growth (%)
1950-60
18.5
13.2
16.1
16.4
38.9
1960-70
13.4
9.8
9.6
14.3
24.2
1970-80
11.4
0.2
4.0
20.0
23.9
Source: Gregory Jackson et al., (1981) Regional Diversity: Growth in the
United States, 1960-1980. (Boston: Joint Center for Urban Studies
of HIT and Harvard University) p. 28.
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of people and industry. An aging and obsolete industrial
plant is often coupled with high rates of unemployment
and few possibilities for new development. These areas
are adjusting to a lower and less intensive level of
economic activity in an effort to redefine their
relationship to the national economic system.
A number of urban centers in the manufacturing belt would
appear to be downward transitional areas at this time.
For example, in recent years the New York, Newark,
Buffalo, Providence, Cleveland, and Detroit metropolitan
areas have experienced a serious erosion of economic
activity along with high unemployment rates and an out-
migration of people and industry. (Weinstein and
Firestine, 1978, p. 61).
Popular and scholarly concern with regional issues has been focused
on the subject of "Frostbelt and Sunbelt" in the late 1970s. Various
hypotheses for the rise of Sunbelt has been explained and tested. Among
them, four reasons stand out: "defense spending (especially that generated
by World War II), other federal outlays, a favorable business climate
[including a lower rate of unionization], and an attractive quality of
life." (Bradley Rice and Richard Bernard, 1984, pp. 1-30).
However, there exists intra-regional heterogeneity: three New
England states grew faster than the U.S. average in the 1970s. According
to Jackson et al., (1981), "in terms of population growth, New England
also has a fast-growing subregion analogous to the sectional 'sunbelt.'
This subregion comprises Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont, where the
emigration charateristic of the early decades of this century has slowed
and become immigration in the last two decades." (p. 47). And as Richard-
son (1984) has pointed it out, these three states "may have been the
beneficiaries of the shifts in locational preferences favoring life in
non-metropolitan areas. "(p. 28) Regional population shift in the U.S,
should be explained more in terms of non-metropolitan turnaround.
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Nonmetropolitan ]_ Metropolitan
Regional population shifts in the U.S. has been accompanied by
another remarkable change: the reversal of nonmetropolitan population
loss. During the 1960s, metropolitan population grew by 17 percent and
non-metropolitan grew by 4.4 percent. But, during the 1970s, nonmetro-
politan (15.4 percent) grew more than the metropolitan (9.1 percent)
(Jackson et al., 1981, p. 65).
A number of studies have documented the origins and magnititudes of
nonmetropolitan growth. Calvin Beale (1973) analyzed county population
for 1970-73 and suggested several reasons for non-metropolitan growth:
decentalization in manufacturing; the growth of the recreational and
retirement activities. R. Briggs and J. Rees (1982) have analyzed
economic trends in nonmetropolitan areas in the 1970s. Their findings
reveal that "the manufacturing sector, long regarded as the most
propulsive industry in the growth process, shows one of the smallest
relative increase over the 1970-1976." (p. 1646). The movement of
manufacturing sector to nonmetropolitan areas was recognized long before.
During the 1960s, manufacturing employment increased by twenty-two percent
in non-metropolitan areas (Rodeney Erickson, 1976, P. 35). And reseachers
find that this industrial dispersion challenges the critical role of
agglormeration economies in regional development. Seyler (1979) has
summarized these findings:
Researchers are asking what has changed the calculus that
had for decades favored the agglomeration of manufactu-
ring. Attention has been directed to the interplay of
the "filtering-down process"; changing forms of indus-
trial organization; redefinition of the nature of agglo-
meration economies; the effects of areal and regional
wage differentials; the effects of varying strengths of
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unionization; improvements in the transportation system
and incidence of footloose industries; the growing
sophistication of community development bodies; and
firms' responses to perceived attractions of nonmetropo-
litan areas as contrasted with disutilities of larger
metropolitan areas. (Seyler, 1979, p. 48)
As Briggs and Rees (1982) have pointed it out, it appears that most
of the "decentralization of manufacturing to nonmetropolitan areas had
occurred before 1970." (p. 1648). And other than economic factors began
to play a role in the transformation of nonmetropolitan. Even the
remote areas are being attracted by migrants. Considering this fact,
Jackson et al., concluded:
This has led many analysts to conclude that, whatever
the espoused reasons for moving, factors other than
employment opportunities such as leisure or retirement
lifestyles, are important for the new migration pat-
terns, — still others [non-metropolitan counties] are
attractive simply because of their remoteness: many
people frustrated with urban life will endure signifi-
cant economic, cultural and social deprivations for
short periods in order to get away. (Jackson et al.,
1981, p. 66-7).
Income Trends
Recent data about personal income trends in the U.S. shows long-term
convergence (Table 3.11). Among 9 census regions, 4 regions (New England,
Middle Atlantic, East North Central, Pacific) have always been above the
national mean, while the other 5 regions have been below up to now. Thus,
convergence in income trends is the combined result of relative decline of
the North (including Pacific) and the steady increase in the South
(including Mountain).
As population statistics shows intraregional diversity within re-
gions, there can be diversities in the patterns of income trends within
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them. Henry Ziraon (1979) has analyzed the relationship of regional deve-
lopment to overall national development and the interrelationship of
changing patterns of regional inequalities at various geographic scales.
Using personal income data he examined the patterns of "the Uilliamson-
7
modified coefficient of variation" (population-weighted level of inequa-
lity) for the years from 1950 to 1978. As expected, "the inequality trend
for the total U.S. has been one of relatively steady, mild convergence
(decreasing inequality) with some indication of minor cyclical fluctua-
tions." (p. 142) (Figure3.1) But his study reveals the different patterns
of inequality between the North and the South:
[A]s overall development promotes convergence of develop-
ment levels (reduced inequality) throughout the total
United States, the already reasonably developed North
retains the excepted stable patterns of low inequality.
Only minor fluctuations and even some continued conver-
gence is noted. On the other hand, the South which
traditionally has been the lesser-developed of the United
States macro-regions, is characterized by initial diver-
gence (increasing inequality) up to 1965. Long-run con-
vergence in the South does not begin until around 1965.
(Zimon, 1979, p. 143).
According to Zimon (1979), the initial stage of convergence during
the 1950s in the South is attributable to "new regional development during
the postwar period." Thus, early stage of development has produced diver-
gence within the South. "Later, as overall development of the South
continued, regional growth spread from the initial points of concentration
and ineqalities decreased — convergence began." (p. 143) But the North
showed a slow convergence trend during the period.
Detailed study about personal income trends by Jackson et al.,
(1981) shows that "the regional variation in per-capita income is much
greater than the variation in earnings per worker in 1960. Regional
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Table 3.11: Personal Income Per Capita by U.S. Census
Regions as a Percent of the U.S. Average.
1930 1970 1980
u.s 100 100 100
New England 129.2 109.2 106.1
Middle Atlantic 147.6 113.1 106.4
East North Central 108.1 103.5 102.7
West North Central 85.0 94.7 98.1
South Atlantic 64 91.4 92.0
East South Central 43.2 74.8 78.1
West South Central 58 84.7 95.4
Mountain 83.7 91.6 94.5
Pacific 124.4 111.4 112.6
Lowest / Highest Ratio 0.393 0.661 0.694
rce: Richardson, H. (198^ ) "Approaches t o Regional De velopraent The
in Western-Market Economies" in Regional Development: Problems
and Policies in Eastern and Western Europe
, G. Derako ed
. ,
( New
York: ST. Martin's Press) p. 8, Table 1.1.
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differences in per-capita income diminished much more than did differences
in earnings per worker during the 1960s and the 1970s" (p. 118). From
these findings, they concluded that among several factors, "regional
changes in the labor-force participation rate account for most of these
differences" (p. 119). Labor force participation rate is largely
dependent on the level of employment and the population. Thus, in order
to find the problem region, employment will be analyzed.
Manufacturing Employment/Unemployment
Historically, the manufacturing belt in the Northeast has been the
core region of the United States. During the 1950s, four of the six New
England states, two of Middle Atlantic (New York, Pennsylvania) and the
state of Michigan had lower than zero growth rate of manufacturing employ-
ment. From 1970 to 1975, "all of the 17 states [in the North] —except
Wisconsin — have experienced substantial decreases in their manufacturing
employment." (Janet Pack, 1978, p. 12). While in the South, all states
except Georgia and West Virginia, had gains in manufacturing employment.
But, it is very difficult to draw similar conclusion from unemploy-
ment rates. (Table 3-12). Sometimes, both slow and rapidly growing
regions have above average unemployment. Even in the same regions, there
have been too much diversity to draw conclusion. But, "by 1975, four of
the five [East North Central] states' unemployment rates were well above
average, the [Pacific] states were also above average but below the rates
of either the [New England] or the [Middle Atlantic] states" (Pack, 1978,
p. 13). Thus, Pack came to the following conclusion:
It appears that the assertion that "unemployemnt (in the
Northeast) has become fixed at a higher rate than the
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FIGURE 3.1. U.S. Regional Inequality Trends for the U.S.,
the South and North.
Source: Zimon (1979) "U.S. Regional Inequalities: 1950-1978" (Ph.D.
Diss., The Ohio State Univ.) p. 144, Figure 8.
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national average," is not entirely unfounded. It is far
from proven, however, since unemployment figures prior to
1970 were not consistently higher than the national ave-
rage and higher than average unemployment rates have also
characterized most of the Southeastern and Far Western
states since 1970. (Pack, 1978, p. 14).
Richard Rosen (1980) has examined the spatial impact of economic
recession during the 1974-75. He classified 51 states into two groups:
high unemployment prone states, low unemployment prone states. His find-
ings reveal that 17 states are highly unemployment-prone: 6 of them
belongs to Northeast, 3 of them belongs to East North Central, and 7
states are in the South. Thus, "states where unemployment rose most
sharply were concentrated in Northeastern and North Central industrial
areas and in the South" (p. 22) The common characteristics among these
states is that "fifteen of the 17 states had an above-average propor-
tion of jobs in manufacturing ." (p. 22)
This broad explanation of regional unemployment can not do justice
to the real problems of the U.S. The United States is actually composed
of many distinct economic regions with their own industrial concentrations
(Rosen, 1984, p. 38). Even each census region comprises several hetero-
geneous states of which many are not evenly homogeneous in their socio-
economic chacteristics. Rosen (1984) explained this diversity:
During 1979, the national average unemployment rate was
5.8 percent, but county unemployment rates ranged from a
high of 40 percent in Menominee County, Wisconsin to less
1 percent in Sioux County, Nebraska. Even during a
period of relatively low unemployment, 89 counties had
rates of 12 percent or more, and 107 had rates between 10
and 11.9 percent. (Rosen, 1984, p. 37).
But, as Rosen (1984) has put it, there are certain clusters of
counties, which "are apt to have certain structural problems retarding
economic progress" (p. 39-40). And they are:
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The industrial Great Lakes States, and counties along the
Appalachian mountains generally had above average unemp-
loyment, as did the Northwestern Pacific areas and parts
of the Southwest. There is also a line of high unemploy-
ment in the Texas counties which border Mexico. (Rosen,
1984, p. 40).
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Table 3-12. Comparison of Employment Growth with Unemployment
Rates, 1950-1975.
Regions
Growth (>f MFTG. Elnployment
1970-75
Unei
1950
4.80
nployme
1960
it Rate 3
1950-60 1960-70 1970 1975
United States 0.88 1.43 -0.99 5.50 4.90 8.50
New England -0.06 0.01 -2.10 6.60 5.70 4.90 9.20
Hid West 0.01 0.02 -3.05 4.70 5.50 4.10 9.00
Great Lakes 0.01 1.08 -1.59 4.00 5.10 5.00 9.30
Plains 1.33 2.01 0.25 2.80 3.80 3.90 5.60
South East 1.99 3.35 0.40 4.00 6.40 4.90 8.90
South West 3.28 4.33 1.64 5.20 5.10 4.80 7.60
Rocky Mountain 3.40 2.39 2.68 4.90 5.00 5.30 6.60
Far West 4.65 1.58 0.41 7.90 5.70 7.50 8.80
Source: Pack, J. (1978), "Frostbelt and Sunbelt: Convergence Over Time."
Inter Governmental Perspective. (Washington, D.C.: Advisory Com-
mission on Intergovernmental Relations) (4), pp. 12-13. Table
3,4.
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Regional Problems in the United States
"The U.S. has been the object of a persistent and extensive research
effort in nearly all fields of socio-economic development." (Zimon, 1979,
p. 62). Especially in the field of regional planning or regional science,
the U.S. itself has been the ideal model for many regional development
theories. (Williamson, 1965; North, 1955; Harvey Perloff et al., 1960;
Berry, 1971). The problem was whether the U.S. experience could be
applied as a model for other developing or developed countries. In this
section, U.S. regional problems will be discussed in terms of regional
income equality. But, when income analyses can not do justice to real
problems of U.S. regions, employment or unemployment analysis will comple-
ment them.
As it: has been explained in the second chapter, Williamson (1965)
has analyzed the long-term relationship between regional inequality and
national development. In addition to the international cross-section
analysis of 24 countries, he also examined historical patterns of income
inequality in the U.S. The results are:
The inequality index exhibits a definite secular
pattern over the whole development spectrum; during the
early stages of growth, 1840-80, regional inequality
increased or regional divergence was the rule; from 1880
to 1920, the degree of inequality stabilized and even
revealed a significant decline; the 1920-60 experience
has been varied, to be sure, but generally the evidence
suggests a secular decline in the North-South problem,
the rate of which has accelerated from the mid-1930's to
the present.
It should be noted first that the tendency towards
regional divergence, prevalent in our early and mid-19th
century history, cannot be explained entirely by the
Civil War and the bitter period of reconstruction which
followed. Regional divergence was the case prior to the
Civil War: the tendency towards increasing North-South
dualism is evident, although not striking, between 1840
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and 1860. The sharpest increase in regional inequality
does occur, however, between 1860 and 1880, a period
covering both Civil War and Reconstruction. (Williamson,
1965, p. 179).
There appears no doubt that U.S. regional inequalities have diminished
over a long time. And the initial "tendency towards increasing North-
South dualism" reveals the fact that the South has been problem region in
the U.S.
Richard Easterlin (1960) has analyzed patterns of personal income in
the U.S. during the years from 1840 to 1950. His analysis also reveals
"the narrowing of per capita income differences between 1880 and 1950,
though not necessarily continuous or to an equal extent" (p. 96). The
declining "coefficient of variation" verified this fact (Table 3-13).
But, the southern three regions' income level has ranged from half to
three thirds of the national mean. Another data (Table 3-14) for the 1960
reveals the pervasive poverty of the South:
In 1960, 46 percent of all U.S. poor families and 32
percent of all poor unrelated individuals lived in the
South. By comparison, the South contained only 30 per-
cent of all families and 27 percent of all unrelated
individuals. Similarly, though only 12 percent of all
U.S. families lived in the rural sections of the South,
26 percent of all poor families lived there. (Xain and
Persky, 1971, p. 244).
Using Esterlin's data, Richardson (1979) explained the problems of
the South:
Ups and downs [of regional incomes] can be summed up —
as interregional income convergence; the coefficient of
variation became progressively smaller over the 1880-1950
period. Thus, the growth and maturing of the American
economy was associated with spatial dispersion of econo-
mic opportunities, which resulted in a dramatic narrowing
of interregional per capita income differentials.
(Richardson, 1979, p. 263).
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In his conclusion, Richardson stressed that the most important
explanation of convergence was the spatial dispersion of economic
opportunities. This implies the urbanization. According to Richardson,
"the historically low incomes of the South could be at least partly
explained in terms of the South's retarded urbanization." (p. 269). In
other words, the South's problems were rural in character. Without further
analysis, it appears that all types of rural problems could be found in
the South: massive outmigration, high level of poverty, low level of
education (Kain and Persky, 1971, pp. 243-275).
Economic growth in the United States has largely centered on
metropolitan areas. "The development pattern of non-metropolitan America
is more strongly characterized by poverty and economic distress than that
of the metropolitan areas" (Lowdon Uingo, 1973, p. 11). The problem
regions of the United States in the 1950s and 1960s have been termed as
the 'interraetropolitan periphery' (Friedmann and Miller, 1965). Thus,
regions which once supported large agricultural populations have been
in decline due to massive outmigration. The coal-mining areas which once
supplied major energy sources for economic growth in the U.S. have
dwindled due to decreased demand for coals. Some of the Northeast
industrial areas began to deteriorate due to massive migration of
industries to the South. These problem areas contained approximately
"one-fifth of the American population" (Friedmann and Miller, 1965, p.
313).
Regional problems vary from time to time. Especially, in the U.S.,
the geographical size of the nation tends to evade certain rules (stan-
dards) which are set by researchers and make it difficult to classify. As
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Table 3-13. Relative Personal Income Per Capita, 1880-1949/51
United States
New England
Mid-Atlantic
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
East North Central
West North Central
Mountain
Pacific
Coefficient of variation
1880 1900 1919/21 1949/51
100 100 100 100
129 120 111 98
129 125 123 119
45 47 61 70
50 48 52 58
60 58 68 72
99 101 104 111
92 98 84 94
191 142 105 99
164 149 126 113
57.9 42.5 30.4 23.4
* Regional = unweighted average of constituent states.
Source: Richardson, H., (1979) Regional Economics (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press) p. 265.
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Table 3.14. Families with Incomes below $3,000 and Unrelated Individuals
with Incomes below $1,500 as a Percentage of All Poor Families and
Unrelated Individuals by Race and Residence, 1960.
South Rest of U.S. Entire U.S.
7.9 28.2 5.3 40.9 13.2 54.1
2.3 7.6 0.1 13.
S
2.4 16.2
4.9 11.9 0.5 24.1 5.4 29.5
5.1 47.7 6.0 78.9 21 100
White Nonwhite White Nonwhite White Nonwhite Total
Families (%) (%) (%)
Urban 12.7
Rural farm 6.3
Rural nonfarm 12.2
Total 31.2
Unrelated
individuals 23.0 8.8 61.5 6.6 84.6 15.4 100.0
Source: Kain and Persky, (1971) "The North's stake in Southern Rural
Poverty" in Essays in Regional Economics eds., Kain,J. and J.
Meyer (Cambridge: iiarvard University Press) p. 275, Table 15.
it has been explained, Weinstein and Firestine (1978) classify the Sunbelt
as "upward transitional areas" and some of northern manufacturing belt as
"downward transitional areas" according to the taxonomy of Friedmann (p.
61). And "several decades ago, the Tennessee Valley, the Ozarks and the
Appalachian regions were considered special problem areas. But these
are now appear to be in an upward transitional phase as a result of their
growing integration into the national economy." (pp. 60-1).
The Regional Outlook Report of the Joint Center for Urban Studies
(of MIT and Harvard) classifies nine census regions into four groups:" the
fast growth East South Central, West South Central, and Mountain regions;
the no-growth Mid-Atlantic and East North Central regions; the
decelerating Pacific and South Atlantic regions; and the resurgent New
England and West North Central regions." (Jackson et al., 1981, pp. 41-
6). Traditional classification of problem regions may put Mid-Atlantic
and East North Central regions into the "depressed regions," because their
unemployment rates are higher than average and their population is growing
below than the national growth rate. But these regions resist such
classification: they still hold higher than average national income. The
aggregate statistics cannot be applied. The U.S. problem regions were not
identified in this way.
In the 1960s when the U.S. had an explicit regional policy, Chinitz
(1968) identified 7 types of distressed areas. There were around 900
eligible areas at that time (An area was defined as a county, a labor
market, or a municipality with a population in excess of 250,000) (p. 56).
This variety of distressed areas comprised all types of problem regions:
transitional large-scale unemployment areas in California, the Pittsburg-
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type old industrial areas, the poor distressed rural areas, the remote
mountain rural and mining areas, the large city ghetto, and the Indian
reservation, (pp. 53-61).
A recent report of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations (1985) identified contemporary distressed areas. This Commis-
sion used five specific measures to gauge economic distress: population
growth decline and composition, income and poverty, employment and unemp-
loyment, public physical infrastructure, and the private sector economic
activity, (pp. 3-9). This Commission's findings reveal the very characte-
ristics of the U.S. problem regions:
All five indicators display distress in many of the
nation's communities that is both cyclical and structural
in nature. Distress can arise anywhere - in central
cities, older suburbs and rural towns. Every region of
the country experience some degree of distress, and poor
minority persons are affected more severely than others.
(ACIR 1985, p. 9).
The U.S. problem regions encompass all types of regional problems.
The national or sub-national aggregate statistics cannot represent the
realities of problem regions. More sophisticated standards have been
employed at the local level in the U.S.
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COMPARISON OF REGIONAL PROBLEMS IN THE U.S. AND IN THE U.K.
Population Movement
The urbanization in Britain was dispersed around the country. Ma-jor
industrial regions had specialized in a few production processes. Since
the Depression, the secular pattern of population movement has been south-
ward. But, in the 1960s, this dominant trend has been weakened largely
due to the decentralization of residential activities within metropolitan
areas. Thus, "across the whole country the dominant North-South migration
streams of the 1950s and 1960s were replaced by more complex interactions,
with greater emphasis on local and intra-regional migration flows than on
inter-regional flows" (Townroe, 1979, p. 13). In the 1970s, this movement
toward peripheral areas has been slowed. There has been some move back to
the previous patterns. While no region actually declined in population
size during the 1950s and 1960s, four out of eleven regions in the north
and west lost their population in the 1970s. The South is still growing
at the expense of others.
In the U.S., economic growth has largely centered on metropolitan
areas in the Northeast. This concentration of economic growth was accom-
panied by massive rural outmigration from the South. As this migration
flow began to dry up, migration took place far into the metropolitan
periphery. This has resulted in a turnaround in population movement
between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. As Morrison (1977) has
pointed out, there has been three stage of movement in this process. The
first one was the spillover of metropolitan economic activity towards
surrounding areas. The second one was the massive filtering down of
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industry into non-metropolitan areas. The third one was the population
movement in pursuit of quality of life or amenity. In terms of inter-
regional shift, the secular patterm has been westward. But, in the course
of nonmetropolitan turnaround, the South began to grow more rapidly in the
1970s.
As there has been a turnaround in population movement between the
metropolitan areas and non-metropolitan areas in th U.S., "some of the
non-metropolitan areas changed their migration balance from loss to gain"
in the 1960s in the U.K. (Champion, 1983, p. 190). And "the 1981 census
recorded that only in the remoter rural areas had the rate of population
growth been higher in the 1970s than in the 1960s" (Britain, 1986, p. 21).
There exists a similarity in this trend between the U.K. and the U.S.
While in the U.S., the South, which was once a problem region began to
grow more rapidly, the north in the U.K. is still a problem region.
Interregional Disparities
Overall interregional disparities in the U.S. have been greater than
those in the UK. Williamson's (1965) international cross-section analysis
shows that V (the weighted coefficient of variation) in the UK ranged
w
from 0.064 in 1954 to 0.116 in 1937, while that of U.S. ranged from 0.169
in 1961 to 0.338 in 1930. As one of the reasons for this, Williamson
(1965) explained that "geographic size may ... influence the degree of
regional inequlaity: given the level of national development, the larger
the geographic size of the national unit, the greater will be the degree
of regional inequality" (p. 170). While the lowest/highest ratio of
regional income in the U.S. was 0.393 in 1930 and increased to 0.694 in
1980, that of U.K. was 0.778 in 1950 and increased to 0.819 in 1977 (^ble
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3.4, 3.11). This fact can attest to that assumption. Compared with other
Western countries, the UK has relatively little regional disparity. Among
four countries (West Germany, United Kingdom, Italy and France), the UK
had the smallest coefficient of variation (Table 3.15). Thus, regional
inequality in terms of income disparity was not so great in the UK.
Cameron (1974) explained this point:
In sum, the differences in welfare across the British
regions are small; rural depopulation has already
occurred to a very great extent; the domination of the
primate city has declined at least if measured in terras
of population and despite inter-regional migration
processes which constantly shape the balance of
population in favor of the South East, East Anglia and
the West and East Midlands; and the overall regional
changes in population distribution, both ' historically
and forecast, are on a modest scale.
In the U.S., there existed a great interregional disparity among
regions. Personal income per capita in the East South Central region was
lower than one third of that in the Middle Atlantic in 1930. But this
disparity has been decreased considerably for the five decades. That
region still has a lower income than 80 percent of the U.S. average in
1980.
Regional disparity in terms of unemployment rate in the U.K. has
been decreased due to several factors. Interregaional migration worked
for convergence in disparity. Regional policy may also have reduced this
disparity. And overall decentralization trend has been one of those
factors. Recent recession in the U.K. has worked against this trend.
Absolute comparison of unemployment rates among regions attests to this
fact. But the proportional growth in unemployment shows no marked dif-
ference among regions.
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Table 3.15: Regional Inequality in Four Countries
Country
West Germany
United Kingdom
Italy
France
Coefficient of Variation
1950
28.5
18.2
35.6
22.6
1960
22.5
13.9
35.6
19.8
1970
17.6
11.4
26.0
19.0
Source: Vanhove and Klassen (1980), Regional Policy: A European Approach
(Hontclair, N.J.: Allanheld, Osmera & Publishers) p. 85.
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In explaining the causes of regional convergence in the U.K., regio-
nal policy has received credit for its effect on convergence. But this
cannot be the case with the U.S. Regional disparity in terms of income
inequality decreased markedly in the U.S. Convergence in income trends
has been the combined results of relative decline of the North (including
Pacific) and the steady increase in the South (including Mountain). Seve-
ral factors also played in this trend as they did in the U.K. "Migration
into the fast-growing, prosperous regions had a significant dampening
force on per capita income growth" (Richardson, 1979, p. 267). But regio-
nal changes in the labor-force participation rate account for most of
these changes (Jackson et al., 1981). As an example for this, "all of 17
states [in the North] — except Wisconsion — have experienced substantial
decrease in their manufacturing employment" (Pack, 1978, p. 12). This
convergence was not considered to be the result of any government policy
(Weinstein and Firestine, 1978). Migration of people and job has resulted
in overall efficiency of resources allocations. But implicit regional
policy has been criticized in that it favored one region at the expense of
other regions.
A high level of unemployment has been the major index in identifying
regional disparities in the UK. And regions which had a high level of
unemployment rate were also low income regions in the U.K. (Although it
may be relatively smaller than the U.S). But this cannot be the case with
the U.S. High income regions did not always have smaller than average
level of unemployment rate.
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Regional Problems
British prosperity was built on exports of textiles, iron and steel,
ships and coal. It is to the collapse of these industries that the
regional problem owed its origin. Thus, the U.K. provided the best
example of depressed industrial regions in the developed countries. This
has been regarded as the predominant type of problem region in Britain.
This was largely due to its peculiarity in urban development. Scotland,
Northern Ireland, Wales, Northern and North Western England had revealed
structural weakness in their sectoral composition of their economies.
This was the main cause of regional problem. In the 1970s, the West
Midland also began to decline.
The South (South Atlantic, East South Central and West South Cen-
tral) has been problem regions in the U.S. Literatures observed that
there existed the pervasive poverty in the South. This fact comes from
its retarded urabnization. The Si-th'a problem was its rural nature. The
number of outmigrants tells the story: "the South has never failed to run
a net migration deficit of less than 1 million. This deficit reached a
high of 2 and quarter million for the decade of 1940-1950" (Kain and
Persky, 1971, pp. 249-50). But the South became a "upward transitional
area", while the North became a "downward transitional area." Another
type of problem regions showed up. Some of the Northeast industrial
areas began to undergo large scale migration of their main industries.
All these problem regions were termed as "intermetropolitan periphery."
And these areas contained approximately one-fifth of ' the American
population (Friedmann and Hieler, 1965). But the geographical size of
each region resist broad-banding of its problems. There are certain
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clusters of counties which are apt to have certain structural problems in
the industrial Great Lake States, in the Appalachian mountains, in the
Northwestern Pacific areas, and in the parts of Sothwest.
Declining central cities have been one of the spatial problems in
both countries. "Fifteen of the twenty one central cities with a
population exceeding one-half million in 1960 lost population in the
decade" (Berry, 1973, p. 36). Large cities in the U.K. showed similiar
decline: London lost 6.3 percent of its population in the 1960s, Liverpool
18.2 percent, Manchester 17.9 percent, Newcastle Upon Tyne 17.6 percent,
and Birmingham 8.6 percent (Champion, 1983, p. 189).
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CHAPTER THREE BACKNOTES
1. Those eight cities were: "Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham, Leeds,
Sheffield, Bristol, Bradford and West Ham." Four cities were:
Glassgow (761.000), Edinburgh, Dundee and Aberdeen, (Cherry, 1974, pp.
8-9).
2. There are seven conurbations: Central Clydeside, Greater London,
Mereseyside, South-East Lancashire, Tyneside, West Midlands and West
Yorkshire. Except West Midlands and West Yorkshire, the other five
conurbations lost population in 1960s. (Cameron, 1980, p. 15).
3 "For example the growth rate in GMP per employed worker slumped
between the periods 1963-73 and 1973-79 from 1.9 percent per annum to
0.1 percent in the United States, 3.0 percent to 0.3 percent in the
United Kingdom and from 8.7 percent to 3.4 percent in Japan
(Richardson, 1984, p. 259).
4. "Cairncross [1981] identifies five notions [of deindustrialization] to
be considered:"
la. Absolute decline in manufacturing employment.
lb. Absolute decline in manufacturing employment on
account of a shift to capital-intensive production
through investment.
2. Decline in the share of total employment taken by
manufacturing industry.
3. 'A progressive failure to achieve a sufficient
surplus of exports over imports of manufatures to
keep the economy in external balance.'
4. 'A contraction of industrial employment is a
matter for concern if it jeopardises our eventual
power to pay for the imports we need.' (quoted
from, Chisholm, 1985, p. 304).
5. Studies on this phenomena shows that "most urban to rural migrants
during this period chose rural non farm destinations" (Johnson and
Beegle, 1982, p. 81).
5. Friedmann classified regions according to "the basis of common
prospects and problems of development." And they are: core region,
upward-transitional area, resource frontier region, downward -
transitional area, and special problem area. (Friedmann, 1965, pp. 41-
4).
7. The Williamson - modified coefficient of variation "measures the
disperson of the regional income per capita levels relative to the
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national average which each regional deviation is weighted by its share in
the national population" (Williamson, 1965, p. 11).
The formula is: /XCVCc - 9)X—
I I 71
Where f = population of the ith region,
i
n = national population,
th
y = "income per capita" of the i region,
i
y = national income per capita.
CHAPTER IV
INTERPRETATION OF REGIONAL PROBLEMS
"An [a public] issue originates with the idea in someone's mind that
some real-world situation is unsai_isfactory. But the vast majority of
such ideas fail to become recognized as issues" (William Solesbury, 1976,
p. 13). All public problems have not been the subject of public policy.
When a public problem has been identified the next question is whether to
take any action at all. And this action usually has been legitimized on
economic, social or political grounds.
Although the steady deterioration of industrial areas or the deepen-
ing poverty of rural areas was perceived, the problems did not convey
similar meanings to all. Some may consider the distress to be nothing
extraordinary; others regard the problems as something that may undermine
capitalism itself. A third groups see that problems exist, but they do
not consider it to be 'spatial' problems. These controversies over
regional development are related to regional development theories. Part
of these controversies have been explained in the second chapter. This
chapter will explore several different meanings which each government has
assigned to its regional problems. Emphasis will be placed upon how the
problems were perceived in each country.
PART I The United States
1
Anti-Regionalism in the 1950s
As has been explained in chapter III, problem regions which con-
tained one-fifth of American population were found in the "inter-metro-
politan periphery." But, "post-war U.S. Administrations and political
parties showed no interest in spatial intervention until the 'sixties and
even then many would currently agree with Samuelson (1969) that such
efforts can only result in a sentimental distortion of the national
production function" (Cameron and Wingo, 1973, p. xiv).
There can be several reasons why the United States had no interest
in formulating regional policies for depressed regions until 1960s.
According to Friedmann and Weaver (1979), "corporate capital was disin-
clined to exploit their [backward areas] potential. They were typed as
low-productivity regions that failed to return the profits on investment
which were possible elsewhere" (p. 143). Economists also argued that
investment in those areas would result in waste of national resources.
Friedmann and Weaver (1979) explained this:
economic backwardness came to be seen as a characteris-
tic inherent in certain areas, a consequence of 'natu-
ral' conditions that were ill-suited to nurture modern
economic growth. It was essentially this interpreta-
tion which led regional planners, such as William
Alonso and Koichi Hera, to argue that any deviations in
the pattern of economic location from the dominant
polarization pattern to one of greater emphasis on
regions of distress would mean significant losses for
the efficiency of the economic system as a whole.
(Friedmann and Weaver, 1979, p. 143).
In other words, advocacy of efficiency in the economic system was
associated with deep-rooted anti-interventionism (planning) in the "busi-
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ness civilization of America" (Walter Goldstein, 197S, p. 2). Entrepre-
neurial freedom has been the folklore in the history of the U.S. Andrew
Hacker (1978) traced the origin of "business society":
As it happens, we have become rather diffident about
these origins. Hence the stress on the purely politi-
cal side of our beginnings, as expressed in the Decla-
ration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill
of Rights. Yet that period produced another, less
heralded, manifesto setting forth assumptions on which
this nation was founded. Its author was Alexander
Hamilton, our original Secretary of the Treasury. His
"Report on the Subject of Manufatures , " submitted to-
ward the end of 1791, declared independence for produc-
tive property, sketched out an economic constitution,
and affirmed the basic rights of entrepreneurship.
(Hacker, 1978, p. 11).
Goldsmith and Jacobs (1982) have explained the reasons why the
federal government has no ability to formulate a national urban policy (or
growth policy) (pp. 58-9). According to their argument, "a successful
policy requires the belief that advanced industrial societies require
intervention and management by public sector" (p. 59). But, as interven-
tion and management are "a centralizing/centralist concept," "national
urban policy challenges something basic to the American psyche and politi-
cal tradition — a pluralism of programs, institutions, and levels of
initiation, all of which reinforce the notion of an 'invisible hand'
influencing the market, as opposed to a coordinated policy" (p. 59).
As it has been explained, the geographical size of the nation tends
to evade certain rules which are set by researchers. Spatial development
patterns are too diversified to be classified. This assertion can also be
applied to the implementation of policies. Newman (1980) explained this:
general rules and regulations, designed for "average"
situations, are inappropriate for communities and areas
that diverge markedly from the average. And in a
country as large and diverse as ours, with as many
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programs as we now have, general rules for average
situations will lead to multitudes of examples to fill
the scrap books of collectors of public administrative
horror tales. (Newman, 1980, p. 14).
These reasons cannot tell the full story of anti-regionalism before
the 1960s in the U.S. Before the 1960s, some literatures, reports and
official bulletins began to publicize the need to help distressed areas in
terms of regional policy. But their suggestions did not receive encour-
agement. In order to clarify the reasons for anti-regionalism, the next
section will discuss two reports which advocated regional development in
the 1950s.
Human Resources Report
In his study, "Rural Depopulation and the Political Process of
Federal Rural Development, 1950-1972," Crane (1975) suggested that "Human
Resources Report, published by the USDA in 1955, served as the foundation
for rural development activities and programs of aid to distressed areas."
(p. 96). This report analyzed the rural poverty county-by-county and
identified major poverty areas: "rural South, running from eastern Texas
and Oklahoma through the Deep South and the Appalachian region into the
fringes of several border states." (p. 97). And this report recommended
several programs for rural (regional) development.
But these findings raise another question: why had not the USDA much
interest in rural development before 1955. According to Crane (pp. 71-
88) , the USDA was more concerned about farm commodity programs rather than
rural development policies. And "the agricultural leaders in Congress
were not prepared to accept either national leadership in rural planning
or the use of USDA as an instrument for implementing a general
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rural policy" (p. 94). "The major interest group supporters of USDA were
the general farm and commodity organizations" and they tended to be con-
cerned that "too much rural development would undermine the agricultural
focus of the Department" (p. 74). The USDA was not involved in active
rural development planning because its objectives were more oriented
toward people rather than places. Rather than generalized interests of
the rural population, the USDA had to serve farm people.
Policy Statement on Depressed Areas
Another report which has supported federal intervention in depressed
areas in the 1950s was the "Policy Statement" by the National Planning
Association (NPA) in 1957. As Miernyk (1982) has pointed it out, the
persistent unemployment problems in old industrial areas were considered
to be the responsibility of local government. But "the first public
organization to take the position that depressed industrial areas consti-
tuted a national problem — and thus required national action — was the
NPA" (Miernyk, 1982, p. 43).
The NPA identified thirty-six labor market areas "in which unemploy-
ment accounted for at least seven percent of the local force in March 1955
Collectively these areas accounted for 10 percent of the nation's
civilian labor force. They contained over 600,000 unemployed workers, or
more than 19 percent of the idle workers in the nation" (Miernyk, 1957, p.
9). This report also examined a number of reasons for chronic economic
depression: the rapid dieselization in transportation, the migration of
textile industry from New England to the South, the declining consumption
in coal, rising imports of textile products, and the depletion of high-
brade and easily accessible seams of coal (Miernyk, 1957, pp. 5-8).
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Considering persistent unemployment and its impact on overall
economic growth, the NPA expressed its views as a "Policy Statement on
Depressed Areas" (NPA, 1957, pp. v-xi). Since it is recognized as the
first to advocate federal intervention in depressed areas, those policy
statement will be summarized as follows:
1. Chronic local unemployment is a national problem.
2. The Federal government should assume the
responsibility for a vigorous program to remove
chronic local unemployment, in collaboration with
local and private programs directed toward the same
end.
3. A positive federal program for ending chronic local
unemployment should undertake new and expanded
activities providing for technical assistance,
certain kinds of financing, and specific types of
tax exemptions which would stimulate the expansion
of business enterprises, or encourage new business,
suitable for the respective areas.
4. Migration and relief may often be necessary
palliatives to chronic local unemployment, but
cannot be accepted as solutions to the problem.
5. Areas of chronic unemployment are more than a
challenge to charity or to expediency. They offer
exceptional opportunities for economic and
administrative progress in our society (NPA, 1957,
pp. v-ix).
As one of the reasons for federal intervention, the NPA suggested
the "equality of opportunity as a social goal" (p. v). "If opportunity is
severely limited in many communities through no fault of the communities
themselves," the NPA argued, "it will threaten internal development." In
regard to this statement, "conservative business organization, such as the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, ... insisted that local problems were a matter
for local political jurisdiction to handle" (Hiernyk, 1982, p. 43). The
NPA statement also reveals several dissenting opinions for federal inter-
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vention. One of them considered federal intervention to be ineffective.
Another suggest that the statement placed too much weight on federal
responsibility and initiative:
In dealing with problem, however, emphasis needs to be
kept on the primary responsibility of those closest to
the scene of action, and those most personally and
intinately concerned with the welfare of the area.
There is a role for the Federal government to play, but
it is one of encouraging, strengthening, and counseling
local efforts, rather than one which will supplant or
undermine local responsibility. To my mind, the state-
ment as written inclines much more to the latter direc-
tion than to the former.- James C. Worthy (NPA, 1957,
p. xi).
Regional Problems in Government
In the 1960s, there was a growing interest in these distressed areas
which had more unemployed workers and pockets of poverty than at the
national level. The public realization of these problems may have been an
evolutionary process. And, at least, this realization evolved into public
consensus that regional problems were worthy of national concern. The
question which was disputed was whether the federal government ought to
take measures in favor of those areas. But one of the turning point in
this process has been the urban riots of 1965-1968. From this point,
rural problems began to be discussed in relation to their impacts on
metropolitan problems. According to Hansen (1931), "it was even argued
that it was in the self-interest of the Worth's larger cities to improve
conditions in the rural South because 'the migration streams originating
in the rural South form the crucial link in a system of poverty' and that
'the magnitude of both Negro and white migration is a measure of the self-
interest northern cities have in the rural South' (Kain and Persky, 1973,
p. 24)" (p. 44).
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Several reports such as "The People Left Behind" (U.S., President,
National Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty, 1967), "Urban and Rural
America: Policies for Future Growth" (U.S., President, Advisory Commission
on International Relations, 1968), and "Communities of Tomorrow" (USDA,
1967) are representatives of the rural (regional) development advocates in
the 1960s. These reports all advocated rural (regional) development or
urban-rural balance as a way of solving urban problems. But the first one
was recognized as "the most authoritative and most publicized study,"
»hich advocated rural development (Hansen, 1970, p. 227). This report
•ill be examined more thoroughly.
The People Left Behind
The Commission was organized with 3 responsibilities: to make a
comprehensive study and appraisal of the current economic situations in
American rural life; to evaluate the means by which existing programs and
policies for rural development may be coordinated; to develop recommenda-
tions for action by local, State or Federal government (NACRP, 1967, p.
vi). The report identified 14 million rural poor persons, who could be
found everywhere in the U.S.:
Poor people live everywhere, including cities, but some
areas and regions have such heavy concentrations of
rural poverty that they stand out. Much of the South
... has a heavy concentration of rural poverty. Out-
side of the South, Indian reservations, noticeably in
the South West and the upper Great Plains, contain
direct concentrations of the rural poor, also with New
England and the upper Great Lakes (NACRP, 1967, p. 3).
The Commission also stressed a number of reasons why rural poverty
should be eliminated. The first one was to secure 'justice' in the share
of social and economic progress:
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Every citizen of the United States must have equal
access to opportunities for economic and social advan-
cement without discrimination because of race, reli-
gion, national origin, or place of residence (p. xiii).
The next causes for rural development was expressed in terms of
interrelationship between the rural and the urban:
Because rural Americans have been denied a fair share
of America's opportunities and benefits they have mig-
rated by the millions to the cities in search of jobs
and places to live ... It is therefore impossible to
obliterate urban poverty without removing its rural
causes. Accordingly, both reason and justice compel
the allotment of a more equitable share of our national
resources to improving the conditions of rural life (p.
xiii).
Finally, the Commission recommends that the federal government should take
more vigorous action in order to attain self-sustaining growth in rural
areas by way of: universal minimum wage, man power program, and area
(regional) development.
One thing which is noticeable is that the Commission stressed the
fair share of the rural in the prosperity of America economy. The justi-
fication for rural development was that all people should have an equal
share in the benefits of economic development regardless of where they
live. Equity or social justice had been the main rationale for helping
the rural poor and for enhanced regional development.
Three Schools of Thought on Federal Intervention
Several reasons for anti-regionalism in the U.S. have been explained
in the foregoing section. This section will discuss the opposition's
theories which advocated federal adoption of regional development policies
for lagging regions. Even the neoclassical theories do not preclude the
possibility of government intervention in a market economy. Thus, these
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theories will also be included in the discussion.
During the 1960s, the notion that the federal government could
(should) take measures for lagging regions had been the subject of
considerable controversy. To this question, there have been three schools
of thought: "the non-interventionist, the adaptors, and the radical trans-
formers" (Cameron, 1977, p. 375). Cameron distinguished three groups
according to the degree and type of federal intervention in lagging areas,
which were suggested by each school. Crane (1975) also suggested that
"there were three major solutions to [rural to urban] migration problems
offered by the scholars which was also considered by the politicians"
(Crane, 1975, pp. 47-70). His suggested three types of solutions were
classified according to the degree of control on urban to rural migration.
And they are; "naturalists, modifiers, and developers" (Crane, 1975, p.
47). Although there may be a little difference in their approaches, those
two taxonomies show similarity in that they focused on the suggested role
of migration in the market economy.
The Noninterventionist/The Naturalists
Proponents of non-intervention assert that migration movement from
lagging to growing regions act as an effective mechanism in the labor
ur-rket disequilibrium. Labor surplus in lagging regions will be reduced
by outmigration. Their theories assume that over the long-term, the
competitive forces of the market create an optimal spatial distribution of
economic activities. Thus, the historical trend from rural to urban
cannot be reversed. If the government interferes with free factor move-
ment, it will induce sufficient loss of efficiency in the overall economy.
As it has been explained, this school of thought has been the major
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opponents of federal intervention in lagging areas.
The Interventionist (Adaptors/Modifiers and Radical Transformers/Develo-
ps)
These two streams of interventionists share the common grounds in
favor of federal intervention. They assume that the free market does not
guarantee optimal spatial distribution of activities. Several reasons for
market failure can be suggested.
1. "The crux of the problem is that most people are reluctant to move,
even in the face of prolonged and severe unemployment hardship."
(Morrison, 1975, p. 227). The outraigration is not sufficiently
elastic to the decline in employment opportunities (Lansing and
Muller, 1969, quoted from Cameron, 1979, p. 379).
2. Since outmigration is highly selective, "the labor force left behind
tends to be overaged, undereducated and underskilled" (Morrison,
1975, p. 233).
3. Agglomeration diseconomies in growing regions tend to expand far
beyond the extent which is optimal in resource allocation. The
inmigration do not consider the social cost that they incur to commu-
nities. The divergence between the private and social cost results
in distortion of resource allocation.
k. Factor price (costs) are usually higher in growing regions than in
lagging regions. If these high costs are transmitted to lagging
regions, it will induce further inflation in overall economy (Came-
ron, 1979, p. 376).
5. Social and economic overhead capitals are underutilized in lagging
regions. If these usable resources are developed, it will move the
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economy closer to the full employment.
All the above reasons for federal intervention indicate cases in
which market forces do not work. But the major difference between the
developers (the radical transformers) and the adaptors (the modifiers)
lies in their different views on rural-to-urban migration. While the
developers argue that outmigration from rural areas should be checked and
reversed, "the modifiers see it foolhardy to take radical migration
control" (Cameron, 1979, p. 334). "They recognize the historical depth
and power of migration into urban areas" (Crane, 1975, p. 50). They
assume that the economic, sociological and psychological power of
population movement cannot be reversed. Thus, the modifiers see it the
best way to redirect population movement into other than lagging areas.
Those can be growth centers or intermediate size cities.
The Hodifiers/The Adaptors
Various ranges of development strategies have been advocated by
these groups. Two great streams can be identified. The first one empha-
sizes human resource development in lagging regions. Their targets in
development are not the places but the people in there. Hoover (1975)
explained the cases in which this strategy can work:
There is a poor matching between the kinds of labor
that are in demand and those that are available, and
there is insufficient mobility and interchangeability
within the labor force. This makes it inevitable that
we run into shortages, rising costs, and consequently
inflation while millions of the less employable are
still out of work. Obviously, any policies that will
reduce these wide disparities and make manpower more
mobile and interchangeable will have the good effect of.
shifting the inflationary brink closer to the ideal of
full employment (Iioover, 1975, p. 273).
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The next one advocates the growth center strategy. If the outmigra-
tion from lagging regions are induced to those areas which have growth
potential, this will enhance overall efficiency in the economy. According
to Hansen (1970), this strategy has some advantages:
it is also necessary to consider the argument that
outmigration from lagging regions includes the adverse
effects and social costs „i increased congestion and
unemployment in industrial-urban areas. However, the
assumption that the social costs of bringing industry
to poorer regions would be less than the social costs
involved in the migration of workers and the increase
in congestion and unemployment in industrial areas
might well be reasonable if there were only two basic
types of region, lagging and congested. However, mig-
ration may be directed toward intermediate regions
where growth is rapid but where congestion poses no
immediate threat (Hansen, 1970, pp. 237-8).
The Developers/The Radical Transformers
As has been discussed, this group assumes that metropolitan areas
are no longer efficient places for production and living. In order to
check the population movement to metropolitan areas, they want to "bring
the jobs to" lagging areas (Crane, 1975, p. 58). With regard to rural
development, they propose rural industrialization. Thus, government
intervention in the process of development covers a wide range of activi-
ties. Especially, "this group values a balanced spatial development in
which every part of urban hierarchy grows at approximately the same rate
so that 'excessive' growth in major metropolitan areas is avoided and
lagging areas is revived" (Cameron, 1977, p. 378). President Nixon's
State of the Union Message proclaimed the need to reverse the rural to
urban population movement.
92
A New Regional Problem:
In the 1960s, especially under the Johnson Administration, federal
domestic programs had grown from 45 to over 400 (Wingo, 1973, p. 8); and
the federal urban outlay had grown from 3 billion dollars in 1967 to 13
2
billion dollars in 1970 (Goldsmith and Jacobs, 1982, p. 56). President
Nixon's State of the Union Message (1970) urged that "we must create a new
rural environment which will not only stem the migration to urban centers,
but reverse it." This fact led to the conclusion that "[b]y 1970 a true
national political consensus had formed that something had to be done to
stop rural-urban migration" (Sundquist and Mields, 1979, p. 309). But
these interests in population distribution and settlement pattern policies
were short-lived (Wingo, 1973, p. 11; Sundquist and Mields, 1979, p. 313).
Biennial national urban growth report which was prepared in 1972, 1974,
and 1976 according to the 1970 Housing and Community Development Act "did
little to formulate policy, instead reporting on the deterioration of
American cities" (Goldsmith and Jacobs, 1982, p. 55). And, "the problem
of rural-to-urban migration that had been of such urgent concern was
apparently spontaneously correcting itself" (Sundquist and Mields, 1979,
p. 314). The later part of 1970s saw the advent of new types of regional
problems.
Zero-Sum Game?
National concern with regional issues turned away from the so-called
'balanced growth' (national urban) policy to the Sunbelt-Frostbelt issue
in the last years of the 1970s. Growth has not been uniform throughout
the country in the United States. The ups and downs of regional economy
have been considered to be the normal phenomena of economic progress. But
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the recent rise of the Sunbelt appears to be more than the traditional
problems of economic development. Philip Rones (1980) had explained this:
Interregional migration has been one of the dominant
forces associated with economic progress in the United
States. At the heart of the great interregional migra-
tions in this country has always been the search for
economic advantage
. . . the most recent major population
shift also has had the search for financial reward as
its principal catalyst and sustainer. But the causes
and repercussions of the movement towards the sun —
from the "industrial heartland" of the North to the
South and West — go beyond economics. Many have moved
for reasons that traditional human capital theory does
not explain: for "quality of life" reasons. And the
growth and development of the sunbelt States have both
created and been nurtured by a shift in regional poli-
tical power. The net result of these factors — econo-
mic, sociological, and political — has been a popula-
tion and employment boom in the South and West, largely
at the expense of the North Central and Northeast
regions (Rones, 1982, p. 12).
The core issue ol 'he Sunbelt idea is whether the South is growing
at the expense of the North. And this issue led to the controversy over
federal policies and programs: "The Second War Between the States", ( Busi-
nessweek, May 17, 1976), "The Pork-barrell War Between the States" ( U.S.
News and World Report, December 5, 1977). According to House and Steger
(1982), "this battle over regional policies of the federal government has
been referred to as the new sectionalism, differentiating the new battle
from regionalism, the more time-honored and less narrowly parochial of the
various forms of federalism" (p. 11).
Rising energy costs and the decline (slow growth) of the American
economy in the later 1970s have fueled this debate and have produced a new
regional problem: "zero-sum game" in the regional development. Miernyk
(1982) has explained this:
During the 1970s — largely as a result of the rapid,
and geographically uneven, rise in energy prices —
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there was a fundamental change in what is loosely
called the "regional problem" in this country. The
problem is no longer one of "disadvantaged" regions,
such as Appalachia, which failed to share in the
nation's earlier robust economic growth. It has be-
come, quite simply, a zero-sum problem of how the
product of a nearly stationary state is distributed
among regions (Hiernyk, 1982, p. 69).
But the zero-sum situation in regional development was not a
matter of concern of late years. In the 1960s, when regional policies
were first introduced in the U.S., the Area Redevelopment Act anticipated
the advent of this kind of problem. This act specifically precluded zero-
sum problem by saying that "under the provisions of this Act, new
employment opportunities should be created by developing and expanding new
and existing facilities and resources rather than merely transferring jobs
from one area of the United States to another." Thus, the Sunbelt issue
has made the competition between regions more acute. And this was further
aggravated by economic decline.
However, regional policy measures in one region do not always result
in a loss in other regions. According to Richardson (1973), 'the
generative growth' doctrine solves the zero-sum problem. And this
doctrine has been one of the obvious reasons for advocating regional
policies. Richardson (1973) explained this:
The growth performance of an individual region can be
raised and may have an impact on the national growth
rate without necessarily adversely affecting the growth
rate of its neighbors. Growth through new technical
innovation is a case in point. Agglomeration economies
and the spatial proximity of activities in certain
cities or regions may induce a rate of innovation above
what it might have been in the absence of agglomerat-
ion. Similarly, changes in the intra-regional spatial
distribution of factors of production facilitated, say,
by an efficient intra-regional transport system may
also increase productive efficiency and the regional
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growth rate. The importance of these spatial impacts
on regional growth will be overlooked in the competi-
tive spaceless models. This phenomenon, where the
intra-regional spatial efficiency of a region may have
a feed-back on the aggregate growth rate, may be called
generative growth (Richardson, 1973, p. 87).
Hoover (1975) has also explained several cases in which regional
rivalry in the process of development can contribute to the national
welfare without resulting in 'zero-sum game':
Regional rivalry, like other forms of competitive pro-
motion and warfare, can be in large part self-def-
eating, or "zero-sum game" ... [HJowever, some signifi-
cant net benefits can accrue from regional rivalry.
Enlightened efforts to enhance a region's growth poten-
tial can take the form of upgrading the region's human
and natural resources and public services, protecting
and improving amenities, stimulating entrepreneurship
and innovation, fostering cooperation among various
business, social, and political elements, and discover-
ing the true comparative advantages of the region for
further development. All these effects favor better
utilization of resources and are clearly in both the
national and the regional interest (Hoover, 1975, p.
260).
It appears that controversies over federal programs and policies
have been concerned more about the implicit regional policies '-„ther than
explicit ones. Explicit regional policies are discriminatory in them-
selves. But analysis of federal programs in terms of their spatial
impacts raises multitudes of questions, especially in federal countries.
House and Steger have expressed some of those problems:
it does, appropriately, raise the issue of national
goals and national welfare. And it raises another
question: Does federal policy and programming that
impacts at the subnational level invariably imply
national betterment? Does it also include betterment,
for regions most affected, for the regional or for the
national good? (House and Steger, 1982, p. 12).
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Summary and Conclusion
Pluralism and anti-interventionism in the American psyche and
political tradition, the diversity in spatial development (the huge geo-
graphical size), the emphasis on people-oriented policy in the early
administration (at least in the USDA), and localism all have combined to
deter the United States from formulating regional policies.
But, in the 1960s, several regional policies were introduced,
adopted and implemented in the U.S. It may have resulted from the public
realization of regional problems. Several analysts suggested various
reasons for the adoption of regional policies in the U.S. According to
Richardson (1979), it "reflected not only the president's commitment, but
also the culmination of a slow build-up of support for regional develop-
ment policies, the currently high nationwide unemployment, and the general
post-World War II trend in favor of redistributive programs" (p. 269).
Besides these trends, Hoover (1975) has attributed it to the effects of
increased mobility in the U.S. society. Increased mobility resulted in
the "dilution of provincialism," and "this more varied exposure is condu-
cive to more objective feelings about programs" (Hoover, 1975, p. 253).
According to Hiernyk (1982), American government could implement its
regional policy because the U.S. was in good economic conditions in the
1960s (p. 72). His conclusions stem from the fact that competition
between regions was not so great as to repress the demand of planning for
depressed areas. Thus, "the representatives of wealthier regions either
supported redevelopment efforts or at least did not oppose them" (p. 106).
Since 1970, the situation has changed much. The rise of the Sunbelt
and the slow growth of American economy have made each region compete for
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more share of the national wealth and federal dollars. As iiiernyk (1982)
has put it, [as also suggested by House and Steger (1982)], "this situa-
tion ... could lead to a virulent form of sectionalism which is the
antithesis of a regionalist approach to national — indeed global —
problems" (p. 106).
PART II THE UNITED KINGDOM
The Barlow Report (19-40)
The United Kingdom is considered to be the first country which
adopted regional policy for depressed regions. British regional policy
dates back to the 1920s. "The earliest official recognition of regional
economic backwardness is found in Britain in the 'Report of the Royal
Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population (1940),'
better known as the Barlow Report" (Friedmann and Weaver, 1979, p. 144).
The importance of the Report cannot be overemphasized.
The Commission's main responsibility was "to inquire into the causes
which have influenced the present distribution of industrial population —
to consider what social, economic or strategical disadvantages arise from
the concentration of industries — and to report what remedial measures,
if any, should be taken in the national interest" (Great Britain, 1940,
p. 1, quoted from McCrone, 1969, p. 102). The Commission's report
reveals that "the disadvantages in many, if not most, of the great indus-
trial concentrations, alike on the strategical, the social and the econo-
mic side, do constitute serious handicaps and even in some respects
dangers to the nation's life and development, and we are of opinion that
definite action should be taken by the Government towards remedying them"
(quoted from Cullingworth, 1985, p. 9).
According to Friedmann and Weaver (1979), "the main recommendation of
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the Commission was to create a central planning agency" (p. 154).
Cullingworth had emphasized its effect en planning policy:
The Barlow Report is of significance not merely because
it is an important historical landmark, but also
because, for a period of at least a quarter of century,
some of its major recommendations were accepted as a
basis for planning policy (Cullingworth, 1985, p. 8).
Manners et al., (1972) stressed that:
it [the Barlow Report] therefore endorsed the objec-
tives of the earlier 1934 special Areas legislation,
and accelerated the creation of a Ministry of Town and
Country Planning in 1943 which was charged with
securing consistency and continuity in the framing and
the execution of a national policy with respect to the
use and development of land" (Manners et al., 1972,
pp. 6-7).
According to McCrone (1969), the Barlow Report laid the basis for
"the development of thought on the regional problem" in that "in several
respects it was ahead of its time and many of the innovations which have
been introduced into British regional policy in the 1960s were given clear
expression in this report some twenty years earlier" (p. 104).
While there can be minor differences in their interpretation of the
Report, most analysts came to the similar conclusion that the Report laid
down the directions of postwar policy. Considering the strategic, social
and economic disadvantages of the congestion in London, the Commission
recommended two basic lines of policy: the containment of London and the
dispersal of industry to depressed areas.
With regard to regional policy, the Report can be a land mark in
that:
1. The Commission unanimously agreed that the problems
were national in character and required a central
authority to deal with them (Cullingworth, 1985, p.
10).
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2. [T]he report laid emphasis on the economic case for
regional development. It regarded the congestion
problems of some cities and the unemployment of the
depressed areas as different aspects of the same
problem (McCrone, 1969, p. 104).
As it has been explained, the continued population movement to the
South East began to be perceived as a problem sine 1920s. "About half of
all new factories opened in the period 1934-8 in England chose to locate
in the still expanding London region" (Hall, 1976, p. 17). The County of
London Plan in 1943 reports "four major defects of the London County
Council in the 1940s are: traffic congestion, depressed housing, inade-
quate and maldistributed open spaces, and the inchoate intermingling of
houses and industries" (Hall, 1976, p. 17). The population share of South
East to the UK ranges from 27.5 percent in 1901 to 30.3 percent in 1951.
Thus further increase in population in congested areas could result in
social, economic and strategic problems in the UK. But, the economic
rationale for the government intervention in population distribution was
not given much importance by the UK government until 1960s; "Yet in the
1950s the Board of Trade regarded their regional development activities
mainly as a social service for the peripheral areas" (McCrone, 1969, p.
104).
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National Planning and Regional Policy
The history of British economic policy over the past decade or so
may be regarded primarily as a series of attempts by successive govern-
ments to move from a 'mixed' to a 'managed' economy" (Trevor Smith, 1975,
p. 52). The Labour government which took office from 1945 to 1951 extend-
ed many war time measures and nationalized railways, coals, gas,
electricity and steels. Industry was subject to strict government con-
trols. At that time, it was acknowledged "that planning must serve a
number of broad policy objectives, including stable prices, full employ-
ment, increasing welfare and living standards, not to mention a strong
balance of payments to bolster the pound" (Ralph Harris, 1976, p. 42).
But the Conservative government elected in 1951 abolished rationing
and controls on industry. The steel industry was denationalized in 1953.
This government which identified planning with controls and restrictions,
was generally opposed to it. As a result, "The conservative government
policy toward industry was generally low-keyed," (Smith, 1975, p. Ill) by
relying on laissez-faire economic policy. It was largely the result of
improved economic conditions in the 1950s. This policy orientation was
also reflected in regional policy. The 1950s is considered to be the age
of 'lull' in the history of regional policy.
"The British entered the 1960s in a mood of bewilderment and
apprehension" (Michael Shanks, 1977, p. 17). During the 1950s, "annual
gross domestic product rose by 7.4% in West Germany, 5.9% in Italy, 4.5%
in France, 3.4% in Sweden and 2.4% in the U.K. Of seventeen European Coun-
tries, only Ireland had a lower growing rate than Britain" (Shanks, 1977,
p. 29). This fact forced successive governments in the 1960s to adopt the
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stimulation of economic growth as the main objectives of policy. (Smith,
1975, p. 53).
Thus confronted with the evident failure of laissez-faire policy,
the British government began to adopt the indicative plan of France, where
a sophisticated form of economic plan had been developed in totally diffe-
rent form of the control-type plan of postwar Britain (Shanks, 1977, pp.
18-19). France's sophisticated system of economic plan showed national
growth targets and objectives, which helped allocate resources in an
optional way. Private and public investment plan were steered into the
right opportunities. "And it was all apparently done by logic and persua-
sion without controls or directives" (Shanks, 1977, p. 19).
In 1961, in an effort to adopt the indicative plan, the Conservative
government established National Economic Development Council (NEDC) and
its office (REDO) (Smith, 1975, p. 111). It was designed to plan for the
economic growth in the national level. In two years in office, the NEDC
published two types of national economic plan: Growth of the United King-
dom Economy to 1966, Conditions Favorable to Faster Growth. In the later
plan, "the NEDC did try to spell out the measures that would have to be
taken to turn the UK from a stagnant to a growth economy" (Shanks, 1977,
p. 29). As one of the these measures, 'the necessity to an active regio-
nal policy' was adopted in that plan. The reason for an active regional
policy stems from this finding that "drawing into employment the unemp-
loyed and the economically inactive in the disadvantaged regions could
contribute helpfully to growth" (Shanks, 1977, p. 112). Thus, the NEDC
was convinced that "fuller utilization of labor in the problem regions
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could make an important contribution to national growth" (McCrone, 1969,
p. 224).
According to HcCallum (1979), "[i]t constituted an explicit argument
that regional policy could serve both national economic growth and
regional redistribution objectives" (p. 16). Cullingworth (1985) also
stressed the importance of this argument:
This argument, it should be noted, was put forward not
by physical planners but by economists. It differed
markedly from the traditional type of economic argu-
ment; and it rejected the idea that the long-term solu-
tion to regional economic decline lay in migration to
the prosperous areas. Apart from the social cost of
large-scale migration that this would involve, there
were two other significant objections. First it would
add to the problems of congestion in the South-East and
the Midlands — problems which were already straining
to the utmost the British machinery of town and country
planning. Secondly, it was thought to be quite imprac-
ticable for these prosperous areas to absorb the
required number of migrants. Furthermore, if the less
prosperous regions were allowed to run down, their
future problems could become even more difficult to
solve. (The opposite argument was seldom heard.) It
followed that the objective should be the formulation
of a regional development policy which aimed at achiev-
ing self-sustaining regional growth (Cullingworth,
1985, p. 302).
It seems clear that reducing regional disparities was one of the
main policy objectives of British industrial policy in the 1960s. Smith
(1975) insinuates this fact by comparing British industrial policy with
that of France:
Thus British industrial policy revealed many similari-
ties with that of France, with one significant differ-
ence: if the aims were often identical, the time
periods in which they operated were very different. In
France, promoting economic growth, exports and regio-
nal balance were the main considerations behind the
Second, Third and Fourth Plans which covered the years
from 1950 to 1965. The Fifth and Sixth Plans were
concerned more with effecting changes in the structure
of industry and with warding-off foreign competition
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and ownership. British policy, on the other hand,
endeavoured to encompass all these aims, more or less
simultaneously, within the confines of a single decade
(Smith, 1975, p. 113).
The Hunt Report (1969)
Since the Barlow Report, regional policy was pursued within the
context of the Distribution of Industry Act which was enacted in 1945 and
revised in 1950 and in 1958. In 1960, the British government replaced it
with the Local Employment Act of 1960. According to Manners et al.,
(1972), these programs "were more a response to the geographical
consequences of the country's industrial and urban history than it was
farsighted regional land use and environmental priorities and goals" (p.
425). The identification of problem regions had been based on the level
of employment. It would be an important indicator of economic distress,
but it could not encompass all the problems of depressed regions. And the
division of Britain into only two types of regions — the prosperous and
the depressed regions — was too over-simplified to encompass all the
diversified geography of economic life. During the 1960s, regional
policy was vigorously implemented by the government with a massive
increase in financial aid to depressed areas. This led the 'gray areas'
"a number of regions which did not qualify as Development Areas but
which nonetheless could not be considered prosperous to agitate for some
considerations of their own problems" (McCallum, 1973, p. 278). As a
result, "by the nineteen-sixties the rationale and precepts of this post-
war phase of regional planning had become increasingly inappropriate to
the problems of the day" (Manners et al., 1972, p. 424).
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Considering these problems, the government set up the Hunt Committee
whose responsibility was "to examine in relation to the economic welfare
of the country as a whole and the needs of the development areas, the
situation in other areas where the rate of economic growth gives cause (or
may give cause) for concern, and to suggest whether revised policies to
influence economic growth in such areas are desirable and if so, what
measures should be adopted" (Cullingworth, 1985, p. 305).
The Committee suggested several criteria for choosing depressed
areas. Main 'cause for concern' was the slow economic growth in the
locality. But the committee stressed that "it [slow growth] is associated
with unused or under-used labor resources, low earnings, a concentration
of industries with a declining labor force, poor communications and a run-
down physical environment making areas unattractive for new economic
growth, and net out migration" (Cullingworth, 1985, p. 305). Thus "in
evaluating the nature of the problem and the possibilities of solution,
the Committee emphasized the 'Total Environment' as a factor" (McCallum,
1973, p. 280). The total environment means "the social, educational,
cultural, industrial, and commercial facilities as well as the physical
infrastructure of buildings, roads, docks, and the like which houses and
sustains them" (quoted from McCallum, 1973, p. 280). Considering these
factors in designating depressed areas, the Committee recommended several
criteria for identifying them: sluggish employment; slow growth in
personal incomes; slow rate of addition to industrial and commercial
facilities; significant unemployment; low or declining proportions of
women at work, low earnings; heavy reliance on declining industry; poor
communications; decayed or inadequate environment; and serious net
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outward migration.
The Committee also recommended specific policy measures which
included designation of intermediate areas. The government response to
their recommendation was revealed in the Local Employment Act 1970. But
this act did not fully adopt their recommendation. The designated inter-
mediate areas did not incorporate all the areas which were suggested by
the Committee. Delineation of development areas was not based on multiple
criteria. "The reaction of the government of the day was that assistance
should be concentrated in more narrowly defined localities within the
regions concerned. The selection of these intermediate areas was to be
governed strictly by 'criteria of need'" (Cullingworth, 1985, p. 309).
But the act incorporated some of their recommendations: industrial estate
factories, training assistance and a grant for derelict land clearance
(McCallum, 1973, p. 281). Tujs, according to McCallum, "the Hunt Commit-
tee's emphasis on environment improvement, at least, thereby received a
reasonably full endorsement" (p. 281).
Although the Committee's recommendations were not fully adopted by
the government, the Report could be "a crucial benchmark in the history of
British regional planning" (Manners et al., 1972, p. 425). Manners et
al., explained this point:
It was after all, the outcome of the first major
governmental enquiry into the location of economic
activity and employment since Barlow. The report mir-
rors many of the advances that have been made in the
understanding of both the symptoms and the causes of
spatial variations in the patterns of socio-economic
change. It naturally reflects something of the consi-
derable experience gained by the British government in
regard to public intervention in the processes of
regional development. In addition, the Committee both
clarified and reformulated a number of important issues
in the field of spatial policy-making and thereby
107
advanced our understanding of them (Manners et al.,
1972, pp. 425-6).
Conflicts 3etween Sector Plan and Regional Policy
The Conservative government which took office in 1970 announced a
change in industrial policy (Smith, 1975, p. 123; Shanks, 1977, pp. 63-4).
According to Smith (1975), "[i]f the Labor government had developed
technocratic style of administration, its successor [the Conservative]
appeared to prefer legalism and laissez-faire" (p. 124). At that time,
the Conservative government was "deeply antipathetic to any form of plan-
ning or interventionist policies" and "pledged to a policy of disengage-
ment from industry in every way possible" (Shanks , 1977, p. 59). Thus,
"[t]he new government hoped to increase the competitiveness of the economy
by pursuing a more vigorous anti-monopolies policy, and 'above all' by
refusing to 'subsidize incompetence' with government grants" (Smith, 1977,
p. 123).
But the bankruptcies of Rolls-Royce and Upper Clyde shipbuilders in
1971 brought about a complete change in British industrial policy (Shanks,
1977, p. 64). The 1972 Industry Act reinforced former intervention
measures by "providing special assistance to particular sectors or
enterprises in regions of high unemployment, and aid for accelerated
investment projects" (Shanks, 1977, p. 64). Thus "[t]his capitulation,
coupled with continuing massive unemployment and a low rate of economic
growth, led to a return to a policy of selective government intervention
in industry" (Smith, 1977, p. 124). These findings imply that regional
policy measures were implemented as one of important tools for industrial
policy. As the government tended to put more emphasis on efficiency in
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industrial policy, regional policy also employed more selective measures.
The 1972 Industry Act adopted selective financial aid to depressed areas.
As expenditures on regional aid increased, its effectiveness began
to be scrutinized by the government itself. The Trade and Industry sub-
committee of the House of Commons Expenditure Committee published a report
on regional policy. As McCallum (1979) has put it, "[i]ts conclusions
were largely critical:" (p. 24).
Much has been spent and much may well have been was-
ted. Regional policy has been empiricism run mad, a
game of hit-and-miss, played with more enthusiasm than
success' ... The Report added: 'Everything in this
inquiry pointed to the need for Government to create a
more rational and systematic basis for the formulation
and execution of regional policy' (quoted from
McCallum, 1979, p. 24).
These problems were not only confined to regional policy. During
the 1970s, the British government has vigorously exerted itself to employ
more effective use of the instruments of industrial policy. A white paper
on An Approach to Industrial Strategy (1975) "set out a new pattern of
economic planning to be carried out" (Shanks, 1977, p. 78). The following
"Elements of an Industrial Strategy" represents government's new stance on
regional policy:
The government will have to continue maintaining a
balance between economic and social objectives which
often have conflicting implications. Nevertheless, the
government intends to give greater weight, and more
consistently than hitherto, to the need for increasing
the national rate of growth through regenerating our
industrial structure and improving efficiency. For the
immediate future this will mean giving priority to
industrial development over consumption or even our
social objectives. There is no other way of developing
the industrial base on which the government's whole
program of economic and social reform depends. The
government will have to ensure the proper coordination
of macro-economic and micro-economic policies since
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success will depend on a complex variety of factors
needing support at national, industry and firm level.
We recognize the need to maintain an adequate level of
demand and employment if both sides of industry are to
possess the confidence required to carry the necessary
changes through (quoted from Shanks, 1977, p. 131).
The new "Industrial Strategy" revealed somewhat different orienta-
tion toward industrial policy. As Shanks (1977) has put it, "[o]ne of the
most important elements in this new-style planning would be the identifi-
cation of the key sectors for future national growth" (p. 80). The
government intended to adopt "sector plans or strategies related to natio-
nal medium-term growth assumptions provided by government" (p. 80). At
that time thirty-nine key sectors were selected, which were considered to
have competitiveness at home and abroad. There would be a planning agree-
ment between each sector and the government. Thus "planning agreements
were seen as mechanisms for linking government financial aid to major
companies in the private sector within a clear program of investment,
product development, finance and marketing" (Cameron, 1979, p. 298).
According to HcCallum (1979), this new strategy posited conflicts with
regional policy:
The Government has been promoting a new industrial
strategy that is based on nation-wide intervention in
(and assistance to) industry on Labor Party ideology
and on an assessment of what is required to revitalize
the obviously ailing British economy, has very impor-
tant implications for regional policy. The most
obvious of these is the fact that extremely large
amount of money are being channelled into industry in
the 'prosperous' regions. The West Midlands is being
assisted enormously by the aid to British Leyland aid
that dwarfs that previously given to shipbuilders in
the 'less prosperous' regions. Equally, the huge sums
spent on subsidizing a British civilian aerospace
industry are largely devoted to the prosperous regions
of the South (HcCallum, 1979, p. 71).
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This new approach to industrial policy resulted in "a spreading of
subsidies over a much larger areas of the nation," (Cameron, 1979, p. 319)
thereby weakening the effects of regional policy. Cameron (1979)
evaluated those approaches and concluded that:
Whilst there is a social justification for such a
practice, it only makes economic sense if the level of
assisted-area productivity is already relatively high.
Subsidies in sectoral schemes should be used to make
relatively strong companies commercially stronger and
not to help weak companies nearer to the margin of
competitiveness. Finally, assisted-area development
will have to be based increasingly upon the development
of new sectors of activity rather than 'stealing'
growth from regions that have pioneered their develop-
ment (Cameron, 1979, p. 320).
The Fall of Regional Policy
In 1979, the Conservative government announced major changes in
regional policy. The major changes included the descheduling of assisted
areas in order to cut the proportion of the employed population of Great
Britain covered by the assisted areas from over 40 percent to around 25
3
percent. And the government planned to reduce regional selective assis-
tance from 609 million in 1979 to 233 million in three years. The
government proposed to continue with a strong but more selective regional
investment policy. Thus, selective regional assistance will be concent-
rated on those parts of the country with the most intractable problems of
unemployment. The government further stressed that assistance will only
be given for projects that would not go ahead as proposed without it and
would be negotiated as the minimum necessary to achieve this.
Further involvement in regional policy can not be expected from this
announcement. The British government continued to pursue regional policy
not because it had confidence in regional policy but rather because it
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wanted to avoid abrupt changes in the framework of regional investment
4
incentives. HcCallum (1979) observed that "regional policy continue to
be subordinated to various national industrial and inner-city policies'
(pp. 37-8). The 1983 White paper 'Regional Industrial Development'
illustrates government new stance on regional policy:
Although an economic case for regional industrial
policy may still be made, it is not self-evident. The
Government believe that the case for continuing the
policy is now principally a social one with the aim of
reducing, on a stable long term basis, regional
imbalances in employment opportunities . . . The argument
that regional industrial policy produces a net national
economic benefit is open to debate . . . The Government
believe that regional industrial incentives still have
and important role to play in influencing the location
on new economic development . . . but the incentives must
be made much more cost-effective than at present, with
greater emphasis on job creation and selectivity, and
less discrimination against service industries. They
also need to focus on encouraging new and indigenous
development in the Assisted Areas, rather than simply
transferring jobs from one part of the country to
another. The Government welcome views on these aspects
of regional industrial incentives (quoted from Culling-
worth, 1985, pp. 423-4).
Summary and Conclusion .
In the UK, regional policy was vigorously implemented as one of the
main tools of industrial policy. The quest for regional balance has been
one of the main goals of national economic policy. Several economic
planning documents such as 'Conditions Favorable to Faster Growth' (1963),
'National Plan' (1965), and the 'Task Ahead: Economic Assessment to 1972
(1969)' all incorporated 'regional balance' as one of the nation s
economic objectives (HcCallum, 1979, pp. 15-9; Cullingworth, 1985, p. 305;
Shanks, 1977, pp. 27-40). These objectives have been legitimized by the
following arguments on economic rationale.
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The Scotland, Hales and the Northern regions had always more than
average unemployment rate. The government believed that if these unemp-
loyed labor forces were drawn to employment, then this would make a sub-
stantial contribution to national output and also to regional prosperity.
According to Keeble (1976), "equalization of unemployment rates in ...
Britain's five assisted regions at the national full employment level
would add 120,000 workers to Britain's employed work force" (p. 210).
The next economic rationale for regional policy evolved from the
Barlow Report. As this Report has revealed, congestion problems in London
provided economic disadvantages in national resource allocation. Keeble
(1976) explained this point by comparing different land costs between
congested regions and depressed regions:
In 1973, average rents per square meter per annum for
new industrial units advertised by Richard Ellis Ltd
... ranged from over £ 10.80 ( 1.00 per sq.ft per
annum) in Greater London and over £ 7.50 (70p)
throughout the rest of the South East, to less than
6.50 (60p) in the South West, Wales and the North, and
less than J- 5.40 (50p) in Scotland, Cumberland and
South West Wales. (Wray, Markham and Watts 1974, p.
162) (quoted from Keeble, 1976, p. 75).
The third argument is also concerned with economic considerations in
regional policy. Factor costs are usually higher in congested regions
than in depressed regions. Thus, if these higher factor costs ares
transmitted "by national trade unions' pressure to the rest of the
country" (Cameron, 1979, p. 396), then it would increase national infla-
tion rate. There can be a counter argument to this position. But this
imbalance in economic conditions can be a problem for the government.
Shanks (9179) explained this point:
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In south-eastern England and the midlands the normal
economic problem was overemployment, congestion and
inflation. In northern England, Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland the typical situation was one of the
decaying industrial structure, underemployment and
emigration. This fundamental imbalance — the other
regions falling somewhere in between these two extremes
— rendered the overall management of demand very dif-
ficult. A policy designed to reduce inflation in Lon-
don and Birmingham was liable to produce a slump in
Glasgow and Newcastle. What was needed, therefore was
some form of regionally differentiated economic poli-
cies, stronger than the measures which had been
operated for a long time by the Board of Trade, to
steer new investment away from the boom areas toward
the depressed regions (Shanks, 1977, p. 40).
But it appears that from the mid 1970s, the strength and scope of
regional policy was gradually reduced in the UK. As McCallum pointed it
out, "in the mid-1970s, [a] well-established 'consensus' view on regional
policy began to be shaken" (p. 36). He attributed this fact to "the
apparent convergence of unemployment discrepancies between 1974 and 1976,
combined with rapid rises in the absolute rate in formerly more prosperous
regions" (p. 36). And he also stressed that "most damaging for the tradi-
tional view of regional policy has been the shift of national concern
towards a non-spatial industrial policy based on individual firms and
sectors" (p. 37). Cullingworth (1985) also suggested the changed context
for regional policy:
This initial unequivocal commitment to regional policy
was dramatically affeccted towards the end of the 1970s
by such factors as the severe recession, by the
national 'industrial strategy' which involved support
for industry outside the 'assisted areas,' by the
dramatic rise of unemployment in the South and West,
and the rise of the 'inner city problem' (Cullingworth,
1985, p. 308).
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Now, several major policy tools such as Office Development Permit (0I)P)
and Regional Employment Premium (REP) were abolished. Industrial Develop-
ment Certificate was suspended. The government continued to give finan-
cial assistance only in those cases that can be considered to be profit-
able or economic. The 1984 White Paper reveals that "the argument that
regional industrial policy produce a net national economic benefit is open
to debate." And it was also stressed that regional policy should not
result in "transferring one job from one part of the country to another."
5
As Cullingworth (1985) and McCallum (1979) have put it, there can be
several reasons for the 'fall' of regional policy. Besides those reasons
that they have suggested, the most important cause may be that British
planning system has operated "to weaken competition" (Harris, 1976, p.
56). The next chapter will discuss this problem.
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COMPARISON BETWEEN WO COUNTRIES
Comparison of Two Report: ^The Barlow Report' vs 'The People Left Behind'
In the U.K., the Barlow Report has been considered to have laid the
ground work for the development of regional policy. Most literature on
regional policy in the U.S., acknowledges the importance of the report,
'The People Left Behind,' in that it advocated regional development.
Comparison of these two reports will shed some light on the question of
how each country has perceived and interpreted regional problems.
There was a two decade time lag between the production of each
report. But the two reports revealed similarity in their approaches to
regional problem. Both the reports regarded the congestion problems and
unemployment problems (rural poverty in the U.S.) in problem regions as
interrelated ones. But the Barlow Report stressed that this
interrelationship constitued the economic rationale for regional policy.
The Commission's report in the U.S. suggested that every citizen should
have equal access to opportunities for economic and social well-being
without discrimination because of place of residence. Thus the Commission
stressed the fair share of the rural in the prosperity of American
economy. The justication for rural development rested with equity or
social justice criteria.
Economic rationale has been the main motive for regional policy in
the U.K. And it was confirmed by the successive national economic plans
in the 1960s. The NEDC specified several measures that would have to be
taken to turn the U.K. from a stagnant to a growth economy. These mea-
sures included the necessity to adopt an active regional policy. The
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underlying causes of regional policy was that fuller utilization of labor
in the problem regions could make contribution to national growth.
As has been explained, several factors played against the adoption
of regional policy in the U.S. In the 1950s, the main issue was whether
the federal government should take steps in favor of problem regions.
Economic backwardness was seen as a natural condition in the overall
process of economic development. Any investment in low productive areas
would mean a significant loss for the efficiency of the economic system as
a whole. The geographical size or the diversity in spatial development
has been a great impediment to federal intervention. The early adminis-
tration in the USDA emphasized people oriented policy. Above all, cultu-
ral and philosophical constraints on government intervention have been the
main factors which reinforced those trends. Thus the advocates for regio-
nal development had to rely on social issues for government intervention.
Federal System and Regional Policy
In the 1960s, controversies over federal intervention in lagging
areas in the U.S. turned on the following question: degree and type of
government intervention in market forces or the degree of control on urban
to rural migration. The Modifiers (The Adaptors) saw it foolhardy to take
radical steps on migration control. As an alternative, they suggested
human resources development or inducement of migration to intermediate-
size cities. The Radical Transformers (The Developers) proposed that
government should bring jobs to lagging areas in order to check the
population movement to metropolitan areas. But this strategy was short-
lived due to the turnaround in population movement in the 1970s.
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The first regional policy in the U.S. had to function within certain
limitations: regional policy measures should not result in transferring
of jobs from one place to another. This issue developed into controversy
over the Zero-Sura situation in regional development in the 1970s. The core
issue about 'The Second War between the States' was whether the South was
growing at the expense of the North. But it appears that it was not the
explicit policy but the implicit policy which has been the subject of
these controversies. These situations represent the institutional set-
tings to which regional policy may have to adapt. In a different way,
Krumme (1981) explained this point:
there may be — ceteris paribus — less need for an
explicit and visible "regional policy" in federal
systems than in centralized countries simply because
the federal government system may have prevented the
type of polarization which gives rise to interregional
inequalities or because the constitutional or political
mandate for regional policies may simply not be
powerful enough (Krumme, 1981, p. 160).
Moreover, actual political process — the so-called, incrementalism — may
be another constraint on regional policy:
Indeed, it [Congress] has tended to discourage planning
in some regional programs. The apparant motivation is
not so much an ideology favoring the market workings of
a "free enterprise" economy as fear that planning of
any kind would decrease the opportunities for resouce
allocation by congressional ad hoc approaches (Hansen,
1981, p. 63).
Sectoral Policy and Regional Policy
As a highly centralized country, Britain did not have such institu-
tional problems as the U.S. had in formulating and implementing policies.
The problem was how to enhance the overall efficiency in attaining goals
which were set by the government.
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Promoting economic growth, exports and regional balance have been
the main objectives of British industrial policy. As a way of attaining
regional balance, regional policy took part in the implementation of
industrial policy. It was assumed that fuller utilization of idle resour-
ces in lagging areas, making demand for labor uniform over the whole of
U.K. and so preventing the creation of excess demand in the South, would
result in overall economic growth.
But the British government began to doubt the overall impacts of
regional policy. It was not only confined to regional policy. The
British planning system has received criticisms in that it has operated to
weaken competition. During the 1970s, the British governemnt has
vigorously exerted itself to employ more efficient policy tools. As a
result, a new industrial strategy suggested that the government intended
to give greater weight to the need for increasing the national rate of
growth through regenerating industrial structure and improving efficieny.
This new strategy which put more emphasis on sectoral policy posited
conflicts with regional policy. The scope and strength of regional policy
6
was gradually reduced. And "regional policy may well not be revitalized,
but instead may continue to be subordinated to various national industrial
and inner-city policies" (McCallum, 1979). The government stressed the
need to focus on encouraging new and indigeneous development in the
Assisted Areas, rather than simply transferring jobs from one part of the
country to another. There occured a great turnaround in the government's
belief in regional policy.
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CHAPTER FOUR BACKNOTES
1. The concept of regionalism can be explained in several ways:
political, cultural, geographic and administrative regionalism. But
this paper focused on administrative or planning concept.
2. Urban outlay as a percentage of total federal outlay was 2.1 in 1967
and 6.7 in 1970. It increased to 11 percent in 1976. (Goldsmith and
Jacobs, 1982, p. 56).
3. Department of Industry, "Government announces more selective regional
policy" Trade and Industry , 20 July 1979, pp. 99-102.
<4. The Scretary of State for Industry, sir Keith Joseph, has expressed
that "Our objective is to maintain reasonable stability in the
framwork of regional investment incentives and to aviod abrupt
changes" Trade and Industry , 20 July 1979, p. 99.
5. Cullingworth, 1985, p. 308; HcCallum, 1979, pp. 36-7.
6. Expenditutes for regional policy comprised 1.3 percent of total public
expenditure in 1976-79. It was 0.7 percent in 1980-81. (Dunford, et
al., 1981, p. 403).
CHAPTER V
EXPERIENCE IN REGIONAL POLICY
Strategies in Regional Policy
This chapter will discuss strategies and tools (instruments) of
regional policy in the U.S. and in the U.K. With regards to strategies.
Hoover (1975) has explained that there can be four basic issues: "place
prosperity versus people prosperity, distress versus development poten-
tial, concentration versus diffusion, and the choice of means of
assistance" (p. 271).
The first issue centers around the question of whether government
assistance should be vested in depressed areas or on unemployed workers in
those areas. The "place prosperity" approach has been criticized in that
government assistance can not be selective with this approach. Those who
benefit most from government aid are "generally property owners and the
operators of established locally oriented businesses, such as utilities,
banks, and commercial and consumer firms" (Hoover, 1975, p. 260). Even
the newly located plants do not tend to employ the locally unemployed
because they do not possess the requisite skills. Thus there can be
certain weaknesses in this approach. The alternative approach used to
advocate human resources development strategy in depressed areas. "Assis-
tance logically takes the form of improving the employability and mobility
of people affected, facilitating their relocation" (Hoover, 1975, p. 273).
Another question which is highly interrelated with the first issue
is that whether people should move to jobs or jobs move to people. The
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first school which is in favor of bringing people to jobs says that
"businessmen usually select very carefully the optimum location for their
plant and if influenced by government policy (or mere pressure) to move,
would be forced into a situation of lower profitability of their firm,
which would decrease economic growth" (Vanhove and Klassen, 1980, p. 373).
But the other school assumes that many industries are footloose and that
people are reluctant to move on social and cultural reasons. This school
advocates dispersion of industry from congested regions to depressed ones.
Increasing congestion, high marginal cost of public infrastructure and
inflationary pressure from additional migration in overdeveloped regions
are suggested as reasons for dispersion of industry. In short, this
school argues that "intervention in private location decisions of firms
does not necessarily reduce national economic growth" (Vanhove and Klas-
sen, 1980, p. 374).
The second issue (distress versus development potential) and the
third one (concentration versus diffusion) are also interrelated problems
in designing regional policy. Any public expenditure of government should
be oriented towards a goal of national economic growth. Consistent with
this view (efficiency) is an emphasis on development potential as the
criterion for allocation of assistance to regions. If assistance is
concentrated in a few regions, it will be more economic. But regional
policy has been justified on equity grounds, which call for more public
expenditure to regions in economic distress. This view implies diffused
assistance to all problem regions. According to Smith (1981), this kind
of policy can be politically attractive but has serious drawbacks:
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In a depressed region it tends to perpetuate the exis-
ting form of the space economy, which may be far from
optimal with respect to the stated planning goals and
may indeed be a serious source of inefficiency. As in
an underdeveloped region it ignores such obvious condi-
tions as the uneven distribution of resources and the
economic advantages to be gained from initiating indus-
trialization in some places rather than in others
(Smith, 1981, p. 393).
Policy Measures and Tools
The fourth issue deals with specific policy measures or tools in
regional policy. All public interventions which aim at reducing inter-
regional disparity can be regarded as regional policy if they "are geogra-
phically limited in their scope and are explicitly designed to spur the
economic growth of certain regions (or limit the growth of other regions)"
(Sundquist and Mields, 1979, p. 305). Th'i3, regional policy measures
"are characterized by the fact that they can, and normally do, discrimi-
nate different types of regions. The direction of the discrimination
depends on the policy targets and the situations in the regions" (Siebert,
1969, p. 193).
Siebert (1969, ch. 9) classified various policy measures "according
to three different criteria: (1) the determinants of regional growth
which they influence, (2) the size of the area which they are basically
supposed to affect, and (3) the intensity of interference with the market
economy" (p. 193). By the first criterion, there can be six types of
regional policy measures: "labor-supply measures, capital-supply
measures, technical progress instruments, demand-influencing instruments,
location policy and mobility policy" (pp. 193-4). The second criterion
divides them into two categories: "regional instruments and national
instruments" (pp. 194-5). "The third criterion for the classification of
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policy variables is to rank them according to their interference with
private activity." Accordingly, there are five types of policy measures:
"direct controls, indirect controls, moral suasion, information policy and
activities undertaken by the government" (pp. 196-200). This classifica-
tion supplies a wide variety of policy measures for policy makers.
According to Vanhove and Klassen (1980), "national instruments [for
regional policy] can be categorized as follows: infrastructure aids,
financial incentives, disincentives, decentralization of government
offices, regional allocation of public investment and public orders and
finally, regional development agencies" (p. 304). But Sundquist and
Mields (1979) specified four types of programs which have been used in the
European countries and in Canada as follows:
1. Extra expenditure for public "infrastructure" necessary to
encourage private investment in lagging areas
2. Subsidies and loans for private investment or employment in
those areas
3. Direction of investment by publicly owned or controlled
enterprises to or location of central governmental activi-
ties in those areas
4. Disincentives to private investment in congested areas.
(Sundquist and Mields, 1979, p. 305).
Financial Incentives
As Allen et al., (1979) have explained it, "there are a large
number of regional incentives in Europe. These include: loans on favorab-
le conditions; grants on capital; employment premia; social security
concessions; tax and investment allowance concessions; factory rent conce-
ssions; training aids; contributions toward share capital; subsidies on
public utility charges; operating and settling-in subsidies" (p. 3). Thus
"an incentive is given to compensate a region for what it lacks in econo-
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mic attraction, because it has no, or not enough, skilled labor or social
amenities, or fails in external economies, owing to high communication
costs, absence of an industrial tradition, low productivity" (Vanhove and
Klassen, 1980, p. 308). But these incentives "have mainly been used to
influence the location decisions of private activities" (Siebert, 1969, p.
198). Among several private activities, "the location of manufacturing
activity has been viewed as the most important single variable controlling
the country's economic and population geography" (Keeble, 1976, p. 201).
Townroe (1979) explained reasons for this fact:
The majority of industrial policy all over the world
has focused on manufacturing as the most spatially
footloose sector of industry and as the sector most
susceptible to the influence of policies (Townroe,
1979, p. xii). '
This argument led to a examining of the degree of footlooseness of
the manufacturing sector. As Smith (1981) has explained it, "[t]here is a
large-measure of agreement on the fact that industry in general is beco-
ming more mobile or 'foot-loose'" (p. 394). The reasons for this argument
are also suggested as follows:
As smaller proportion of industrial activity remains
concerned with the processing of bulky materials, as
improvements in transportation reduce the cost of over-
coming distance, and as certain external economies of
agglomeration become more geographically mobile, it is
argued that very many firms can locate almost anywhere
they please within fairly broad spatial limits
(margins). For example Luttrell (1962) estimated that
something like two-thirds of British manufacturing
industry can operate successfully in any of the main
regions of the country, providing it is skillfully
managed (Smith, 1981, p. 394).
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Public Infrastructure
Most problem regions are in need of basic infrastructure. Since
direct intervention in market forces tends to cause another problem,
public infrastructures have become more important instruments for regional
development. According to Siebert (1969), "social-overhead outlays cause
both an income effect and a capacity effect" (p. 198). As additional
income tends to leak out of the region, the capacity effect is considered
to be more important. This effect "causes external economies which in
turn will induce private activity" (Siebert, 1969, p. 198). Also this
will enhance "local promotion, image-building, and other dissemination of
information that might induce manufacturers to see a region in a more
favorable light" (Smith, 1981, p. 391).
The above examinations of two types of policy measures show that all
policy measures have certain specific functions. Few of them can be
versatile in their functions. Certain advantages and disadvantages of
each specific tool can be identified (Allen, et al., 1979, pp. 7-11).
Considering policy targets and the situations in the regions and comparing
advantages and disadvantages of each tool, policy makers may have to
choose more effective ones. "Depending on the planning goals, and on the
way the economic system functions, some instruments will be more effective
than others" (Smith, 1981, p. 392).
Considering these points, this chapter will, first, examine strate-
gies and tools in both countries. And then, those measures will be eval-
uated in terms of their effect on interregional disparity. This will be
followed by comparison of policies between two countries.
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PART I. BRITISH EXPERIENCE IN REGIONAL POLICY
As Keeble (1976) has put it, the history of British regional policy
"is a major topic in its own right" (p. 220). The analysis of policy is
more difficult because "policy development has not really been a continu-
ous process, but subject to rapid fluctuations in intensity of controls,
scale of financial inducements, extents of areas affected, and range of
policy instrument, consequent primarily on changes in national and
regional economic fortunes and in government administrations" (Keeble,
1976, p. 220).
In the first section, this paper will discuss the major changes in
policy measures. And then, the next section will deal with the evaluation
of each measure. In the last section overall evaluation of British regio-
nal policy will be discussed with emphasis on its impact on regional
development.
Regional Policy Before 1970
Special Areas (1934-39)
The earliest response to regional problems was a migration policy
which encouraged labor migration out of problem regions. The Industrial
Transference Board which was set up in 1928 "aided the moves of an average
28,000 workers a year and lasted until 1938" (Yuill, 1979, p. 38).
McCrone (1969) stressed that "this was more of a labor policy than a
regional policy" (p. 92). Strictly speaking, mobility policy, migration
policy and regional (industrialization) policy cannot be identical (Van-
hove and Klassen, 1980, pp. 371-3). In so far as regional policy is
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concerned about all the factor movements (capital, labor) between regions,
these differences cannot constitute real problems.
The 1934 Special Areas (Development and Improvement) Act was the
first policy measure that affect the distribution of industries. This act
provided an alternative approach to regional problems: work-to-workers
policies. Four areas with high levels of unemployment were designated as
Special Areas. In order to attract industries to Special Areas, British
government began to provide loans and subsidies for those areas.
Development Areas (1945-60)
The Special Areas became Development Areas under the Distribution of
Industry Act of 1945. This act set the foundatin of British regional
policy from 1945 to 1960 (McCrone, 1969, p. 107). The designation of
these areas was again determined by their unemployment rate. This act
empowered the Board of Trade to make grants or loans to specific manufac-
turing firms in Development Areas, if the firms had no alternative source
of finance and had good prospects of success (McCrone, 1969, p. 110). The
British government introduced Industrial Development Certificate (IDC)
system in 1948. This was established by the 1947 Town and Country Plan-
ning Act, which made it compulsory for any industrial building project of
more than 1,000 sq. ft., (465 sq. meters) to get IDC issued by the Board
of Trade. By granting or refusing IDC, the Board could channel develop-
ment to problem areas.
Development Districts (1960-1966)
Since 1960, "a much steeper economic decline in the peripheral
region's industries ... has resulted in a massive intensification of
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regional policy, particularly after 1963" (Keeble, 1976, p. 226). Under
the Local Employment Act of 1960, Development Districts were designated in
any area where "high rates of unemployment existed or ... were likely to
exist" (McCrone, 1969, p. 122). The criterion for delineation was the
possession of unemployment rate greater than 4.5%. This led to frequent
and continuous re-scheduling of assisted areas: "holding 12.5 percent of
the national insured population in 1961, they declined to 7.2 percent in
1962 and reached a maximum coverage of 16.8 percent in 1966 (Yuill, 1979,
p. 36).
Incentive packages included a grant of 10 percent of plant and
machinery costs and free depreciation for tax purpose, by which "indus-
tries were able to reduce their tax liability to zero until they have
recovered the full cost of the new equipment" (Keeble, 1976, p. 226).
The Special Development and Development Areas (1966-1971)
"Beginning in late 1964, then, an ideologically committed Labour
government began to introduce the series of innovations which ushered in a
'new era' in British regional policy" (McCallum, 1973, p. 271). Those new
innovations are summarized as follows.
1. Regional Structure
Before 1964, Board of Trade (BoT) had the responsibility of regional
development. Upon creating a Department of Economic Affairs (DEA),
the Labour government formed Regional Economic Planning Councils
(REPCs) in each region in 1965. "Their principal function [was] to
assist in the formulation of regional plans and to advise on their
implementation" (McCrone, 1969, p. 23).
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2. Assisted Areas
The Labour government replaced the Development Districts with the
new Development Areas under the 1966 Industrial Development Act.
And in response to acute unemployment problems in certain coal-
mining areas, the government designated Special Development Areas
with the intention of giving them special priority in incentives. A
new method was introduced in designating assisted areas: "the new
Development Areas were to be selected according to a number of
criteria, including unemployment, population change, migration, and
even 'the objectives of regional policy'" (McCallum, 1973, p. 274).
3. Office Development Permit
The Control of Office and Industrial Development Act of 1965
provided a new control system on service sector. Under this act,
Office Development Permit (ODP) was required for office development
of more than 3000 sq. ft. in Greater London and 10,000 sq. ft. in
the rest of the South East and in the urban areas of East and West
Midlands.
4. Regional Employment Premium
This new incentive system was "a per capita labor subsidy payable to
manufacturing employers in the development areas" (Allen, et al.,
1979, p. 6). This was a response to the criticisms that the invest-
ment grant system was likely to encourage an overconcentration of
capital-intensive industry which provided relatively few jobs
(Keeble, 1976, p. 229). According to McCrone (1969), "this [REP] is
estimated at approximately 7.5 percent of the wage bill" (p. 201).
"REP was a distant departure from past policy in that it
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was the first large-scale subsidy to operating cost" (McCallum,
1973, p. 277).
5. Automatic Grants on Investment
Highly sophisticated incentive system was replaced by new automatic
grant on investment. Investment grants were nationally available,
but they had a regional differential: 40% for development areas, 20%
for all manufacturing industry (Yuill, 1979, p. 40). This automatic
grant system, combined with REP, resulted in a massive increase in
regional assistance (Table 5.1). According to Keeble (1976), "[i]n
1970-71, special regional assistance was costing the Exchequer no
less than 270 million a year, representing a fivefold increase in
simple monetary terms since 1960-61" (p. 230).
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Table 5.1: Regional Policy Funds by Major Headings, 1962-63 to 1977-78.
(Millions of pounds at constant 1970-71 prices)
1972 Industry
Act
1966
Industry Regio- Sect-
Local Act nal ion 7 Grand
Employ - REP invest- Devel- Aid Net Total
raent and ment opment All tax net
Acts SET grants grants funds items funds
1962-63 22.5 22.5 -0.3 22.2
1963-64 41.5 41.5 -0.1 40.5
1964-65 53.6 53.6 -0.1 53.4
1965-66 53.2 53.2 +63.9 117.11966-67 67.2 67.2 +40.6 107.81967-68 55.4 42.3 88.3 186.0 -13.5 172.5
1968-69
1969-70
61.9
89.9
145.5
147.8
100.4
107.2
307.8
344.9
-19.5
-20.7
288.3
2z4.21970-71 70.2 118.7 123.5 312.4 -21.5 290.9
1971-72 59.3 101.0 82.5 242.8 +2.9 245.7
1972-73 58.8 86.6 56.8 6.3 2 .9 211.9 +20.4 232.31973-74 29.3 82.6 22.9 83.1 14 .1 232.0 -5.4 226.6
1974-75 29.1 101.9 10.2 140.7 43 .4 330.3 -3.3 327.01975-76 10.3 111.9 2.9 170.1 39 .6 334.3 -3.1 331.71976-77 8.5 72.2 2.2 186.8 41..3 311.0 N.A 311.01977-78* 6.0 1.0 200.0 40,.0 247.0 N.A 247.0
N.A - Data not avai lable.
*
- Estimated.
Note. All figures have been rounded to nearest 100,000. These data alsoinclude funds which have a large recoverable element (such as loans andfactory building) and so do not represent true ultimate net cost.
Source: McCallum (1979), "The development of Regional Policy" in Regional
Pollc y : Past Experience and New Directions, eds. , D. Maclennan
and J. Parr (1979) (Oxford: Martin Robertson) p. 32, Table 1.5.
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Regional Policy in the 1970s
The Conservative Government (1970-1973)
It was the economic recession which made the government give up its
former reliance on disengagement from regional policy. The 1972 Industry
Act contained a new type of financial incentive system: regional develop-
ment grant. It "is available on new plant, machinery, buildings and works
in the special development and development areas at rate of 22 per cent
and 20 percent, respectively. In the intermediate areas only buildings
and works are eligible, the rate of subsidy being, as in the development
areas, 20 percent" (Yuill, 1979, p. 44).
This act also introduced a selective incentive system. Loans and
interest relief grants were available for certain projects which has
profitability or viability. "Selectivity and discretion entered into the
British regional incentive system" (Yuill, 1979, p. 4). And these are
considered to be the second most important source of aid.
These incentives were channeled through the newly established Indus-
trial Development Executive (IDE). IDE had its own regional offices in
the depressed areas. And its work was "assisted by an Industrial Develop-
ment Advisory Board." This board "was to advise on the best means of
stimulating industrial development and to supervise the allocation of
government grants" (Smith, 1975, p. 124).
The conservative government extended Intermediate Areas to the
entire area of the North West, Yorkshire and Humberside, and Wales. "This
extension ... meant that almost half of the nation's population lived in
assisted areas" (McCallum, 1979, p. 23).
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The Labour Government (1974-1979)
The strenghthening of regional policy by the successive Labour
governments has always been associated with good results of the Labour
party in elections in the assisted areas (Keeble, 1976, p. 212). "True to
its political roots as well as to its own past policy, the Labour govern-
ment announced its firm commitment to regional development activism"
(McCallum, 1979, p. 24). Without revising the 1972 Industry Act, the
government doubled the value of REP and extended the assisted areas. The
results of these approaches was that:
By 1976, the assisted areas thus contained no less than
43 percent of all Britain's employed population and
covered a wider area than ever before. Moreover, an
actual 1973-74 regional policy cost of over £ 310
million was expected, on official government estimates,
to rise to no less than <H 575 million by 1976-77 and to
603 million by 1979-80. These very large totals prima-
rily reflected massive regional development grant (
243 million, 1976-77) and Regional Employment Premium (
213 million, 1976-77) payments (Keeble, 1976, pp. 232-
3).
But, after the oil crisis in 1973, "Britain's inflation rate doubled
during the year, and moved ahead of all other major industrial countries
except for Italy and Japan (the two countries hardest hit by the oil price
rise)" (Shanks, 1977, p. 24). The government began to adopt a new indus-
trial strategy, "which would rely on greatly increased public intervention
with prime aims of stimulating investment and promoting competitive effi-
ciency" (McCallum, 1979, p. 27). It appears that the government wanted to
meet the crisis "by maintaining a socialist siege economy" (Shanks, 1977,
p. 75).
The new industrial strategy stemmed from a 'White Paper on an
Approach to Industrial Strategy,' which was published in 1975. As it had
134
been explained in Chapter IV, this new strategy presaged the fall (devo-
lution) of regional policy. Cameron (1979) explained this new strategy:
This strategy, which covers the whole of the United
Kingdom, has four component parts: planning agreements
between the government and major companies; financial
aid to achieve industrial change in the private sector;
state intervention into and involvement with private
economic activity through special state agencies; and
diagnostic exercises and cooperative planning covering
roughly forty key manufacturing sectors. Ostensibly,
each one of these components has been selected so as to
improve productivity growth over the medium-to-long
run. Institutionally, they are to be the building
blocks of a new and flexible relationship between
government, the trade unions and private industrial
enterprise, based on the recognition of the interdepen-
dence of decision making in a mixed economy (Cameron,
1979, p. 279).
Most regional assistances to industry programs were available
outside the assisted areas. But economic recession has also forced the
government to cut public expenditures. Regional policy has finally become
a victim of this general squeeze, and the drop in regional funds from
1975-76 to 1977-78 will probably turn out to be around 25 percent in real
terms" (McCallum, 1979, p. 31). Some of assisted areas downgraded for the
first time in the history of British regional policy. ODP systems began
to lose its former powers: "[i]t was announced that ODP would be greatly
relaxed, with higher limits (30,000 sq. ft., - the highest yet) and with
outright exemption for small employment (200-300 workers)" (McCallum,
1979, p. 30). Under the name of 'efficiency', the strength of the British
regional policy began to deteriorate.
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The Conservative Government (1979- )_
As soon as the Conservatives took power in May, 1979, the government
announced major changes in regional policy. The most prominent change was
the reduction in the financial and geographical scales of regional aid to
industry in two stages, in August 1980 and August 1982. RDG was payable
at the rate of 22 percent in the Special Development Areas and 20 percent
in the Development Areas on capital expenditure for new plant and machine-
ry, buildings and works, and at the rate of 20 percent in the Interme-
diate Areas on new buildings and works. There was no big change in the
state of Special Development Areas. But the rate of grant payable in the
Development Areas was to be reduced to 15 percent and grants for Interme-
diate Areas were planned to cease to be paid.
The government abolished the Regional Economic Planning Council and
Office Development Permit System. At that time, the government did not
see it necessary to abolish the IDC. The IDC procedure was still useful
in identifying large projects which were potentially mobile. "As the
economy worsened it became increasingly clear that industrial development
certificates were of little of relevance. Between 1975 and 1981 only 28
out of 7000 applications for IDCs were refused." In 1981 the government
announced the suspension of IDC controls until further notice (Cullin-
gworth, 1985, p. 379).
Announcing the details of changes in regional policy, the Secretary
1
of State for Industry (1979) expressed that:
Although expenditure on regional incentives will con-
tinue to be substantial, I must emphasize that regional
differences will not be reduced simply by redistri-
buting money from taxpayers: there needs also to be
local enterprise and plenty of co-operation in making
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businesses competitive and profitable. Nothing will do
more for the prosperity of a region than a reputation
for effective work, high productivity and co-operation
between workforce and management. (Keith Joseph, 1979).
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Evaluation of Policy Measures
Designation of Assisted Areas
Upon taking office, every new government has changed geographical
boundaries of assisted areas. This frequent change in spatial coverage
'
received severe criticisms in that it "created an atmosphere of
uncertainty for businessmen and public planners alike and thus led to an
obvious dilution of the impact of regional policy measures on investment
and location decisions" (Yuill, 1979, p. 37).
But the main criticisms of assisted areas pointed toward the
criteria by which they were created. Unemployment has been the major
criterion in selection of assisted areas. This fact also led to frequent
changes in boundaries. This tended to aid those areas which had the least
potential and were least attractive to industrialists. Cullingworth
(1985) summarized these criticisms:
... The 'selection' of development districts was made,
however, on the basis of unemployment rates. Yet unem-
ployment in itself is neither an adequate measure of
the regional problem nor an indicator of what needs to
be done. It is inadequate as a regional indicator
because of the large numbers of potential workers who
would figure among the employed if jobs were available.
It is also inadequate in that it obviously cannot take
account of those workers who have already migrated from
the region to areas where jobs are available. Indeed,
it is a measure of only one aspect of a regional econo-
my, and ignores a whole range of other factors such as
incomes, demand, locational attributes, and so forth
(Cullingworth, 1985, p. 303).
The degree of geographical coverage has al«o been the targets of
criticisms. Sometimes, it covered half of the U.K. population. In 1979,
the government revealed that 40 percent of the employed population was
covered by the assisted areas. It cannot be a discriminatory measure,
138
which ignores the very essence of regional policy.
The other criticism concerned with the locational disadvantages of
assisted areas. "Specific criticisms of peripheral regions as relatively
uneconomic locations for manufacturing industry center on the transport
cost and labor quality and relations arguments" (Keeble, 1976, p. 213).
But "it is argued that very many firms can locate almost anywhere they
please within fairly broad spatial limits" (Smith, 1981, p. 394). Thus,
there can be a controversy over whether locational disadvantages resulted
in overall inefficiency in manufacturing industry. It appears that "too
much attention had been given to problems of regional industrial structure
and not enough to regional locational disadvantages" (Smith, 1981, p.
427). And one thing which cannot be disputable is that "peripheral areas
are characterized by more militant union attitudes and a greater frequency
of strikes" (Keeble, 1976, p. 215). This controversy over inefficiency
will be discussed more in the next section.
Financial Subsidies
The British government ivented a wide range of financial inventives
and implemented them to encourage regional development. There have been
some clear trends in this evolution and use of incentives:
1
.
"The scale and scope of the incentives was greatly increased in the
1960s" (McCrone, 1969, p. 191).
2. Compared with the discretionary or selective assistance, greater
emphasis was put on automatic grants. Regional Development Grant
(RDG) and Regional Employment Premium are of this type.
3. "There was an increased use of grants in relation to expenditure on
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loans and factory building on industrial estates. The non-returnable
element in the assistance given has therefore increased" (HcCrone,
1969, p. 191).
Among several types of incentives, the "Regional Employment Premium" is
worthy of special comment. When it was first introduced, it was expected
to have several strong points:
(a) it implies no discrimination against existing firms;
(b) it gives special encouragement to labor intensive types of
industries;
(c) it cuts regional production costs and so has the positive
effects of a regional devaluation without the negative ones (no
higher import prices)
;
(d) it minimizes the spreading of effects to other regions;
(e) it incorporates an income transfer from rich to poor regions.
(Vanhove and Klassen, 1980, p. 328)
But criticisms of REP centered on the huge amount of public expendi-
ture for this package. It amounted about one third of the total expendi-
ture on regional policy (Wilson, 1979, p. 97). The second criticism
concerns its effectiveness on productivity. According to Vanhove and
Klassen (1980), "[i]n 1975, it represented 5.0 percent of the earnings of
the male workers and 4.4 percent of those of female workers, which is not
more than about 3.5 percent in terms of value added" (p. 329). And the
REP was "particularly weak because its payment was totally unconditional"
(Wilson, 1979, p. 97).
Thus, "capital grants are superior to REP in that changes in a
region's industrial capital have to be made before grants are paid."
(Wilson, 1979, p. 98). But most criticisms on incentives focused on the
system of automatic granting. This has led to the conclusion that "policy
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had not been sufficiently selective from an industrial point of view. All
industries were treated in much the same way, even though some are more
suitable for the problem regions than others" (Smith, 1981, p. 427).
The assistance system did not consider the specific characteristics of
problem regions. Thus, it is quite reasonable to assume that this system
might have produced inefficient and non-competitive firms in the assisted
areas. Firn and Maclennan (1979) explained this point:
there is the knowledge that many of the regional indus-
tries, especially in the critical export-oriented manu-
facturing sectors, remain heavily subsidized and non-
competitive due to such factors as weaknesses related
to the age and vintage of their capital stock, the low
productivity of much of their workforces, the absence
of modern effective management, and a reliance on
externally generated technology (Firn and Maclennan,
1979, p. 292).
Keeble has also sided with this point:
there do seem to be indications that certain peripheral
areas, notably the more distant ones of Scotland and
Northern Ireland, do not afford all sectors of modern
manufacturing industry with as efficient an operating
environment as the central regions of the South East
and Midlands. Achievement of regional policy's prime
goal, 'a better economic balance between the different
parts of the country ... for the social and wider
economic reasons . . . may well therefore involve a cer-
tain loss of national manufacturing output through less
efficient production, and may hence require some long-
term operating subsidies' (Keeble, 1976, p. 220).
Restrictive Policy Measures
Locational policy measures for industrial dispersion was reinforced
by different type of measures: Industrial Development Certificate (IDC).
And the Office Development Permit (ODP) was implemented with regards to
the fact that "office development ... [was] more unevenly distributed in
comparison to manufacturing employment with London having a very high
concentration of office employment in both qualitative and
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quantitative terms" (Nicol and Wettman, 1979, p. 165).
During the periods when they were implemented there had been wide
range of fluctuations in their degree of control. When the governments
wanted to implement a strong regional policy, they usually tightened
exemption limits and extended geographical coverage (Table 5.2, 5.3).
The two control systems were considered to be cheap to operate, and
they provided the attractiveness of the assisted areas (Nicol and Wettman,
1979, p. 165). But the ODP System lost its attractiveness because of the
inner cities' deterioration. It also increased the rent value, which
resulted in the rise of production cost. Moreover, the distance of move-
ment was not so great as to solve the congestion problem of the Southeast.
There can be controversies over the effectiveness of the IDC system.
According to Keeble (1976), "[d]uring the 1960s, the figure [the rate of
refusal of industrial development certificate] was usually between 20 and
30 percent, but in any case it fell substantially after 1968. Moreover,
most refused schemes apparently nonetheless go ahead, to some degree at
least, in non-IDC controlled existing central region premises" (p. 213).
Thus he saw it reasonable to conclude that "the loss of growth caused by
IDC controls is not large" (Cameron, 1974, p. 29).
But opponents of this system stress the relative poor status of the
South East in comparison with other regions in EEC countries. They cannot
find the reasons for controlling the development of the South East. As
Manners et al., (1980) has put it:
Whereas the South East of England
... for long has stood as the
wealthiest region in Britain, set in an EEC context it ranked
only seventeenth in income per head in 1970, with a Gross
Domestic product only 40 percent of the richest EEC region
(Hamburg). Such comparison raise all manner of questions
about the validity of exchange rate conversions, about the role
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Table 5.2: ODP Controls: Changes from 1964 to 1979.
Year
1964
Area covered
Exemp-
tion limit
(square
feet)
Comments
1965 London Metropolitan Region 3000
(Aug) West Midland Conurbation
1966 Southeast
(Jul) West Midlands
East Midlands 3000
East Anglia
1967 London Metropolitan Region 3000
(Jul) Other controlled areas 10000
1969 Greater London 3000
(Feb) Other controlled areas 10000
(Apr)
1970 Southeast
(Dec)
1976 Southeast
(Apr)
1977 Southeast
(Apr)
1979 Abolished
10000
15000
30000
"Brown ban" on office devel-
opment in the metropolitan
region.
Control applied retrospect-
ively to LilR from Nov. 1964.
Control removed from East
Anglia and rural parts of
East and West Midlands.
ODPs no longer required for
developments within the curt-
ilage of an industrial build-
ing for which an IDC was
issued.
Control removed from rest of
East and West Midlands.
"Inner areas" became second
priority after assisted
areas.
Source: 1964-1979: Nicol and Wettman (1979) "Background Notes to
Restrictive Regional Policy Measures in the European Community"
in Balanced National Growth , ed., K. Allen, (Lexington: Lexington
Books), p. 177, Table 6.2.
1979: Cullingworth (1985) Town and Country Planning in Britain,
(London: George Allen & Unwin), p. 379.
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Table 5.3: IDC Controls: Changes from 1948 to 1981
Year Area Covered Exemption limit
1948(Jul) Great Britain 5,000
1965(Aug) Southeast, East Anglia,
and Midlands 1,000
Others 5,000
1966(Aug) Southeast, East Anglia,
and Midlands 3,000
Others 5.000
1970(Dec) Southeast, East Anglia,
and Midlands 5,000
Others 10,000
1972(Jul) Southeast 10,000
Others 15,000
1974(Sep) Southeast 5,000
Nonassisted areas 10,000
1976(May) Southeast 12,500
Others 15,000
1977(Jun)
1979(May) Nonassisted areas 50,000
Others
1981 Suspended
Source:
Control removed from
development and special
areas.
Inner areas of London and
Birmingham gain second pri-
ority after AAs as recipi-
ents of mobile projects.
l.?48-1979, Nicol and Wettman (1979) "Background i'lotes to
Restrictive Regional Policy Measures in the European Community",
in Balanced National Growth, ed., K. Allen, (Lexington: Lexington
Books), p. 168, Table 6.1.
1979, Trade and Industry , July 20, 1979, p. 99.
1981, Cnllin ?wnrth (1985). Town and Country Planning in Britain,
(London: George Allen and Linwin) , p. 379.
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of different regions in the various national economies of
Western Europe, and about the implications to be drawn for
inter-regional policies. Nevertheless, the low rankings of all
the British regions, and the relatively poor status of its most
successful, at the very least challenges traditional notions
about the ways to restrain development in southern England -
and raise some doubts about the wisdom of restraint at all
(Manners, et al., 1980, p. 57).
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Overall Evaluation of British Regional Policy
Several quantitative analyses on British Regional Policy reveal the
impact of policy on manufacturing movement. Moore and Rhode (1976) repor-
ted that regional policy had induced 128 manufacturing movements to the
2
Development Areas annually during the 1960s. The total jobs created by
movement was 171,000. McKay (1979) also showed similar results. Using
shift-share technics, he compared regional with national performance
industry by industry and summed the results: "[t]he comparison of actual
and 'expected' employment provides an estimate of the performance of a
region relative to the nation" (McKay, 1979, p. 288). Figure (5.1) shows
"the results of a differential shift calculation for the 4 Development
Areas," (p. 288). This figure clearly reveals the impact of the strong
'
regional policy on regional employment. McKay has explained this finding:
There is a clear and obvious break in trend ... A trend
line fitted over 1952-63 shows that in each year the
regional performance fell about 0.1% below the national
and, as can be seen from fig. [5.1], there is
surprisingly little deviation from this trend. From
1963 there is a marked change. Performance in the
regions now becomes consistently better than we might
expect using national performance as a standard of
comparison, and by 1973 employment is 10% above
"expected". If we allow for continuation of the steady
downward drift that occurred 1952-63, the improvement
post 1963 is even more marked; by 1973 actual
employment was over 12% (approximately 190,000) above
the earlier trend (McKay, 1979, p. 288).
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Figure 5.1: Differential Shift: Development Area Regions (1952-73) and
Fitted Time Trend (1952-63).
Source: McKay (1979), "The Death of Regional Policy — Or Resurrection
Squared ?" Regional Studies
, 3(3), p. 288, Figure 4.
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According to Ashcroft and Taylor (1979), "over 50 percent of the
movement of industry into Development Areas of Great Britain during the
1961-71 was the direct result of regional policy" (p. 60). In terms of
additional jobs created by these movements, they suggested around 100,000
during the 1960s. Among several measures, they found that "both location
controls and capital subsidies had substantial effects on the movement of
industry to the DAs. A major difference between these two policy
instruments, however, is that location controls appear to have affected
both the generation and the distribution of industrial movement
. .
.
,
whereas capital subsidies had only a distribution effect" (pp. 60-1). As
they have put it, their estimates of the effect of regional policy on the
movement of industry are lower than those of Moore and Rhodes (1976).
These findings all support the fact that "government regional policy
is now a major influence upon manufacturing location trends in Britain,
whether measured by employment or floorspace" (Keeble, 1976, p. 114).
And, regional policy has contributed to the convergence in regional
inequality. But, as Smith (1981) has put it, "during the 1970s, the
critique of British industrial location policy shifted from design and
implementation to an examination of the nature of the development that has
actually taken place" (p. 428). The British literatures on regional
policy began to examine the structural problems of the problem areas. One
of those problems was the "branch-plant economies" of the assisted areas
(Hoare, 1983, p. 91). Thus, "attention has focused on the predominance of
the movement of branch plant to the peripheral areas, with the associated
increase in external control" (Smith, 1981, p. 428). Hoare (1983) showed
this predominance of branch plants in the movements (Table 5.4).
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Main criticisms on 'branch-plant economies' have been focused on the
fact that branch plants are not conducive to the economic growth of the
depressed areas. Branch plants do not generate great multiplier effect on
the local economy. And branch plants tend to foster unionization and are
vulnerable to higher rates of strikes due to their lack or management
function (Wray, 1983, p. 467). Firn (1975) went further by arguing that
the separate management function (external control) bring about:
a changing balance between innovative, entrepreneurial-
type decision making and routine management-type super-
vision. When major decisions, such as on investment,
sales, or purchasing are made elsewhere, the plant
managers in the regional subsidiaries or branch plants
are reduced to what Baumol calls "competent calculating
machines". Thus much of the drive, enthusiam and
invention that lies at the heart of economic growth is
removed, reduced, or at best, suppressed (Firn, 1975,
p. 410).
According to Stohr and Todtling (1973), "regional policy instruments
(especially investment incentives) tend to support the establishment of
branch plants and subsidiaries with foreign ownership in peripheral areas"
(p. 95). Of considerable importance in these findings is that this dicho-
tomy in firm organization has produced new type of regional problems. The
Regional Studies Association of the UK suggested that "a basic regional
dualism in economic development was identified in the UK. This differen-
tiated between a 'Greater South East
1
zone of comparative economic buoyan-
cy and the less prosperous regions on the north and west" (1933, p. 58).
This Association regarded 'Greater South East' as the core and the less
prosperous regions as the periphery. The core regions have the following
characteristics:
Nonetheless, as a description of key spatial variations
in the extent of relative specialization in different
Table 5.4: Branches and Tranfers: Contributions to Employment in Movement
of Destinations in Assisted Areas.
1945-65 1966-75
1 2
Movement to Peripheral Areas Movement to Assisted Areas
1945-51 1952-59 1960-65 1966-71 1972-75
Transfers(%) 19.2 9.6 7.2 33.4 40.8
Branches(%) 80.7 90.3 92.8 66.6 59.2
Note: 1. Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales, North Herseyside, Devon and
Cornwall.
2. Northern Ireland, Special Development Areas, Development Areas
and Intermediate Areas.
Source: Hoare (1983), The Location of Industry in Britain (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press), p. 91, Table 4.4.
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economic functions, the core-periphery distinction is
useful. One of the most important aspects of this
distinction is its association with geographical
differences in the capacity for indigenous economic
development. The structural characteristics of the
core region appear to provide an economic environment
which is much more conductive to self-reliant growth
than that of the periphery. This may be illustrated by
a consideration of spatial variations in indigenous
potential with regard to two key sources of growth -
technological innovation and new enterprise formation
(RSA, 1983, p. 58).
These findings led to the conclusion that while regional policies
have been partly successful in their quantitative aspects, there still
remain problems in their qualitative and structural aspects (Stohr and
Todtling, 1978, p. 109). Wray (1983) emphasized that "re-ional policy has
not merely been a weak palliative but also had adverse side effects" (p.
467).
According to Goddard (1981), "regional policy in Britain is at a
cross roads" (p. 319). Several analysts also began to suggest the alter-
native for future policy (Chisholm, 1985; Moore and Rhodes, 1982; Elias,
1982; Wray, 1983). The basic assumptions for future policy seem to rest
with the argument that "a successful national economic strategy is the
main requirements for a solution to the economic problems of all regions"
(Moore and Rhodes, 1982, p. 329).
As the national economy began to decline, "the special needs of the
less prosperous areas would have to give way to the more general needs of
the economy as a whole" (Wilson, 1979, p. 81). Thus, "the package of
policy introduced in the postwar period of economic growth are clearly no
longer appropriate in the present period of structural change" (Goddard,
1982, p. 320). And, "the primary emphasis of regional policy should now
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be to facilitate economic growth, not to redistribute the existing
stock
of employment opportunities" (Chisholm, 1985, p. 312).
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PART II. AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN REGIONAL POLICY
Tennessee Valley Authority
In the United States, "little concern for depressed areas was evi-
dent until 1960," (Friedmann and Weaver, 1979, p. 144). But there can be
controversy over this statement. This problem requires the understand-
ing of the work of the Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA) and
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Friedmann and Weaver (1979)
explained this point:
To what extent there was a 'lag' depends partly on how
one interprets the evidence. The TVA, of course, was
the best-known instance of regional planning and also
the first. It had been the federal government's answer
to endemic poverty in the South. But that was before a
clear concept of 'depressed area' had been formed
(Friedmann and Weaver, 1979, p. 155).
And, behind the TVA (New Deal), there was RPAA's idea on regional planning
(Friedmann and Weaver, 1979, pp. 30-41). Mumford (1931, 1976) suggested
the difference between the regional planning and metropolitan planning as
follows:
[1] [Metropolitan planning] would be city planning on
a large scale and not regional development . . . The
first different factor in regional planning is
that it includes cities, villages and permanent
rural areas, considered as part of the regional
complex (1976, p. 209).
[2] The second important factor in regional planning
is its respect of balanced environment and a set-
tled mode of life . . . Regional planning is
concerned with provisions for the settlement of
the country; and this settlement in turn implies a
balanced use of resources and a balanced social
life (1976, pp. 209-10).
,B
"[F]or the RPAA, regional planning was a method which could be used
to contain metropolitan growth and re-establish what they called a regio-
nal balance". The region was the base for the improvement of human life.
3ut "the prevalent concepts of [the RPAA] did not start with the goal of
economic growth" (Friedmann and Weaver, 1979, p. 32). The Advisory Commi-
ssion on Inter-governmental Relation's (ACIR) report on Multi-State Regio-
nalism (1972) reveals that "intellectual interest" on the analysis of
4
"regional economic problems" can be found after the war (p. 7).
The TVA can be "the first regional development program in the United
States" (Miernyk, 1982, p. 41). But it was "designed initially to exploit
the potential of hydroelectric power" (Miernyk, 1982, p. 41). "The area
covered by the TVA was designated to achieve specific goals such as imp-
rovement of navigability, provision for reforestation and proper use of
marginal lands, and provision for the national defense" (Lim, 1983, p. 8).
Its primary objective was not concerned with the amelioration of regional
disparities in economic prosperity. Its area was not designated according
to the differentiation of the developed and depressed regions of the
country. According to Sundquist and Hields (1979), "the Tennessee Valley
Authority happened to be located in what had been an underdeveloped
region" (p. 306).
Area Redevelopment Administration
During the 1950s, the Senate began to investigate the causes of
high-levels of localized unemployment (Miernyk, 1982, p. 44). Among
several types of problem regions, it was the depressed industrial areas
that got the support of the government (the Senate) for the first time.
This fact tells part of the characteristics of American politics. This
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fact may also be associated with the reasons why regional development
programs did not belong to the Department of Agriculture. Later, the
Senate also authorized the study of low-income families. And, "in order
to capture rural votes, depressed areas were defined to include rural
areas," in the bills which were introduced to aid depressed regions
(Richardson, 1979, p. 273).
The Area Redevelopment Act of 1961 empowered the Area Redevelopment
Administration to "help local public authorities to build or improve
public service facilities ... by grants or loans, to provide part of the
financing for construction of private commercial or industrial facilities
and to aid areas in development analysis and planning through technical
assistance in kind or through grants to support such work" (Hoover, 1975,
p. 285). But it appears that the federal system did not permit this
agency to induce mobile industries from other regions to redevelopment
ares. According to Miernyk (1982), "the objective of this agency was to
create new jobs." The basic approach to regional development was to
"develop and expand new and existing facilities and resources without
reducing employment elsewhere" (p. 45).
Redevelopment area was designated according to the unemployment
rate: (a) 50 percent above the national average for three of four prece-
ding years, (b) 75 percent above the national average for two of the three
preceding years, or (c) twice the national average for one of the two
preceding years. For a rural area to be eligible, it had to have "one of
the highest incidence of low income families and sustained unemployment"
(Crane, 1975, p. 115).
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From 1961 to 1965, the Area Redevelopment Act "financed S323 million
in a variety of projects" (Sundquit,r and Hields, 1979, p. 318). 54 per-
cent of the expenditure was allocated for industrial and commercial loans
and 32 percent were spent for public facilities grants and loans. As
Miernyk (1982) has put it, "the ARA was involved in a program of directly
productive investment (DPI)" (p. 45).
Compared with USDA's rural development programs, the ARA's projects
were very modest. During the early years of 1960s, USDA implemented
several rural development programs under the Office of Rural Areas
Development. But most of these programs were decentralized, with emphasis
on state and county activities. These programs were: The Cooperative
Extension Service, Farmers Home Administration and the Rural Electrifica-
tion Administration. From 1961 to 1965, federal payment to states' Exten-
sion Service amounted $ 320 million. Total appropriation for Rural Elec-
trification Administration was $ 54 million but this agency's authorized
loan limit amounted to $ 2027.5 million (Crane, 1975, pp. 283, 285).
According to Crane (1975), among 900 counties which were designated
as Redevelopment Areas, "some 300 counties were qualified as low income or
low farm areas," 230 rural development program counties were designated
"as a sop to USDA" and "another 300 counties were designated as depressed
small urban areas" (p. 117). As the ARA was willing to "place projects in
counties already in the USDA's RDP (Rural Development Program)" and as
most metropolitan places were unable to qualify for assistance, "the ARA
was highly oriented toward helping sparsely settled areas" (pp. 117-8).
These findings lead to doubt the economic viability of ARA's projects.
Sundquist and Hields (1979) explained this point:
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Because ARA was limited to areas of persistent and
substantial unemployment identified on a county-by-
county basis, the natural growth centers of depressed
regions were often excluded, and the available funds
had to be concentrated in smaller places that
frequently had little capacity or potential for
substantial growth. The county unit of government
turned out to be inadequate in terms of both planning
and execution of the program's objectives. Economic
planning by county committees did not produce long-
range viable blue-prints for alleviating the economic
problems of the depressed communities (Sundquist and
Hields, 1979, p. 318).
But Miernyk (1982) does not see the demise of the ARA as the result
of limited success. He seems to put more emphasis on the political set-
tings to which federal programs may have to subject:
While scholars criticized the ARA for its limited
successes, representatives of businesses in areas where
ARA supported establishments were operating
successfully were complaining bitterly to their
congressmen about the "unfair competition" of
government-subsidized establishments. Indeed, it is at
least possible, if not probable, that the major cause
of the ARA's demise was that it worked too well rather
than too poorly (Miernyk, 1982, p. 46).
It takes much time and money to bring less-urbanized communities to
the minimum development thresholds. "Development thresholds are not
insurmountable but they can be overcome by incurring additional (often
very high) investment costs, known as threshold costs" (Vanhove and (Clas-
sen, 1980, pp. 203-4). Considering these arguments. Hoover (1975) recom-
mended that "measures applied to less-urbanized and poorer areas may be
confined largely to human resources development and income supplements for
people who, because of age or disability, can not be expected to solve
their problem by migrating" (p. 284). Thus, this kind of people-oriented
activities can be found in ARA's projects. ARA spent $ 26.6 million in
training courses for workers. And "ARA did claim considerable success for
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its job-training program, which placed 70 percent of the 45,000 indivi-
duals trained" (Sundquist and Mields, 1979, p. 318). Considering that the
ARA was the first federal program for depressed areas and that "it had no
domestic precedent to draw on" (Miernyk, 1982, p. 45), ARA's experience
in human resources development is worthy of its claim of success and
should have been emulated by successive federal programs.
It appears that the major problem lay in its activities in indus-
trial and commercial loans. "Such business groups as the Chamber of
Commerce insisted from the first that the program constituted unfair
government intervention into private business decisions. Labor unions
protested that business was being encouraged to move into areas where
unions were unorganized or very weak" (Crane, 1975, p. 118).
Economic Development Administration
Reorganization of government agency usually gets its rationale from
the criticized deficiencies of the former agency. If there were any
necessity to change, this should occur in strategies (ways) or standard
operating procedures (means). EDA will be discussed in this perspective.
The Public Works and Economic Development Act (PWEDA) of 1965 states
that its primary goal is to "help areas and regions of substantial and
persistent unemployment and underemployment
... [with] planning and
financing their public works and economic development." Thus the Economic
Development Administration's (EDA) responsibility is "to generate jobs,
help protect existing jobs in economically distressed areas, and promote
the capacity of States and localities to plan and conduct economic
development programs" (EDA, 1983, p.l).
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The EDA has worked with communities in economically lagging areas
and 'its assistance had been limited to areas of substantial or persistent
unemployment, low family income, or sudden rise in unemployment" (EDA,
1975, p.l ). The Public Works and Economic Development Act Amendments of
1974 contained three more Titles than the former one. EDA extended its
aid for private enterprises and included such programs as Special Economic
Development and Adjustment Assistance Program and Job Opportunities Prog-
ram. This program was included as "an antirecessionary measure to help
create jobs in areas of high unemployment" (EDA, 1975, p. 1). This kind
5
of change may obscure the initial objectives of the EDA . Thus EDA will
be discussed in two parts: before and after the amendment to PWEDA.
Before Amendment
The PWEDA of 1965 identifies three different geographic areas that
may be eligible for EDA's assistance: redevelopment areas, development
districts and economic development region. Redevelopment areas can be a
county, a labor area, an Indian reservation, or a municipality. Except
Indian reservations, these areas should have a population of at least 1500
and not more than 250,00. Development districts must contain at least two
redevelopment areas and either a redevelopment center or an economic
development center. This center must be an area or city of sufficient
size and potential to foster economic growth. The economic development
region can be a multi-state one.
The PWEDA of 1965 provided three basic tools for EDA to implement
its objectives. They are: grants and loans for needed public works and
development facilities, industrial and commercial loans, and planning, and
research assistance. Like the ARA, EDA has certain limitations in its
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program. The first one is the restriction on relocation of industry.
"All assistance under the Act must be denied if it would assist job
relocation" (EDA, 1968, p. 20). EDA explained this restriction as
follows:
Job relocation and plant piracy hold particular dangers
in disadvantaged areas where an employer may find it
economical to avoid collective bargaining obligations
or to escape from a "high wage" to a "low wage" labor
market area. Such relocation does not create new jobs,
but merely effects the transfer of the problems of
unemployment from one area to another (EDA, 1978, p.
20).
V
EDA does not "provide funds for facilities designed to serve
primarily or essentially firms engaged in the apparel or garment trade
within the textile industry" (EDA, 1968, p. 23). This restriction comes
from the recommendation of the Senate and the House. The Senate Committee
Report states:
The Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965
is not intended to authorize the use of Federal funds
for grants, loans, guarantees, subsidies, purchases of
indebtedness, or assistance of any kind for programs,
projects, facilities, or purchases to be used by or for
highly mobile, intensely competitive industries, such
as the apparel or garment trades within the textile
industry, in which substantial unemployment and
abnormal unused plant capacity exists, and in which
labor turnover is high and the prior possession of a
specific skill or training is not typically a
prerequisite for obtaining employment. (Senate
Committee Report No. 193, 89th Cong., 1st sess., page
14.) (quoted from "DA, 1968, p. 25).
There are specific eligibility criteria for assistance: substantial and
persistent unemployment, population loss and low median family income. In
practice these criteria can be divided into eight as noted in Table(5.5).
EDA had a 'worst - first' strategy in the designation of assisted areas.
This rule was not adopted according to the law nor to theories. From the
Table 5.5: Determination of Eligibility for EDA Assistance
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Criterion Number of Areas
1973 1979
2585
1983
Total 1818 2653
Substantial Unemployment 385 1566 1616
Persistent Unemployment 497 230 233
i-iedian Family Income 448 86 85
Indian Reservations 142 176 187
Sudden rise in Unemployment 139 47 47
Special Impact Areas 14 365 367
Per Capita Employment 181 114 117
One Redevelopment Area Per State 14 1 1
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, EDA, Annual Report 1973, 1979, 1983.
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first two years' of experience, EDA learned that unemployment rates were
too flexible to be standards. "In its first ten months of operations, EDA
had approved 650 separate projects, and 324 eligible areas received one or
more projects. However, nearly a third of these were terminated at the
end of the first annual review because their unemployment rates had fallen
below the 6 percent required for participation" (Hansen, 1977, p. 411).
This fact had made EDA develop a 'worst - first' strategy (Hansen, 1977,
p. 412; Richardson, 1979, p. 280; Hiernyk, 1977, p. 395). Randolph Martin
(1979) tested the relationship between unemployment rates and per capita
income levels of counties, and the level of assistance from ARA and EDA.
His analysis showed that EDA was truthful to its principles:
per capita income and unemployment rates are
statistically significant factors in the selection of
areas for assistance and in the disbursement of funds
among the selected areas. In particular, it was
observed that these factors are most efficient in
predicting whether a particular county has received any
assistance under the regional development programs
(Martin, 1979, p. 49).
According to Richardson (1979) "this [worst-first strategy] provided
a focus, but at the expense of efficiency. Also, adoption of this crite-
rion was incompatible with the growth center strategy by making sure that
development districts should have a sufficient size and potential for
growth. Adoption of growth center strategy was considered to be the
principal innovation from the early ARA experience.
After 1968 "there had been some change in policy toward supporting
the growth centers" (Richardson, 1979, p. 280). It was also largely the
result of EDA's experience in worst-first strategy. "With limited funds
and a large number of designated eligible areas, it was impossible for EDA
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to make the kinds of massive investment that would have been required to
turn around some of the seriously depressed areas chosen for assistance"
(Miernyk, 1977, p. 395). EDA's involvement in growth center strategy was
made possible by the process of Overall Economic Development Program
(OEDP). EDA requires that every assisted area formulate an OEDP, "which
must be approved by EDA before the area can be officially designated"
(EDA, 1968, p. 13). OEDP activity in a district was normally carried out
by a district organization. Thus through the OEDP process, a growth
center could identify its goals, objectives and resources, provide a
detailed program for development and was eligible for assistance. But,
according to Pvichardson (1979), "growth centers were typically too small
to generate many spillovers in their hinterlands: out of 171 development
centers designated by April 1970 only 13 were larger than 100,000 popula-
tion, and only 30 larger than 50,000" (p. 280). These findings led to the
conclusion that EDA's assistance has been widely dispersed to small commu-
nities. Miernyk (1977) explained this:
To be successful a growth center strategy would require
a fairly high degree of selectivity. BUt selectivity
has little appeal to members of Congress, each of whom
is looking for benefits that will accrue to his or her
district. The required degree of selectivity would no
doubt be unacceptable to a majority of congressmen.
Partly because of the political difficulties or
pursuing an economically viable growth center strategy,
EDA has been forced to spread its funds for investment
in public works widely (Miernyk, 1977, p. 395).
Before 1973, EDA's main programs have been focused on public works.
75.6 percent of EDA's expenditure have been spent on public facilities:
industrial site, general development, recreation, educational, port, air-
port, and health facilities. But only 17.2 percent of expenditure went
for business development loans and working capital guarantees. Although
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Table 5.6: EDA - Obligated Projects by Program
Program Amounts in million dollars* ' (%)
1973 1979 1983
Public Works 1,440 (75.6) 2,641 (54.7) 3,357 (54.5)
Business, develop, loans 327 (17.2) 655 (13.6) 792 (12.9)
- Guarantees (66) ( 3.5) 738 (15.3) 874 (14.2)
Technical Assistance 94 ( 4.9) 215 ( 4.5) 284 ( 4.6)
Planning Grants 44 ( 2.3) 178 ( 3.7) 282 ( 4.6)
Economic Adjustment — 397 ( 8.2) 569 ( 9.2)
Total 1,905 (100 ) 4,824 (100 ) 6,158 (100 )
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, EDA, Annual Report, 1973, 1979, 1983.
Note: * Cumulative amount to each fiscal year.
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the assistance was widely dispersed, the Appalachian states were the first
6
beneficiary of this program.
EDA's staff report (1970) on evaluation of 125 public works programs
shows that "the EDA D'.'blic works program has been, in general, successful
in terms of process, job, structural and service impacts" (p. 1). With
regards to job impacts, "sixty-one percent of the projects evaluated had
some direct job impact. A total of 9,994 direct jobs were saved or
created as a result of the EDA projects, and another 3,708 local indirect
jobs were generated by the additional spending in the community. This
meant that an average of 80 direct jobs and 30 indirect jobs have thus far
resulted from each project" (p. 3). According to Hiernyk (1980), "the
rank correlation between EDA expenditures and changes in [state] per
capita income was only 0.31, and that between expenditures and changes in
the unemployment rate was only 0.17" (quoted from 1982, p. 47). Thus it
is very difficult to draw conclusion from these findings. Cut the follo-
wing observations suggest that ESA did not have enough power and money.
According to Townroe:
Expectations of the EDA have not really been matched by
its funds or its power. Relative to the expenditures
on area development by the governments of most European
countries (as a percentage of GNP), the budget of the
EDA is small and is vastly overshadowed by the
expenditures of other federal programs. And the
American political process '...encourages diffusion and
discourages focus' so that the effectiveness of the
EDA programs has been weakened by an inability to use
strong tools selectively. (Townroe, 1979, p. 9).
As Jerrett and Barocci (1979) have put it, "the goal of EDA is long-
run results and the demands put on the agency are short run" (p. 32). And
considering the fact that "for capital investments on industrial and
commercial projects the EDA's share was less than 5 percent" (p. 28), they
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observed that "this small portion nay not have been the determining factor
in inducing private business to invest in projects, but rather, were
simply a windfall" (p. 28). They concluded that:
The economic - development efforts of the agencies [ARA
and EDA] have mixed results. On a positive note, some
of the special-area efforts have halted or at slowed
economic decline. Thousands of jobs have been created
and many still-utilized facilities have been built. At
a very minimum, economic development plans have brought
together previously unconnected interest groups within
communities to discuss their goals and priorities. At
a maximum, the plans will aid in furthering smooth and
coordinated economic change in the future (Jerrett and
Barocci, 1979, pp. 32-3).
After Amendment
In 1972, the EDA assumed Public Works Impact Program (PWIP) "to
implement a countercylical employment program along with the regular
economic development, public-works projects" (Jerrett and Barocci, 1979,
p. 28). The main objective of this program was to create immediate jobs
in areas of high unemployment. Thus, accordingly to Sundquist and Hields
(1979), "the program, while geographically restricted to areas of heavy
unemployment, was deliberately severed from any economic development and
hence more properly be considered as a relief program than as a regional
development program" (p. 325).
From 1975 to 1976, the EDA implemented the Title X Job Opportunities
Program. EDA has provided almost $ 500 million for 2255 projects. Among
these projects, 31.4 percent were rehabilitation and repair works for
existing structures or facilities. According to Jerrett and Barocci
(1979), "over two-thirds of Title X projects are in non metropolitan
areas" (p. 49), And "Title X was funded primarily to provide a short-term
countercyclical stimulus to local economies. Long-term impacts were not
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intended to be the focus of the program" (p. 203). These findings led to
the conclusion:
While similarly restricted to distressed areas, it
emphasized employment rather than infrastructure deve-
lopment, and consequently a requirement was inserted
that half the funds be reserved for projects with
nonlabor costs of not more than 25 percent. Thus
repair, maintenance, landscaping, and beautification
projects were given precedence over heavy construction
projects (Sundquist and Hields, 1979, p. 325).
The EDA put more emphasis on urban and short-term programs than on
rural and long-term ones. As Richardson (1979) has put it, "with more
emphasis on unemployment problems in central cities than on interregional
redistribution, the EDA regional development programs withered away in the
early 1970s" (p. 280).
Appalachian Regional Commission
The President's Appalachian Regional Commssion (PARC) devoted one
year's study to the region's problems. Its report (1964) described six
major problems of the region: "low income, high unemployment, lack of
unbanization, deficits in education, deficits in standards of living and
changing population" (quoted from Newman, 1972, pp. 29-30). It also
recommended 'four priority goals' for regional development:
a. Providing access both to and within the region.
b. Utilizing the region's natural resource of coal, timber,
and tillable land.
c. Utilizing the region's rainfall and water resources.
d. Improving the education and the health of the people.
(Newman, 1972, p. 53).
Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) which was established by the
Appalachian Regional Development Act was the first federal-state joint
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agency. It was composed of a federal co-chairman and 13 participating
governors. Its responsibility was planning and implementing of programs
through its member states and their local development districts.
From 1965 to 1976, ARC was authorized to spend about $ 2791 million.
And 61% of these funds went to highway development. But ARC's activity
was very diversified. Besides highway construction, it encompasses health
program, vocational education, mining area restoration, and others. "By
February 1979, 73 percent of the projected 2384 miles of development
highways had been completed or were under construction, and 86 percent of
the planned access roads had been finished or were being built" (Miernyk.
1982, p. 51).
"Conditions in Appalachia have improved dramatically since the
commission was established" (Sundquist and Mields, 1979, p. 322). But "no
serious analyst could support the conclusion that this is solely the
result of ARC's activities" (Newman, 1980, p. 15). According to Miernyk
(19S2):
the Appalachian region benefited from exogenous forces
— the rapid rise of energy prices during the 1970s —
which resulted in the revival of some of the more
severely depressed parts of the region. While there is
no doubt that the development highways, and the various
forms of investment in human capital, have contributed
to the revival of Appalachia, the gains in this region
would have been much smaller in the absence of the
"energy crisis" (Miernyk, 1982, p. 51).
Newman (1980) observed that "one obviously favorable effect has been
the creation of considerably altered regional infrastructure, a substan-
tial portion of which produces what would generally be designated as merit
goods" (p. 15). And one thing which he stressed is that "favorable com-
ment has been made about ARC's blending of local, state, and national
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perspectives in policy and program decisions" (p. 1). He explained this
point:
A major claim for the regional approach is the ability
of the commission format to adapt national programs to
regional needs while retaining a sense of national
priorities. Those who find merit in ARC performance
place considerable emphasis on this attribute. They
see in the ARC model a better way to conduct and
administer the public's business, a way well beyond the
confines of conventionally defined economic development
although such development is an important part of the
range of possible activities (Newman, 1980, p. 15).
Regional Planning Commission
Title V of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965
made it possible for several states to organize a planning commission.
Under the guidance of the Secretary of Commerce, planning commission were
organized by the following criteria:
1. High unemployment.
2. Low income.
3. Low levels of "housing, health and educational
facilities."
4. Dominance of the regional economy by "only one or
two industries, which are in a state of long-term
decline."
5. Substantial out-migration of labor, capital, or
both.
6. Low growth rate of aggregate output.
7. Adverse effects from changing industrial technology
or changes in national defense facilities or
production, (quoted from Hoover, 1975, p. 287).
Like the ARC, these commissions were composed of a federal co-
chairman and governors of the participating states. There were eight
planning commissions before abolished. "Together with ARC, they cover 70
percent of the nation's land area ... but less than half of its popula-
tion" (Sundquist and Hields, 1979, p. 322).
169
These commissions' main functions wert to coordinate interstate
cooperation and to assist local economic development planning. Thus they
had no project funds nor any administrative jurisdiction. Usually, they
prepared multi-year development plan for their regions. And their funds
from federal government have been negligible. "Congress in 1975 provided
ARC S 299 million, while limiting the Title V commissions as a group to
only $ 41 million in assistance funds ... on this scale, there is no
evidence to suggest any significant economic impact stemming from these
commissions' activities" (Sundquist and Mields, 1979, p. 324).
However, according to Newman (1977), these commissions provided new
aspects in federal systems:
The opportunity for the governors to meet, discuss
regional conditions, and utilize modest funds and
Federal support to lesson adverse conditions, has been
an attraction that helps explain, in part, the spread
and persistence of Title V commisssions. They have
apparently responded to a perceived need for a
recognition of regional commonality within the Federal
system (Newman, 1977, p. 5).
Implicit Policies
As there are no strong explicit regional policies, may analysts have
focused their analyses on implicit policies. In fact, many federal acti-
vities have spatial impacts and territorial consequences. Budget alloca-
tion itself has spatial meanings. Especially, much attention has been
focused on federal defense spending in terms of its spatial impact. And
the debate over the regional distribution of federal spending has been
intensified along with the Sunbelt issue. One good example for this case
was that "the North eastern states, with 45 percent of America's people,
get only 28 percent of the national defense spending while the states of
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the Sunbelt with 38 percent of population get almost half of the national
defense budget" (Morris, 1980, p, 148).
In their analysis of the Sunbelt cities, Rice and Bernard (1983),
observed that "some federal spending programs have proved especially
helpful to the South and South West" (p. 15). They enumerated those
federal programs: interstate highway, which made Atlanta, Dallas, and
Phoenix grow; urban redevelopment programs, which rebuilt Atlanta, Tampa,
New Orleans and Oklahoma City (pp. 14-15). There are more federal prog-
rams which made the Sunbelt cities grow:
Other federal programs stand out as important
stimulants in particular examples. Without federal
assistance, for example, Atlanta could not have built
its impressive rapid rail transit system. The
establishment of the Johnson Space Flight Center south
of Houston and the location of the Federal Aviation
Administration's training center in Oklahoma City
illustrates how federal spending can boost local
economies and images. Federal regional offices are
especially important to Atlanta and Albuquerque.
Without Social Security and other government retirement
programs, the booms in Miami, Tarapa-St. Petersburg, and
Phoenix would probably been smaller. In short, through
a combination of deliberate redistributive policy,
political clout, and plain happenstance, the Sunbelt
owes much of its rise to money from Washington (Rice
and Bernard, 1983, p. 15).
But, according to Browning (1981), "the impact of federal outlays
varies because a dollar spent on one kind of program is not the same in
its local or regional impact as a dollar spent on another kind of program.
In the terminology of the economic base, the multiplier effect differs for
different kinds of programs" (p. 142). He stressed the difficulty in
measuring the spatial impact of different program.
In his analysis of defense spending, Sees (1981) also observed a
similar problem that "the spatial pattern of prime defense contractors
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differs considerably from that of subcontractors. All three companies [in
the Dallas-Fort Worth area] are dependent in their procurement of mate-
rials produced in the traditional manufacturing belt, the 'American Ruhr'
of the Northeast and Midwest" (p. 211). His final conclusions are:
All examination of the pattern outlined in this essay
should also confirm the notion that the federal
government through its procurement policies, is a forum
for planned adjustment in the U.S. regional system in a
de facto if not de jure sense. However, this still
leaves unanswered the complex question whether such
federal policies, either by design or by accident,
played an important role than national demand or
technological change in the major changes that have
taken place in the U.S. space economy in the 1960s and
1970s (Rees, 1981, p. 219).
,Labovitz (1978) compared the federal expenditure with revenues in
regions and states. His findings show that "the leading region in contri-
butions to federal revenues in 1974-1976 — the Midwest, at 21.9% — was
marginally below its 22.2% share of expenditures. The Great Lakes had the
next highest regional percentage of revenues, 20.2%, but was fourth in
expenditures, at 15.1%. The Far West provided 13.7% of total revenues and
drew 15.5% of total expenditures" (p. 22) (Table 5.7).
Considering diverse factors involved in these findings, he concluded
that:
Excepting in an egalitarian society, uniformity in the
ratios and index numbers is not to be expected.
Indeed, such uniformity might run counter to the
dominant values of our federal system of government,
which allows and adjusts for regional and individual
differences in economic status, consumption levels,
resource availability, demand for governmental services
and activities, and other characteristics. Interstate
uniformity in the ratios of federal expenditures to
revenues, if it appeared, might attest to some
frustration of national interests and standards
(Labovitz, 1978, p. 23).
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There can be more arguments and counter arguments over this issue.
But with regards to policy formulation this issue provides some require-
ment for planners or policy-makers. Gober (1981) explained this point:
Although prospects for a comprehensive national
migration policy are dim, it is increasingly necessary
to understand the geographic impacts of government
policy. Seemingly unrelated activities may have far-
reaching and sometimes unwanted consequences in terras
of population distribution and migration. Recognition
of the geographic qualities of government activity is a
prerequisite to the efficient planning and manipulation
of future population growth and its spatial
distribution (Gober, 1981, p. 320).
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Table 5.7: Percentage of Federal Government Revenues by Region of Origin
and Expenditure by Residence of Recipient of Location of Activity:
Fiscal Years 1974-76.
Region Expenditure(%) Revenues(%)
New England 6.2 6.1
MidWest 22.2 21.9
Great Lakes 15.1 20.2
Plains 7.1 7.4
South East 21.7 19.5
South West 8.4 8.1
Rocky Mountain 2.7 2.5
Far West 15.5 13.9
Alaska, Hawaii 1.1
100
0.7
Total 100
Source: Labovitz (1978) "Federal Expenditures and Revenues in Regions and
States." Intergovernmental Perspective
. Advisory Commissions on
Intergovernmental Relations, 4(4), pp. 21-2. Table 9, 10.
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Overall Evaluation of American Regional Policy.
In 1969, when EDA was working for depressed regions, Chinitz (1969)
recommended that:
One of the principal tasks for the federal agency
charged with promoting regional development, the
Economic Development Agency, is to determine an
appropriate policy to each of these types of distressed
area problem. This task will demand not only
considerable technical sophistication in delineating
the correct policy weapons but a political strategy
which is strong enough to prevent federal funds from
being allocated to areas which have no potential for
economic development (Chinitz, 1969, p. 61).
This recommendation reveals the very characteristics of regional
policy in the U.S. Regional agencies (EDA, ARC, ARA) all have worked
within certain built-in requirements: restriction on job relocation and
plant piracy; political port-barrel. The first restriction forced regio-
nal agencies to focus on public works. The second situation has made
their activities dispersed. Thus, it is quite reasonable to conclude
that:
official policies and public statements have generally
soft-pedaled migration as an instrument of regional
policy, have paid a great deal of deference to the
Place Prosperity strategy and the criterion of need,
and have favored spreading assistance among an
increasingly large number of claimant areas rather than
concentrating it (Hoover, 1975, p. 274).
With regards to measures, "regional programs in the United States
have been limited almost entirely to [expenditures for public infrastruc-
ture]" (Sundquist and Mields, 1979, p. 305).
This does not mean that regional policies have no effect on spatial
development. Although natural process of population movement (turn around
of non metropolitan) has helped them much, it is significant that:
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The turnaround regions lie wholly or mostly within the
areas coverd by the regional commissions created in
1965 by the Public Works and Economic Development Act
and the Appalachian Regional Development Act; and they
have profited in varying degree from the activities of
the Economic Development Administration and from
planning efforts carried out within the context of
state-designated multi-county planning units (Hansen,
1977, p. 414).
But Hansen (1977) emphasized that "few would claim that these
federal and state initiatives have been responsible for the growth of the
relevant regions, [considering] they have had too little money, too little
time, and have lacked a consistent development strategy" (p. 414).
Since EDA began to be involved in non-spatial programs, the U.S.
regional policy withered away. Under the Carter administration, national
concerns about spatial problem focused on urban problems. In 1977, the
Urban Development Action Grants (UDAG) was created to help distressed
areas. According to Wilmoth (1984), "the UDAG program provided grants to
private development projects that would otherwise not be feasible in
cities with high unemployment rates and other indicators of distress" (p.
238). He argued that this program represented "the shift [from] the
emphasis of regional policy onto business development policy with a nod
toward small business." He explained this point:
Certain private development projects (characteristical-
ly hotels, conventior. centers, and shopping centers) in
targeted cities were awarded direct federal grants in
order to "leverage" additional private investment.
UDAGs fitted the political requirements of the time:
leveraging appeared to make scarce federal dollars go a
long way; targeting on areas "in distress" appeared to
focus them effectively; and offering grants ultimately
to corporations rather than to local governments
appeared to ensure that jobs so created were private,
and hence permanent, by contrast with jobs created
within, or fully by, the state (Wilmoth, 1984, p. 238).
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Under the Carter administration, according to Wilmoth (1984),
"industrial policy eclipsed regional policy, and an earlier 'jobs-to-
people' emphasis turned to a 'people-to-jobs' strategy" (p. 236). His
argument comes from the report "A National Agenda for the Eighties"
(1980). On industrial policy, this report reads:
The aim of government policies should be to facilitate
the access of all industries to adequate capital, ideas,
and labor, rather than to direct resources toward some
sectors or industries and away from others. Not only
are effects by government to designate "winners" and
"losers" likely to be fraught with difficulty ... but
the very imagery is that of divisiveness and politici-
zation rather than consensus and cohesion. Instead,
the emphasis should be on maintaining diversified
industrial strength, competitiveness, and technological
dynamism, with policies that encourage resources to
flow to their most productive uses. At the same time,
it is essential to provide temporary assistance to
workers and communities hurt by the transitions resul-
ting from technological progress and changing patterns
of international trade, (quoted from Wilmoth, 1984, p.
249).
Wilmoth (1984) observed that "[t]he new cooporatists wanted the
'divisiveness and polarization' of redistributive regional policy replaced
by a 'consensus and cohesion' over reindustrialization policy focused on
production" (p. 249). He finally put that "[N]o U.S. government document
has ever argued so strongly for the neglect of declining regions" (p.
248).
In 1981, President Reagan proposed a new budget document: America's
New Beginning: A Program for Economic Recovery
. For economic recovery, he
proposed to eliminate most of federal support for regional policy (plan-
ning). This package included the phasing out of federal support for EDA,
ARC and the Title V commissions. The FY 1981 EDA program budget was
reduced by 30 percent (EDA, 1982, p. 1). EDA expressed its new commitment
to economic development as follows:
The decade of the eighties requires a new and bold
approach for economic prosperity. President Reagan and
Secretary Baldrige are providing the Nation the benefit
of courageous leadership. We are committed to economic
development within the context of the new federalism
initiative and the President's Economic Recovery
Program.
Accordingly, we are placing the emphasis on job
creation where it belongs - with American business
(EDA, 1981, p. 1).
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COMPARISON OF EXPERIENCE
Among three categories of strategy, the UK has put more emphasis on
place prosperity rather than people prosperity, has selected assisted
areas according to the criterion of need (distress) rather than develop-
ment potential, and has dispersed aids around the country. With regards
to policy measures, Britain has relied on location contrcl on manufactu-
ring industry. Manufacturing industries were considered to be more foot-
loose than any other type of industry.
The U.S. has pursued a similar strategy. "[Official policies and
public statements have
. .
. paid a great deal of deference of the place
prosperity strategy and the criterion of need, and have favored spreading
assistance among an increasingly large number of claimant areas rather
than concentrating it" (Hoover, 1975, p. 274). But the U.S. has largely
focused on public works among several policy measures.
Britain has employed a wide range of financial incentives in order
to induce firms to lagging areas. In addition to capital subsidies,
financial subsidies included aids on operating cost (REP). These measures
were reinforced by direct controls (IDC, ODP) on the location of firms and
service sector. Compared with Britain, the U.S. has avoided direct mea-
sures to induce firms to lagging areas. But this does not mean that the
U.S. provided no financial incentives to mobile industries. "The influx
of industrial investment into particular individual communities in the
United States has been strongly influenced by local programs to promote
industrial growth, depending largely on local initiative and funding"
(Townroe, 1979, pp. 9-10). Most common instruments of industrial aid are
financial subsidies such as industrial revenue bonds, property tax exera-
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ption, loan guarantees or interest subsidies, and corporate income tax
incentives. Thus, financial incentives similar to those of Britain were
also available for mobile industries in the U.S. And these states' prog-
rams are actually incurring cost to federal government. Harrison and
Kanter (1978) explained this point:
recent figures calculated by the U.S. Office of
Management and Budget for FY 1976 show that foregone
federal revenues amounted to nearly $ 4.8 billion that
year, with three-fourths of that accruing to
corporations and only one-quarter to private
individuals (Harrison and Kanter, 1978, p. 431).
British regional policy has been criticized in that it has weakened
competitiveness of private firms: financial incentives produced ineffi-
cient and non-competitive firms in the distressed areas. Direct control
on development in the South East has put this region in relatively poor
status in comparison with other regions in Western Europe. "Regional
policy has not merely been a weak palliative but also had adverse side
effects" (Wray, 1983, p. 467). Regional policy has fostered branch plants
which were not conducive to the economic growth of the depressed areas.
One of the most serious consequences of this biased forms of economic
development has been its effect on industrial relations: the high rate of
unionization in depressed areas.
But the policy has worked. (Moore and Rhode, 1976; McKay, 1979;
Aschcroft and Taylor, 1979). Several studies report that the policy was
directly responsible for the diversion of around 200,000 jobs to the
assisted areas. It appears that the problem did not lie in goals or
objectives of policy but in tools and measures. The problem seems to have
come from the process of policy implementation.
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The British government stressed the economic rationale for regional
policy. But, with regards to tools or measures, Britain did not remain
truthful to its economic rationale. The assisted areas were not desig-
nated according to their development potential. The financial aid was not
concentrated on a few areas. The assistance system did not take into
account of the specific locational conditions of each region. Broad-
banding and blanket approach have been the main weakness in 3ritain regio-
nal policy.
Regional policy in the U.S. received similar criticisms in that the
worst-first strategy provided a focus at the expense of efficiency and
that EDA has been forced to spread its fund for investment in public works
widely. Considering the fact that regional agencies in the U.S. have
worked mainly for widely dispersed underdeveloped (rural) areas and that
they had to function within certain limitations such as restraints on
plant piracy and political pork-barrel, it appears that those agencies
have been truthful to economic conditions. Public expenditures has been
used to eliminate barriers to the mobility of both labor and capital. But
one thing which is noticeable is that main focus has been put on those
barriers to the mobility of capital rather than to the mobility if labor.
If those agencies had put more emphasis on human resources development,
they would have left nothing to be desired. In the U.S., implicit policy
has got more public concern than explicit one.
British regional policy began to wither away from the mid-1970s.
The government lost its confidence in economic rationale of regional
policy. Regional policy began to be replaced by sectoral policy. Main
reason for this was that government intended to facilitate economic growth
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through regenerating industrial structure and improving efficiency. With
regards to this new emphasis on sectoral policy, the U.S. and the U.K.
showed similarity in their approach to industrial policy. Under the
Carter administration, "industrial policy eclipsed regional policy"
(Wilmoth, 1984, p. 230). For example, 'A National Agenda for the Eighties
(1981)' wanted the 'divisiveness and polarization' of redistributive
regional policy replaced by a 'consensus and cohesion' over
reindustrialization policy focused on production (Wilmoth, 1984, p. 249).
As the U.K. has reduced expenditure on regional policy in order to
regenerate industrial structure, President Reagan proposed to eliminate
most of federal support for regional policy on behalf of economic
recovery.
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CHAPTER FIVE BACKNOTES
1. The Secretary of State for Industry, Sir Keith Joseph. "Government
announces more selective regional policy," Trade and Industry, 20 July
1979, p. 99.
2. Normal movement without policy was expected 10-15 per annum. quoted
from Hoare (1983). The Location of Industry in Britain (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press) p. 91.
3. Most literatures on British regional policy classify the period, 1964-
1970, as that of strong regional policy. McCallum (1979) classified
the history of British regional policy as follows:
1. Foundations: from the Great Depression to 1947;
2. Consolidation and Gradual change: 1947 to 1964;
3. The Boom in Regional Policy: 1964-1970;
4. The Unsuccessful Counter - Revolution: 1970-1974;
5. An Age of Uncertainty: the Rise and Fall of Regional Policy,
1974-1978. (McCallum, 1979, pp. 3-39).
4. "Books such as Bogue's Structure of the Metropolitan Community. Duncan
and Scott's Metropolis and Region, and Perloff's Regions, Resources
and Economic Growth^ among others, highlighted the regional character
of economic growth, particularly with regard to the differentiation of
the developed and depressed portions of the country." (ACIR, 1972, p.
5. "The Trade Act of 1974 authorizes EDA to provide adjustment assistance
to communities or certified eligible firms that have been adversely
affected by foreign imports" (EDA, 1982, p. 8).
6. "Nearly one half of the EDDs [Economic Development Districts] are
found in the Southeastern States, an area which until recent years
could indeed be classified as a 'problem area'" And "this region had
by far the largest percentage of its counties contained in designated
and operating EDDs (58%)" (Martin, 1978, p. 2).
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
This thesis is an analysis and evaluation of regional policy in the
United States and in the United Kingdom. The main objective of this
thesis was to suggest an answer to the question: how differences in the
structure of the country, in the country size and in the specific phase of
national development could (would) produce different types of regional
policies in different times.
Regional policies in both countries were described according to the
specific phases in policy formulation process. Regional disparities,
problems and problem regions were compared. This thesis has also
identified policy goals, strategies and tools and compared them between
two countries.
Broad comparison of population movement between two countries shows
that there was not a big difference in their population movement. Decen-
tralization of metropolitan economic activity can be found in each
country. The remote rural areas became more attractive places for living.
But the degree of movement towards those areas were greater in the U.S.
than in the U.K. Recent recession in the U.K. has weakened this movement,
thereby strengthening traditional north-south shift. During the course of
turnaround in population movement between non-metropolitan and
metropolitan, the South in the U.S. began to grow more rapidly.
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Overall interregional disparities in the U.S. has been greater than
those in the UK. Regional disparity in terms of unemployment rate in the
UK has been decreased. Interregional migration, regional policy and
decentralization process worked for this convergence. Convergence in
income trends in the U.S. has been the combined results of relative
decline in the North and the steady increase in the South. Several
factors, except regional policy, also played for this trend as they did in
the UK. But the impact of implicit policy on the rise of the South has
been the subject of controversy.
The UK provided the best example of depressed industrial regions.
Problem regions in the UK showed structural weakness. The South in the
U.S. has been problem region. The problem was associated with retarded
urbanization. Some of the Northeast industrial areas began to undergo
large scale of migration of industries. But geographical size of each
region resists broad - banding of its problems. There have been certain
clusters of counties which are apt to have structural problems.
There was a striking difference in the perception and interpretation
of regional problems between the two countries. This difference may have
come largely from the differences in government system and geographical
size. The U.K. which did not have marked regional disparities could
easily adopt regional policies using existing government structures and
employing centralized power. Economic rationale has been the main motives
for regional policy in the UK. And it was confirmed by successive
national economic plans. Regional policy was implemented in relation to
industrial policy. It was assumed that fuller utilization of labor in the
problem regions could make contribution to national growth. Rather than
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relying on government control, the U.S. believed that regional problems
could be solved by market forces. And several factors have played against
the adoption of regional policy in the U.S. They are: cultural and
philosophical constraints on federal intervention, diversity in spatial
development and localism. The early administration in the USDA emphasized
people - oriented policy.
The U.K. employed direct control on location decisions of private
sector. Financial subsidies have been one of the important tools in
industrial policy, which was highly interrelated with regional policy.
The U.S. avoided using controls and relied on public works in order to
eliminate barriers to the mobility of both labor and capital. However,
subsidies which are similar to those in Britain are also available for
mobile industries in the U.S. And they are under the control of states
and local municipalities. Those subsidies are actually incurring cost to
the federal government.
British regional policy has been criticized in that it has weakened
competitiveness of private firms: financial incentives produced
inefficient and non-competitive firms in the assisted areas. Direct
control on development in the South East has put this region in relatively
poor status in comparison with other regions in Western Europe. British
government stressed the economic rationale of regional policy. But, with
regards to tools or measures, Britain did not remain truthful to its
economic rationale. The assistance system did not take into account of
the specific locational conditions of each region.
Regional policy in the U.S. received similar criticisms in that the
'worst first' strategy provided a focus at the expense of efficiency and
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that EDA has dispersed its funds for public works. But regional agencies
in the U.S. had to function within certain limitations such as restraints
on plant piracy and political pork-barrel. Thus both countries used
blanket approach in solving regional problems. In the U.K., securing
efficiency has been a major problem in implementing those measures. In
the U.S., problems did not lie in explicit policy but in implicit policy.
Recognition of geographic impact of government policies may be a
prerequisite to the efficient planning in any country.
In both countries, regional policy began to wither away. The main
causes of this trend are similar in both countries. The two countries
wanted to put more emphasis on national economic growth rather than
redistributive regional policy. It appears that effective regional policy
is dependent upon thriving national economy. (Maclennen and Parr, 1979, p.
2; Miernyk, 1982, ch. 5).
In selecting several case studies for 'industrial development plan-
ning,' Smith (1981) expressed that "Britain illustrates an experience
typical of that of the advanced capitalist world, but with its own dis-
tinctive features" (p. 423). Unemployment problems in old industrial
regions can be more easily identified in advanced capitalist countries.
From the beginning of the policy, British literatures stressed the need to
link equity with efficiency. Confronted with such criticisms that poli-
cies had weakened competitiveness, regional policies became more selec-
tive. And regional policies came to be in conflict with sectoral poli-
cies. In addition to these conflicts, British experience in regional
policy shows more conflicts among several strategies: place prosperity
versus people prosperity, distress versus development potential, and con-
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centration versus diffusion. These findings may represent the typical
problems in any advanced capitalist country which has regional problems.
In other words, these findings lead to the conclusion that problems in the
field of regional policy in advanced capitalist countries may be those of
British regional policy. Fifty years of experience in regional policy may
testify to this fact.
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Abstract
REGIONAL POLICY IN TIE UNITED STATES
AND Hi THE UNITED KINGDOM:
COMPARATIVE STUDY
This thesis is an analysis and evaluation of regional policy in the
United States and in the United Kingdom. The main objective of this
thesis was to suggest an answer to the question: how differences in the
structure of country, in the country size and in the specific phase of
national development could (would) produce different types of regional
policies in different times.
Regional policies in both countries '..-ere described according to the
specific phases in policy formulation process. Regional disparities,
problems and problem regions were compared. This thesis has also identi-
fied policy goals, strategies and tools and compared them between two
countries.
Overall interregional disparities in the U.S has been greater than
those in the UK. Regional disparity in terms of unemployment rate in the
UK has been decreased. Interregional migration, regional policy and
decentralization process worked for this convergence. Recent recession in
the UK has worked against this trend. The South is still growing at the
expense of others.
Convergence in income trends in the U.S. has been the combined
results of relative decline in the North and the steady increase in the
South. Several factors except regional policy also played for this trend
as they did in the UK.
The UK provided the best example of depressed industrial regions.
Problem regions in the UK showed structural weakness. The South in the
U.S. has been problem region. The problem was associated with retarded
urbanization. Some of the :!orth East industrial areas began to undergo
large scale of migration of industries. But geographical size of each
region resists broad - banding of its problems. There have been certain
clusters of counties which are apt to have structural problems.
There existed a narked difference in the perception and interpreta-
tion of regional problems between two countries. Comparison of the Barlow
Report with the report, 'The People Left Behind' verified this fact.
Economic rationale has been the main motives for regional policy in the
UK. And it was confirmed by successive national economic plans in the IE,
Regional policy was implemented in relation to industrial policy. It was
assumed that fuller utilization of labor in the problem regions could make
contribution to national growth. But several factors have played against
the adoption of regional policy in the U.S. They are: cultural and
philosophical constraints on intervention, diversity in spatial develop-
ment, and localism. The early administration in the USDA emphasized
people - oriented policy.
British regional policy has been criticized in that it has weakened
competitiveness of private firms: financial incentives produced ineffi-
cient and non-competitive firms in the distressed areas. Direct control
on development in the South East lias put this region in relatively poor
status in comparison with other regions in Uestern Europe.
Regional policy in the U.S. received similar criticisms in that
'worst first' strategy provided a focus at the expense of efficiency and
that EDA has been forced to spread its fund for public works, 'Jut region-
al agencies in the U.S. had to function within certain limitations such as
'
restraints on plant piracy and political pork-barrel.
British government stressed the economic rationale of regional
policy. But, with regards to tools or measures, Dritain did not remain
truthful to its economic rationale. The assistance system did not take
into account of the specific locational conditions of each region.
Regional agencies in the U.S. have worked for widely dispersed under-
developed areas. Public expenditures have been used to eliminate barriers
to the mobility of both labor and capital. Cut main focus has been put on
those barriers to the nobility of capital rather than to the mobility of
labor.
In Britain, the main problem was how to implement policies without
a loss in efficiency. In the U.S. the problem did not come from explicit
policy but from implicit policy.
In both countries, regional policy began to wither away. Similar
reasons for this shift have been suggested: both two countries wanted to
facilitate national economic growth rather than to redistribute it. It
appears that effective regional policy is dependent upon thriving national
economy.
